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ABSTRACT 
The International Relations (IR) literature has been dominated by studies on great 
powers, often neglecting the role of small states. Moreover, the accounts on small states 
have generally overlooked the role of geography. This thesis proposes an analytical 
framework to observe the role of geography by observing the impact of Multinational 
Transboundary Infrastructures (MTIs) on the relational power of small states. The 
framework is then applied to the case study of Laos observing the impact of two 
selected MTIs – the Xayaburi dam and the Boten-Vientiane high-speed railway – on 
Laos’s relational power with respect to Vietnam and China.  
Data has been collected through a set of 48 semi-structured qualitative elite interviews 
mainly carried out during a period of fieldwork in Laos in 2015. The data generated by 
the interviews, triangulated with other primary and secondary sources, enabled a 
process tracing analysis of the two negotiation processes on the selected MTIs. 
The findings show that the two observed MTIs positively affected the relational power 
of Laos despite the asymmetry that shapes its bilateral relationships with both Vietnam 
and China in terms of capabilities. The case study therefore indicates that a central 
geographic position could reduce asymmetries of power and that relational power 
manifest a greater explanatory capacity than power-as-capabilities.  
This thesis contributes to knowledge adding empirical material on the diplomatic 
negotiation on the Xayaburi dam; on the Boten–Vientiane high-speed railway; on 
Laos’s international relations with Vietnam and China; and on China’s High-Speed 
Railway Diplomacy. The thesis contributes also to the theoretical literature by 
identifying a geographic gap in small states studies. Analytically, the thesis contributes 
developing the concept of MTIs and an original analytical framework to study relational 
power. Finally, methodologically the thesis provides new insights on how to gain access 
to elites in Laos.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: THE RESEARCH BACKGROUND, APPROACH 
AND STRUCTURE 
For so long the United States has been so 
big, so powerful that we felt that we could 
afford not to know about a country like 
Laos. But the world has shrunk, it’s 
interconnected – Barack Obama 20161 
 
1.1 The research background, rationale and goals 
1.1.1 Why Laos? 
Laos is often perceived as a small, dependent, powerless, exotic country, worthy of an 
adventurous holiday at best. By Barack Obama’s own admission, made during the first 
visit in history of a sitting United States president to Laos,2 which took place in 2016,3 
the American superpower had formerly perceived Laos to be so irrelevant that it did not 
even judge it useful to gain knowledge about the poor, landlocked Southeast Asian 
nation. Nonetheless, the embryonic first steps of this research arose from precisely such 
a perception, as the author was inevitably embedded in a similar mindset: the original 
idea, when starting to develop a PhD research proposal, was to study China’s role (and 
influence) in the Mekong Region, a region in which China is seen by many as having 
replaced old Western colonial powers and become a dominant actor (Kurlantzick 2007). 
The increasing relevance of the Mekong Region for Beijing, both economic – China 
being the first commercial partner for Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam, as 
well as the first investor for Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar – and political, led it to 
inaugurate in 2016 the Lancang–Mekong Cooperation (LMC) framework, to 
complement its wider relations with Southeast Asian countries (China Daily 2016). 
                                                          
1 The Obama White House (2016). 
2 This thesis uses interchangeably the names Laos and Lao PDR (Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic) when referring to the country and uses Lao as the adjective. 
3 Obama visited Laos on the occasion of the ASEAN Summits held 6th–8th September 2016. 
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Figure 1.1 – Laos: the hearth of the Mekong Region 
 
Source: Operation World 
However, one fact emerged sharply from an initial literature review: despite Laos’s 
central strategic position within the region (Figure 1.1), academic research had paid 
scant and sporadic attention to it, especially to its contemporary foreign affairs (among 
the very few exceptions are Abuza 2003; Pholsena and Banomyong 2006; and Rehbein 
2007). This lack of attention is further intensified by the limited extent of the research 
among Lao scholars (and students), too, on the country’s international relations. As a 
professor of International Relations at the National University of Laos pointed out, 
“when it comes to selecting a dissertation topic, our students tend to avoid Laos, 
preferring instead different case studies such as the Tibet issue, the India–China 
relationship or the South China Sea” (Interview 5-2015). 
In particular, looking at one of China’s key tools for exerting its influence – the 
development of infrastructural projects (Osborne 2006) – Laos appeared to hold much 
greater importance than is commonly considered, and to deserve more in-depth analysis. 
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From these initial considerations, the idea grew of turning the traditional perspective on 
its head and focusing on the small and previously neglected Laos. In fact, even though 
Laos is “so small” and “there are probably much more interesting issues on which to 
build PhD research”, as a Chinese scholar in Kunming bluntly put it over a coffee, a 
first-glance observation of the two most important negotiations related to infrastructure 
projects with an international dimension – the Xayaburi dam on the Mekong 
mainstream and the high-speed railway planned to link Kunming to Vientiane – 
suggested that, despite the asymmetry in material power, Laos was seemingly managing 
to pursue its interests: in the first case, proceeding with the construction despite 
Vietnam’s opposition, and in the second case stubbornly halting and delaying China’s 
plans. This observation prompted the initial intuition that then became a research 
question: how was that possible? Therefore, to understand first of all whether or not 
such a first-glance observation was correct and, if so, how this was possible in a context 
of clear power asymmetry, it appeared worth the effort of sailing off on a PhD 
adventure in order to gain a much deeper and more detailed understanding of the 
complex issues going on in the country and in the region. This is to pre-emptively 
answer the reader’s most natural question, “Why Laos?” – the recurrent question the 
author has had to tackle over the last few years as the constant, unavoidable first 
subquestion that followed the icebreaker “What’s your PhD about?”.  
The intuition pointed out above led to the main question of this research: what is the 
impact of multinational transboundary infrastructures (MTIs) on Laos’s relational 
power? In other words, can MTIs be a source of leverage and an equilibrising factor in 
asymmetric relationships, or are they just another tool of influence for bigger states? An 
answer to this question has therefore been sought in the research, which considers the 
impact of two specific MTIs on Laos’s relational power within specific domains and 
scopes. In the first case the question was as follows: what is the impact of the Xayaburi 
17 
dam MTI on Laos’s relational power with respect to Vietnam (the domain) and within 
the scope of the management of the Mekong River? In the second case the question was 
as follows: what is the impact of the Boten-Vientiane high-speed railway MTI on 
Laos’s relational power with respect to China (the domain) and within the scope of 
transport connectivity in the broader China–Southeast Asia context? Through these 
enquiries the answer to a subsequent question was sought: does a central geographic 
position increase or reduce the asymmetry of a relationship? In other words, is being 
centrally located an advantage or a disadvantage for a small state in an asymmetric 
relationship?  
This chapter presents the key themes necessary to understand the context in which the 
thesis is framed. Having addressed the reasons for choosing a case study focused on 
Laos, it will begin by clarifying the other constitutive components of the research’s title: 
small states, relational power and multinational transboundary infrastructures (MTIs). In 
the process, it will be highlighted why the research question was formulated around the 
ideas of smallness and relational power and why MTIs4 were conceived as the 
independent variable and used to measure their impact on Laos’s relational power in 
two specific processes of negotiation and bilateral relationships. The subsequent 
sections will lay out the research design, approach and methods and the reasons for the 
selection of the two MTIs used in the analysis. Finally, the last section will provide an 
account of the structure of the thesis, helping the reader to navigate its different 
sections. 
1.1.2 Why look at Laos through the lens of small states and relational power? 
The scant consideration of Laos’s foreign affairs among International Relations (IR) 
scholars is anything but exceptional. Indeed, as will be discussed in depth in the next 
chapter, IR has traditionally dedicated very little energy to the study of small (less 
                                                          
4 Chapter 3 defines MTIs as “Directly or indirectly transboundary physical infrastructures built 
using also foreign resources”.  
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powerful) polities5 and this has much to do with the roots of the discipline, which are 
profoundly intertwined with a historical context populated by few great powers, such as 
the world after World War I (WWI). Thanks to the dominant interpretation of power-as-
capabilities, countries with fewer resources have been generally “sacrificed” by IR 
scholars, either in terms of the quantity of publications dedicated to them or in terms of 
the degree of agency that has been attributed to this category of states. 
Systemic/structural approaches have in fact been by far the most utilised, and, as 
explained in chapter 2, this has led to neglect of small states’ agency, as well as neglect 
of the role of the geographic variable and thus the relevance of their geographic 
position. In this context, small states have often been a residual category (Neumann and 
Gstöhl 2004) and viewed more as battlegrounds in which great powers can engage in 
manoeuvres to increase their influence and pursue their interests. Such tendencies, 
combined with the absence of studies on the role of geography for small states, 
elucidate why Laos has been overlooked so far. Taking as the starting point the 
assumption that, when looking at small states, geography does not matter, and only 
capabilities do, Laos might well consequently be ignored. In terms of resources, Laos’s 
smallness is undeniable, since Laos, in spite of having a relatively large territory,6 is 
demographically, economically and militarily smaller. It holds, in fact, a population of 
not quite 7 million, an exception in a region that is on average highly populated: even 
excluding China, the other four countries of the Mekong Region (Cambodia, Myanmar, 
Thailand and Vietnam) in 2016 had over 230 million people between them (only 
Cambodia had fewer than 50 million). A similar asymmetry can be seen looking at 
                                                          
5 The rationale behind the choice of the term “small states” is addressed in the next chapter. 
6 At 236,800 km2, Laos is the 84th country in the world by size, only 6,000 km2 smaller than the 
United Kingdom. The source of the data provided in this section is the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators database, which can be accessed at 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators. 
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gross domestic product (GDP): Laos’s GDP stands at around 16 billion US dollars,7 just 
below Cambodia’s (20 billion dollars), but far below Myanmar’s (67 billion dollars), 
Vietnam’s (202 billion dollars) and Thailand’s (406 billion dollars). Consequently, its 
military capabilities are also affected by the country’s dimensions, and Laos clearly lags 
behind its peers in military terms: between 2004 and 2013, Laos’s military expenditure 
never exceeded 26 million dollars per year, an amount very much smaller than the 
resources invested by its three big neighbours, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam 
(respectively, 3.7, 5.7 and 4.5 billion dollars in 2015), but also lower than the 
expenditure of Cambodia, which from 2010 to 2016 spent on average 274 million 
dollars per year.8 Finally, it must be noted that Laos’s smallness is also evident in how it 
is perceived; without doubt, the word “small” best fits the collective imaginary, in and 
outside Laos, in which the country is often labelled as “Tiny Laos” (Kislenko 2004; 
Kurlantzick 2002; Otto 2016; Laotian Times 2016). 
In terms of material power and capabilities, in fact, Laos is undoubtedly smaller when 
analysed in relation to both China and Vietnam, the countries in relation to which the 
impact of the MTIs analysed in this research is studied.9 However, when this picture of 
clear power asymmetry was taken together with the progress of negotiations on the two 
international infrastructures mentioned above, the Xayaburi dam and the Boten–
Vientiane high-speed railway, a big divide between capabilities and outcomes seemed to 
emerge. Therefore, in order to understand whether such a divide is consistent and how it 
originated, this research looks at power in relational terms, according to the Dahlian 
notion, and uses it as the dependent variable, following Baldwin’s (2013) suggestion. 
Dahl, in fact, criticising the power-as-capabilities approach on the basis that too often in 
                                                          
7 Hereinafter, unless otherwise specified, references to amounts of financial resources should be 
assumed to be in US dollars. 
8 The source of the military statistics is the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI). The data can be accessed here: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Milex-
constant-2015-USD.pdf. 
9 The debate around the definition of small states is discussed in chapter 2. 
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history superiority in assets has not been reflected in effective power, focuses instead on 
relational power, intended as “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do 
something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl 1957: 202–203). Even in the case of a 
leading global power such as China, as noted by Goh (2016), there is no clear evidence 
of the latter’s ability to use its capabilities to obtain its goals in spite of other actors’ 
preferences. Answering the research question of this thesis, therefore, will also shed 
new light on whether factors beyond static material power (capabilities) can indeed 
influence the effective power of states in their dynamic relationships, and how. 
Adopting this approach, the intuition gained from observing how the negotiations on the 
Xayaburi dam and the Kunming–Vientiane railway projects, with Vietnam and China 
respectively, were developing enabled the construction of the MTI independent variable 
and the MTIs–relational power analytical framework proposed in chapter 3. The next 
section aims to equip the reader with the background knowledge essential to 
understanding the analysis of the two selected MTIs described in chapters 5 and 6, 
through a succinct overview of the international dynamics (political and economic) that 
concern contemporary Laos. 
1.1.3 Why a multinational and transboundary variable (MTIs) to observe 
Laos’s relational power? 
Multinational and transboundary have been marginal terms for Laos in the aftermath of 
the Second Indochina War and the establishment, on 2nd December 1975, of the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) under the rule of the Lao People’s 
Revolutionary Party (LPRP). For the next 15 years, the country remained almost 
completely secluded: politically and economically highly isolated, and physically 
disconnected. However, this context started to change in the late 1980s with the end of 
the Cold War, which produced a normalisation of international relations in the region, 
which in turn led to the end of the multiple bilateral and multilateral conflicts propelled 
by the Third Indochina War in 1992. This regional systemic transition was also coupled 
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with a new economic direction taken by the communist Lao leadership, with the 
introduction in 1987 of the New Economic Mechanism (from the Lao word 
Chintanakanmai, which means “new thinking”), which provided the basis for economic 
liberalisation (Vixathep 2014) and for the approval of a liberal law on foreign 
investment (Lintner 2016). The law, which allowed foreign actors to own 100% of the 
investment from the beginning, was then revised in 1994, 2004 and 2009 further 
liberalising FDI in the country granting to the investors increasing incentives and fiscal 
exemptions as well as progressively extending the maximum duration of the investment 
(Phommahaxay 2013). In its effort to attract foreign investors, Laos moreover shortened 
the procedures for opening a new business in the country, allowed foreign actors to 
access domestic finance and, with some limitations, to own the land (general 
(Kyophilavong et al. 2017). Such neoliberal process encompassed reforms pertaining to 
prices, taxation and finance, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) privatization, banking, 
resulting in a broader “open door policy” respect to trade, investments and international 
cooperation in general (Ibid.). The 1990s were therefore a decade of physical and 
diplomatic opening up and integration: in 1989, the first tourist visas since 1975 were 
issued; in 1992, diplomatic relations were established with the United States; in 1994, 
the first historic Thai–Lao Friendship Bridge over the Mekong – the first and most 
important MTI of the new era, physically, economically and symbolically – was 
inaugurated, marking a turning point in a traditionally tense bilateral relationship that 
had erupted in a short, intense war only six years before; and in 1997, Laos joined the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). As a result, flows of people, goods 
and capital could flourish, increasing the relevance of the terms multinational and 
transboundary for the country. International merchandise trade steadily grew (apart 
from the biennium 1997–1998, which was affected by the 1997 Asian financial crisis), 
moving from representing 31% of Laos’s GDP in 1990 to the 49% registered in 2016. 
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The increase, however, is best seen by looking at the data in absolute terms: the sum of 
exports and imports in 1990, in fact, was just 312.5 million dollars, while in 2016 the 
value exceeded 10.8 billion dollars. Foreign direct investment (FDI), however, displays 
in an even more crystal-clear fashion the transformation that occurred in the country, 
skyrocketing from a mere 6 million dollars in 1990 to over 1 billion dollars in 2016.10 
The same goes for the data on official development assistance (ODA), which increased 
from 149 million dollars in 1990 to an average of about 400 million dollars in the last 
decade (UNESCAP Statistical Online Database). Less politically relevant, but equally 
useful in gaining a vivid image of the country’s reality, are the data on tourism: in 1995 
(the first year for which a statistic is available), only 60,000 tourists visited Laos, then 
numbers increased until they passed the 1 million threshold in 2007 and reached 3.1 
million in 2014 (UNESCAP Statistical Online Database). 
Moreover, after disaggregating the data and breaking them down by partner country, it 
emerges clearly how Laos’s landlocked position in the middle of the Mekong Region 
(the only country bordering all the others) and scarce connections with regional and 
global value chains mean that the country is strongly embedded in its neighbourhood. 
Beginning with trade, it can be seen how the country’s three biggest neighbours (China, 
Thailand and Vietnam) dominate the scene, accounting in 2016 for 36.6% of Laos’s 
exports (17.7% to Thailand, 12.6% to China and 6.3% to Vietnam) and for 51.4% of its 
imports (36.7% from Thailand, 9.4% from China and 5.3% from Vietnam). Although 
the three countries together do not cover percentages close to 100%, the data show, 
however, that no other country accounts for a share higher than 1.6% (India attracts 
1.6% of exports, and 1.2% of imports originate from South Korea) (EIU 2017), while 
the European Union as a whole does not exceed 1.19% of imports and 5.25% of exports 
                                                          
10 Author’s elaboration of statistics retrieved from the World Bank country profile of Laos, last 
accessed June 2017. Available at 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/Views/Reports/ReportWidgetCustom.aspx?Report_Name=C
ountryProfile&Id=b450fd57&tbar=y&dd=y&inf=n&zm=n&country=LAO. 
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(Ministry of Planning and Investment of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 2016). 
Moving on to FDI, the chart below (Figure 1.2) demonstrates how in the period 1989–
2014 China, Thailand and Vietnam were by far the top three investors, accounting for 
81.3% of the total flow of investments that reached Laos. 
Figure 1.2 – Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to Laos 1989-2014 (by country, %) 
 
Source: www.investlaos.gov.la 
 
At first glance, the figure covering the source of ODA flows displays a different picture, 
being still dominated by Western and developed countries. In fact, according to the data 
provided by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in 
2015 Japan ranked as Laos’s primary donor, with around 105 million dollars, followed 
by South Korea (86 million dollars) and Australia (36 million dollars). However, as 
claimed by a Chinese diplomat and by Chinese media, China is indeed Laos’s top 
foreign donor (Interview 47-2015; Xinhua 2017). In fact, a recent report by the 
Overseas Development Institute in London shows that by looking at flows of capital 
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beyond ODA (BOFs)11, it can be seen that between 2010 and 2012 China accounted for 
more than 70% of the BOFs to Laos (Prizzon et al. 2016). Moreover, despite not being 
included in the OECD’s data (because they are not part of the organisation’s 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC)), both Vietnam and Thailand provide 
development assistance and are the two most important emerging donors to Laos 
(Shanghai Institutes for International Affairs 2016; Laporte 2017). Finally, the China–
Thailand–Vietnam trio is also leading with regard to tourist flows: 3.7 million of the 
total 4.3 million tourists who visited Laos in 2015 came from Thailand (51.6%), 
Vietnam (24.2%) and China (9.9%) (Bank of the Lao PDR 2016). 
Therefore, the regional integration process that commenced at the end of the Cold War 
realised, for Laos, the famous formula proposed by the then Thai prime minister, 
Chatichai Choonhavan, who aimed to turn the Indochinese region “from a battlefield 
into a marketplace” by integrating, after decades of conflict, the developed and capitalist 
part of Southeast Asia with the socialist and less developed countries (Erlanger 1989). 
This provided Laos with the “peace dividends” of the new international context, 
allowing it to rapidly increase its interdependence with neighbouring countries and 
explore the opportunity to turn itself from a buffer zone into a crossroads (Jerndal and 
Rigg 1999; Evans 2002; Pholsena and Banomyong 2006), therefore making 
multinational and transboundary projects much more likely and relevant. Today’s Laos, 
in fact, besides being ever more involved in multilateral partnerships (within ASEAN in 
the first place), at the bilateral level enjoys good ties, both economically and 
diplomatically, with all the five countries immediately behind its borders, especially 
with its three crucial (as seen above) neighbouring partners. Stressing the good relations 
                                                          
11 Flows of capital mobilised for development not included in the ODA category. These flows 
can be both concessional and non-concessional and originate from private sources (e.g. private 
grants, foreign direct investment (FDI)) as well from official sources (such as export credits 
provided by Export Credit Agencies (ECAs)). More information can be found on the OECD 
webpage dedicated to BOFs, which can be accessed here: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/beyond-oda.htm.  
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with these three countries is highly relevant to this research since China and Vietnam 
constitute the domains in which the relational power analysis of the two selected MTIs 
is conducted, and Thailand, while not being a domain, is still relevant in one of the two 
case studies (the Xayaburi dam), being the source of the foreign investment and 
therefore of the multinational nature of the infrastructure. It is also important because 
while Vietnam has “always” been there, since the revolutionary war and the inception of 
the communist regime – the two countries share a strong “special relationship” based on 
the 1977 Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation and shaped by close linkages between 
the two leading communist parties and the two leaderships (Pholsena and Banomyong 
2006) – bilateral relations with China and Thailand were normalised only between the 
end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, coinciding with the new peaceful era 
and the end of the conflict in Cambodia that involved all the regional states. Diplomatic 
bilateral relations with China were resumed in mid-1988 after an interruption of more 
than eight years (Shanghai Institutes of International Affairs 2016). In parallel, after the 
border war with Thailand in 1987–1988, there were strong improvements, with high-
level state visits paid from 1989, and the establishment of a joint cooperation committee 
in 1991 pointed to a new era of cooperation, despite the border dispute having yet to be 
fully solved (John 1998). Since then, relations with Beijing and Bangkok have 
improved constantly: in the 1990s, Thailand became a crucial foreign investor, followed 
in the next decade by a skyrocketing flow of capital from China, as a consequence of 
the latter’s “Going Out” strategy (Tan 2015). Subsequently, Sino–Lao relations rose to a 
new high after a bilateral cooperation agreement was signed in 2000 (following China’s 
assistance during the Asian financial crisis) and a “comprehensive strategic partnership” 
was established in 2009 (Thayer 2013). Therefore, China became, alongside Vietnam, 
the most important political partner for Laos. In fact, while inundating Laos with 
financial resources (especially in mining and hydropower investments), China also 
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developed a prominent role in the security sector and contributed military supplies, 
security assistance and cooperation that matched the economic links (Australian 
Government 2015; Leebuapao and Voladet 2013). Three recent remarkable events point 
to the excellent relations between Beijing and Vientiane, as well as to the relevance of 
Laos for China’s foreign policy. In 2011, for the first time in history, a Chinese 
university inaugurated a physical campus abroad: the Vientiane campus of Soochow 
University (Brown 2016). In 2015, 31 billion dollars of Chinese investment in an 
economic zone at the border with Laos was announced (Reuters 2015), and in the same 
year Laos launched its first communication satellite (LaoSat1), funded by Chinese 
investment of 258 million dollars (de Selding 2015). 
Addressing the China–Laos–Vietnam diplomatic triangle – and the alleged competition 
between Hanoi and Beijing for influence over Laos – goes beyond the scope of this 
research. Yet the facts summarised above are necessary background knowledge for a 
full picture of the context in which the two infrastructures analysed by this thesis are 
placed and negotiated. To summarise, and to answer the question posed in the title of 
this section (“Why a multinational and transboundary variable (MTIs) to observe Laos’s 
relational power?”), the new geopolitical context led Laos and its neighbours to develop 
specific policies to take advantage of such a configuration. For Laos, it meant in 
particular developing the country and addressing its structural problems, starting by 
supporting economic growth and reducing the country’s isolation through neoliberal 
policies such as those related to FDI detailed above. The Government of Laos (GoL) 
saw in the new context a chance to exploit the most important assets with which the 
country is endowed – abundant water resources, combined with an advantageous 
morphology that has high hydropower production potential, and a central position in a 
region under rapid integration – through which it could transform Laos, both as the 
“battery of Southeast Asia” and as a “land-linked” country. These two key policies, in 
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which the two MTIs studied in this research are embedded and which are analysed in 
chapters 5 and 6 respectively, were based on the expectation that public and private 
foreign investments could be secured and on the possibility of concretely – stone by 
stone – reconstructing the country. In other words, as will be seen in chapter 5 and 6, 
the peace dividends brought to Laos’s “MTIs fruits”. In fact, both the Xayaburi dam on 
the Mekong mainstream and the plan of linking Laos to China via a railway network 
(though not at first a high-speed one) date back several decades: the Xayaburi dam was 
included in the Mekong Committee’s Indicative Basin Plan, put together in 1970 
(Geheb et al. 2015), while the railway has its roots in the French colonial period, when 
it was dreamed of as a tool for the country’s mise en valeur (Stuart-Fox 1995; Tan 
2015). A plastic symbol of the historical change that took place in the region can be 
found in the fact that the first plan to link Southeast Asia to Southern China with a 
railway was discussed at the ASEAN level two years before Laos joined the 
organisation (Fau 2016). Now, the Chinese, who, when diplomatic relations deteriorated 
at the end of the 1970s, left Laos, interrupting road construction projects and 
abandoning a country deemed geostrategically important as a “land bridge” (Thayer 
2013), have their work shoes on the ground there once more. 
Lao leaders, paraphrasing Khanna (2016), therefore see in MTIs the only way out for a 
landlocked small state that is a prisoner of geography, such as their own. However, if 
Laos’s intentions are understandable and clear, without deeper research it is challenging 
to establish the impact of MTIs on its relational power with regard to neighbouring 
states that are by far more powerful in terms of capabilities (hereinafter, any reference 
to a more powerful state must be interpreted to indicate a higher level of capabilities, i.e. 
absolute power). Can MTIs be a source of leverage and an equilibrising factor in its 
international relationships, or are they just another tool of influence in its bigger 
neighbours’ hands? 
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1.2 Selection of cases, methodology and approach 
1.2.1 Selection of cases 
To answer this question, two MTIs that involved Laos and more powerful actors were 
selected. Consequently, the objective of the research is to address the impact in 
relational power terms of the selected MTIs in the domain of the specific bilateral 
relationships with the other states involved and over a specific scope (i.e. the particular 
sector/realm in which the MTI is inserted (e.g. transport connectivity). 
The choice, already anticipated, of the Xayaburi dam in the Mekong mainstream and of 
the high-speed railway from Boten to Vientiane, which will cross Laos and connect it to 
China and Thailand (and therefore also connect these two countries), does not rest 
merely on the initial intuition that these large projects (the largest infrastructure 
investments in Laos12) have shown counter-intuitive outcomes. The two MTIs were 
therefore selected because they are the two most internationally relevant MTI projects 
involving Laos, as demonstrated by their inclusion in the international relations 
assessment and outlook section of several successive editions of the Laos quarterly 
country reports edited by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).13 In the “Laos Country 
Report 3rd Quarter 2013”, for example, the following is reported: 
Laos is also focusing on closer links among the so 
called CLMV group of poorer, later entrants to 
ASEAN – namely Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and 
Vietnam. These links, which include bilateral trade, 
are set to develop at a healthy clip, although 
differences over the proposed use of regional 
hydropower resources could cause tensions. The 
Lao government has been unusually strident in its 
support for the controversial Xayaburi dam project 
on the lower Mekong river, which neighbouring 
Cambodia and Vietnam oppose. The LPRP has 
                                                          
12 Costing over 6 billion dollars, the railway is the largest project currently under construction in 
the country, while the Xayaburi dam, at over 3.7 billion, is ranked second, together with the 
Hongsa Mine Mouth Power Project. 
13 The Xayaburi dam case was included in the “International Relations” section of the “Country 
Report 4th Quarter 2012” and the high-speed railway in the “Country Report 2nd Quarter 
2013”. 
29 
traditionally taken its foreign-policy cues from the 
ruling Communist Party of Vietnam, but Laos’s 
determination to go ahead with the Xayaburi project 
points to a growing sense of independence amid 
increasing foreign investment and support from 
other allies, notably China and Thailand. (EIU 2013: 
11, emphasis added) 
Also, the “Laos Country Report 2nd Quarter 2013” put the Boten–Vientiane railway at 
the top of the list of “several transport infrastructure projects” intended to increase the 
country’s integration, stating that 
Laos joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 
February 2013, and the government will continue its 
policy of regional and international integration in 
the next two years. Several transport infrastructure 
projects that will improve links with neighbouring 
countries are planned or are under way. These 
include a north–south railway connecting the Lao 
capital, Vientiane, with China’s Yunnan province. 
(EIU 2013b: 11, emphasis added) 
Their international relevance, however, derives also from the fact that these two MTIs 
involve China and Vietnam, who are, as seen above, Laos’s two most important 
partners, as well as two key interests of these two neighbours: transport connectivity in 
the case of China, and water/environmental security in its Delta region in the case of 
Vietnam. 
The international relevance of the Xayaburi dam MTI emerges also from the attention 
the project has received among scholars and analysts, as will be fully discussed in 
chapter 5. One Foreign Policy blog post, written by the renowned professor of 
International Relations Stephen Walt and published on the day of the Xayaburi dam 
groundbreaking ceremony, endorsed the relevancy of the issue by provocatively asking 
in its title “Why aren’t we threatening preventive war against Laos?” (Walt 2012). 
Walt’s argument was that the United States pays too much attention to purely 
hypothetical risks such as the enrichment of uranium in Iran, while serious and tangible 
threats are overlooked, although, as in the Xayaburi case, “many experts believe will 
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permanently harm the ecology of the Mekong Delta and affect the lives and livelihoods 
of millions of people” (ibid.). Moreover, a paper published by the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington underlines the fact that “some 
diplomats and officials in the region have quietly begun to describe the Mekong River 
as the next ‘South China Sea’” (Phuong 2014: 3). 
The Boten–Vientiane high-speed railway MTI, on the other hand, deserves some 
clarification here, since it has been selected in spite of the fact that when this research 
began it was only at the planning phase. Nevertheless, it has been selected for its 
international relevance, already stressed, and because the impenetrable negotiations 
around it have made it challenging and fascinating to explore the project and try to 
understand the causes of the continuous delays, observable as early as 2013 (the year in 
which this thesis was initiated). Another clear indicator of the project’s diplomatic 
relevance is the fact that at the time the fieldwork for this research was conducted, the 
United States embassy in Vientiane had a diplomat whose main duty was monitoring 
the development of this particular infrastructure project (Interview 26-2015). Moreover, 
it appeared to be extremely interesting, not only for the analysis of relational power in 
the China–Laos bilateral domain, but also (as addressed in chapter 6) for its 
implications as the very first example (and test) of a far-reaching Chinese strategy such 
as that of the high-speed railway diplomacy within China’s wider One Belt, One Road 
(OBOR) initiative, considered to be a century-shaping project. 
1.2.2 Methodology and approach 
As with the selection of the two MTI cases, the choice to carry out a within-case study 
is linked to the original inception of the research, described above. However, the 
process of structuring the research design produced, besides a useful, deeper knowledge 
of an often-neglected small state, the awareness that, because of the scarcity of 
secondary English sources to be analysed, together with limitations on the time and 
31 
financial resources available, the only practicable option would have been to focus just 
on Laos instead of adding one or more countries to produce a comparative analysis. A 
cross-case study was also made impossible by the fact that no previous studies looked at 
the impact of MTIs on small states’ relational power, this analytical framework having 
been developed in this thesis for the first time. Moreover, the scarcity of available data 
led to the choice of a methodology that would allow the complex realities under 
scrutiny to be reconstructed, and therefore process tracing and semi-structured 
qualitative elite interviews, to be conducted de visu, were selected as the best strategies 
for achieving the research goals. Chapter 4 will provide a comprehensive illustration of 
the rationale behind the choice of the applied methodology, but here it is important to 
stress that the combined effects of the lack of previous research; Laos’s political 
context, dominated by the one-party rule, which creates a closed reality that is difficult 
to penetrate; and the high stakes involved in the two MTI projects constituted the 
fundamental rationale. A consistent period of fieldwork conducted “on the ground”, 
mainly in Vientiane, between March and June 2015, in collaboration with the Faculty of 
Law and Political Science at the National University of Laos, where the author was 
hosted as a visiting researcher and assisted by the local staff in various ways (detailed in 
chapter 4), made it possible to overcome the challenges not only in getting basic data on 
the two MTI interactions but also in establishing contacts that proved to be vital in the 
research phases following the fieldwork. During his stay in Laos and in the region, in 
fact, the author met relevant informants who, in some cases, were then contacted for 
follow-up questions after the interview (via email, Skype or telephone) in order to 
clarify issues, gain more details of some emerging facts and access non-English 
documents. This was a crucial factor in enabling the author to follow and understand, 
especially, the development of the Boten–Vientiane MTI, which was only at the 
planning/negotiation stage at the beginning of the research and during the fieldwork 
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period, as underlined above, but which was subject to rapid development between the 
end of 2015 and the end of 2016 when the construction of the railway actually began. 
In addition, besides explaining the main reasons behind the research design and 
strategies, it is necessary to underline here the analytical level at which this research 
was conducted. In fact, the analytical framework used in this thesis, being based on 
process tracing and causality, requires the assumption that states are unitary and rational 
actors, as in the influence framework proposed by Goh (2016), on which the framework 
developed in chapter 3 builds. In fact, the Dahlian concept of “A prevailing over B” 
rests on the assumption that A and B have clear, autonomous and rational preferences so 
that the relational power can be observed in the distance (or proximity) between their 
preferences and the empirical outcome. Considering, moreover, that the objective of this 
research is understanding the impact of two MTIs on the international bilateral 
relational power of Laos with regard to two neighbouring countries, and not the profits 
and gains such infrastructures could bring to the communities across borders, such as 
the hydropower bureaucracies or the railway contractors, it made sense to isolate the 
two negotiations by stopping at the inter-state level. In fact, the process tracing exercise 
was intended to reconstruct the negotiation processes mainly by looking at the actions, 
proclaims, decisions and silences of state actors to assess their preferences in relation to 
the two MTIs. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the overall impact of the two 
MTIs might well go beyond the Laos–China and Laos–Vietnam pairings, provoking a 
set of different effects in different places, sectors and groups at the local as well as at the 
regional level resulting in different degrees of social, environmental economic and 
cultural gains and losses that, as recognised by Furlong (2006), among others, might 
transcend the state dimension. However, for the purpose of this research (i.e. observing 
the impact of MTIs in a bilateral state-to-state relation shaped by asymmetry in material 
power), taking the states as unitary and rational and limiting the analysis to the inter-
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state interaction was not merely a logical consequence, but a key analytical strength. In 
fact, this approach allowed to take into account the multitude of forces, actors and 
interests emerging from the process tracing investigation and aggregating them into a 
comprehensive unit of analysis: the state. This is also linked to the methodological 
choice of collecting data by interviewing members of the elite, i.e. stakeholders 
participating in the policymaking process with clear stakes in or expertise on/knowledge 
of the two projects (such as politicians, entrepreneurs, negotiators, diplomats, 
academics, journalists), instead of the local communities that will certainly be affected 
in many ways either by the Xayaburi dam or by the Boten–Vientiane Railway, two 
projects that will probably also have huge consequences below the state level. To 
conclude: despite the inevitably partial analysis of the two MTIs offered by this thesis – 
their impact on inter-state power – this research attempts a new path in the International 
Relations and small states scholarship, looking at how material power asymmetries 
work in practice and whether such material power is indeed fungible, regardless of the 
domain and scope. By doing so, this thesis diverges from the mainstream approach to 
small states studies, an approach that is also often used to analyse the international 
relations of Southeast Asian countries; it begins by acknowledging the asymmetry of 
power and, from there, attempts to analyse foreign policy options and strategies for 
smaller actors, such as hedging, balancing, bandwagoning, etc. (among others, see Roy 
2005; Cheng-Chwee 2008; Goh 2007). Following Baldwin’s (2013) advice to go 
beyond the study of overall national power and the use of power as an independent 
rather than a dependent variable, this thesis provides an original account, from an 
innovative perspective, of the power of an overlooked small state. 
1.3 The structure of the thesis 
This thesis is composed of seven chapters. This introductory chapter is followed by a 
theoretical literature review (chapter 2), the development of the MTIs–relational power 
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analytical framework (chapter 3) and the methodology (chapter 4). Chapters 5 and 6 
will present the core findings and chapter 7 will draw the conclusions. 
Chapter 2 provides a review of the International Relations (IR) literature on small states, 
addressing the difficulties in the discipline of taking into account less powerful entities, 
given the strong focus on power rooted in the very origin of IR studies. It then 
highlights the various approaches to and conceptualisations of power, pointing out the 
problems in ranking states by a power measure. Consequently, the literature review also 
reveals a context in which a definition of “small states” is anything but clear, with no 
agreement even on how to label the category. Finally, the key point identified by the 
chapter is the almost total absence of consideration of geographic factors in the IR small 
states literature, a paradoxical omission given the importance of geographic position for 
small states, which, having fewer internal resources, are more exposed and susceptible 
to the external environment. 
Chapter 3 moves on from the thinking on the relation between capabilities and 
geography that emerged through the literature review in the previous chapter to develop 
an analytical framework capable of connecting these two components and observing 
their relationship. To this end, the chapter proposes multinational transboundary 
infrastructures (MTIs) as the independent geographic variable through which to study 
the power of small states. The chapter is therefore composed of two main sections: the 
first analyses the MTIs concept, defining it and pointing out why MTIs are relevant and 
what their strategic, political and economic implications are; the second section focuses 
on the dependent variable – relational power – explaining the rationale behind the 
analytical framework and how it can be operationalised. 
Having defined the theoretical and analytical boundaries and aims of the research, 
chapter 4 details the methodological strategies used to conduct the case study research. 
It begins by motivating the choice to use process tracing and qualitative elite interviews 
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as overall strategies, and then it describes how the data analysis phase was planned and 
carried out. The last section focuses on the main data collection tool used by this 
research to generate the necessary primary data as well as to put in context the 
secondary data: the set of 48 semi-structured qualitative elite interviews conducted 
during the fieldwork period, mainly in Laos. The chapter clarifies in detail the strategies 
adopted and the practical arrangements put in place, and it reflects on the strengths and 
challenges of this particular research tool in the context of Laos and in general. 
Chapter 5, the first findings chapter, analyses the impact of the Xayaburi dam MTI on 
the power of Laos in relation to Vietnam (the domain) within the scope of the 
management of the Mekong River (the scope). First of all, the chapter analyses the 
policy context in which the Xayaburi dam is located, pointing out the relevance of 
hydropower as a source of revenue for Laos’s economy and the strategies implemented 
by the Government of Laos to exploit this resource in order to become the “battery of 
Southeast Asia” and develop the country. Once the broader context has been laid down, 
the second section reconstructs the negotiations between Laos and Vietnam on the 
Xayaburi dam and highlights the key facts of what occurred between 2007 and the 
beginning of the construction in November 2012. The third section takes stock of this 
reconstruction and analyses the negotiations evaluating the outcomes and identifying 
the factors that allowed Laos to proceed with its plan despite Vietnam’s divergent 
preferences. The fourth section investigates the role of the wider geopolitical context in 
order to assess the role played by “other” states, external to the Laos–Vietnam pairing, 
for the outcome of the negotiations. Finally, the fifth section discusses the results, 
applying the MTIs–relational power analytical framework and stressing the implications 
in theoretical terms. 
Chapter 6 contains the analysis of the second selected MTI case, the Boten–Vientiane 
high-speed railway project, currently under construction, which will eventually link 
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Kunming (in the Chinese Yunnan province) to Bangkok and then to Singapore, and 
investigates its impact on the relational power of Laos with regard to China (the 
domain) and within the scope of regional transport connectivity. It follows the same 
structure as chapter 5 and therefore begins by setting the policy context focusing on 
both China’s and Laos’s policies, because each country has its own connectivity 
agenda. In doing so, the chapter begins with China, because it has been the main actor 
behind the project, and offers a succinct background of China’s One Belt, One Road 
(OBOR) strategy and highlights the relevance of another, less studied Chinese strategy: 
high-speed railway diplomacy (HSRD). It then points out Laos’s policy to turn the 
country into a land-linked nation. The second section focuses on the Boten–Vientiane 
Railway, focusing on the key facts of negotiations that lasted from 2009 to the end of 
2016, and the third analyses why the two countries were unable to reach agreement 
earlier, despite the overall convergence of interests. As in chapter 5, the last two 
sections assess the role of the broader geopolitical context and discuss the findings in 
analytical and theoretical terms respectively. 
Finally, chapter 7 concludes the thesis by summarising its content, individuating the key 
findings from an empirical and from a theoretical perspective, highlighting the 
research’s contributions to knowledge and suggesting potential lines of further research. 
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CHAPTER II 
SMALL STATES IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
LITERATURE AND THE GEOGRAPHIC GAP 
Power, like love, is easier to experience than 
to define or measure – Joseph S. Nye Jr 
199014 
 
2.1 Introduction: A discipline of power in a world of states 
The concept of power is intimately related to the discipline of International Relations, 
rooted in the colonial world after WWI and dominated by a small number of great 
powers. Therefore, IR scholars have been focused on studying these actors, ignoring the 
role of less powerful polities. A bright example is contained in one of the most 
important classic works of IR, Politics Among Nations, in which Morgenthau (1948) 
argues that the very existence and independence of small nations originates from the 
external constraints arising from an international system dominated by great powers, 
and thus that existence and independence assumes a “negative” nature. In his view, in 
fact, 
Small nations have always owed their independence 
either to the balance of power (Belgium and the 
Balkan countries until the Second World War), or to 
the preponderance of one protecting power (the 
small nations of Central and South America, and 
Portugal), or to their lack of attractiveness for 
imperialistic aspirations (Switzerland, Spain). 
(Morgenthau 1948: 196, emphasis added) 
 
Even though of a different nature, systemic features were also seen as a precondition for 
small states’ existence in the second half of the 20th century: 
Small states could survive and proliferate in good 
measure because of the state system’s structure and 
“limitations”. Their right to existence was asserted, 
their borders were beyond dispute, their colonial 
                                                          
14 Nye (1990: 177). 
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past justified special consideration and military 
violence directed at them was politically 
problematic. Taken together, this improved small 
states’ security and provided major opportunities for 
small states’ proliferation. A number of additional 
features, such as the norm of equality of states, large 
and small, the revival of collective security after 
World War II, the implementation of collective 
defense through NATO, the economic and security 
benefits granted by European integration and the 
liberal economic order (Alesina et al. 1997) further 
strengthened the position of small states regionally 
during the Cold War. (Maass 2014: 723) 
These passages show the extent to which power has been a guiding criterion for IR 
studies, and the literature about small states is no exception, being also dominated by 
the study of power. In it, the term “small states” represents the implicit choice to use a 
word other than power and thus makes of the small states a residual category, as 
underlined by Neumann and Gstöhl: 
Small states started life as a residual category and 
under a different name. Until well into the twentieth 
century, in all European languages states were 
routinely referred to as “powers”; French puissance, 
German Macht, Russian derzhava, 
Spanish/Portuguese poder, etc. While this noun is 
still used for a different category of states, namely 
“great powers” (and more rarely also for “middle 
powers”), “small powers” are nowadays simply 
referred to as “small states”. (Neumann and Gstöhl 
2004: 3) 
As Goetschel (1998) points out, even in work by classic political thinkers such as 
Rousseau and Montesquieu, “the qualification of a state as ‘small’ in the context of 
foreign and security policy meant that such a state was perceived as no danger to 
neighbouring states” (Goetschel 1998: 13), thus giving prominence to the power that 
states hold and characterising small states by their lack of power. To face this problem, 
Kassimeris, for instance, proposes re-establishing the term “small power”, asserting that 
despite the increased relevance of small states “their role in the international 
environment remains underestimated” (Kassimeris 2009b: 12). 
39 
Nonetheless, the number of states on the planet grew after the end of WWII, and further 
during the 1960s and 1970s thanks to the decolonisation process, by the end of which 
small states had almost tripled in number (Maass 2009). Therefore, to some scholars a 
discipline based on a minority of actors seemed far from ideal, so small states started to 
attract more attention. A pioneering work in this respect was Fox’s analysis of small 
European states’ diplomacies during WWII (Fox 1959). In the 1980s, neoliberal 
institutionalism started to challenge the realist and neorealist theories, as shown by 
Keohane’s “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas”, which aimed to assess small states’ foreign policy 
within multilateral organisations (Keohane 1969). After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation, the small states population 
increased further, but in IR “they still remain a niche in the broader field and when 
studied the perspective is often systemic, rather than focused on their foreign policies” 
(Kassimeris 2009: 85–86). Moreover, small states have at times also been excluded 
from comparative studies. In this respect, Veenendaal and Corbett (2014) noted, for 
instance, that in his The Third Wave, Huntington (1991) took into account only 
countries with a population larger than 1 million. 
This chapter presents a critical analysis of the academic literature on small states in the 
field of IR. As the objective of this research is to study the impact of MTIs on the 
relational power of Laos, the remainder of this chapter will a) critically review how the 
literature has approached concepts of “power” and “smallness” in relation to states; and 
b) address the analytical level at which small states are investigated, uncovering the role 
of geography, which has been neglected in the study of small states. 
2.2 How to measure power for hierarchising states? Power-as-capabilities versus 
relational power 
In International Relations, power has traditionally been conceived as the amount of 
resources that a unit holds and can mobilise to exert influence over others. These 
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“elements of national power”, also called “capabilities” or “power resources”,15 were 
challenged later in the development of the discipline by the “relational power” 
approach, based on specific scopes and domains (Baldwin 2013: 274–275). Material 
resources (military, economic, technological) allowed to differentiate great powers from 
minor actors over time: only after 1945 did the criterion distinguishing the two 
categories become the possession of nuclear weapons, whereas in the past it had been 
based on the number and wealth of a state’s colonies and, until 1914, on demographic 
size, since a large population was necessary for a mass army (Taylor 1968). However, 
many scholars still consider capabilities to be the very foundation of power. In the 
offensive realism theory proposed by Mearsheimer, for instance, power derives only 
from resources: 
Power is based on the material capabilities that a 
state controls. The balance of power is mainly a 
function of the tangible military assets that states 
possess, such as armoured divisions and nuclear 
weapons. However, states have a second kind of 
power, latent power, which refers to the socio-
economic ingredients that go into building military 
power. Latent power is based on a state’s wealth and 
the size of its overall population. Great powers need 
money, technology, and personnel to build military 
forces and to fight wars, and a state’s latent power 
refers to the raw potential it can draw on when 
competing with rival states. (Mearsheimer 2007: 72–
73) 
Capabilities, nonetheless, are also central in governments’ strategic thinking, as China’s 
Comprehensive National Power (CNP) demonstrates. Angang and Honghua (2002) 
pointed out, in fact, that the 
CNP may be simply defined as the comprehensive 
capabilities of a country to pursue its strategic 
objectives by taking actions internationally and the 
core factors to the concept are strategic resources, 
strategic capabilities and strategic outcomes, with 
                                                          
15 Hereinafter, the terms resources and capabilities will be used interchangeably in relation to 
power. 
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the strategic resources as the material base. (Angang 
and Honghua 2002: 3) 
As a consequence, several attempts have been made to classify states according to their 
power, and the research effort on the concept of power can be seen as having the goal of 
establishing a ranking of the actors populating the international system. In order to 
simplify the mare magnum of the world using power to illuminate the scene, different 
typologies of “powers” (Super, Hyper, Large, Great, Regional, Middle, Small, Weak, 
Mini, Micro) have been theorised (in particular, see Wight 1946; Organski 1958; 
Huntington 1999; Lemke 2002; Buzan and Wæver 2003). A more nuanced approach to 
power-as-resources is represented by the issue-specific power theory initially proposed 
by Lasswell and Kaplan (1951). The theory builds on the assumption that power, not 
being congruent across issues, cannot be taken as a general measure, but must rather be 
taken as a specialised entity. Issue-specific power, however, shares with the power-as-
resources approach the proposition for which, even though only within an issue area, 
resources are fungible, an assertion that emerges from Keohane and Nye’s classic 
Power and Interdependence: “Within each issue area one posits that states will pursue 
their relatively coherent self-interests and that stronger states in the issue system will 
dominate weaker ones and determine the rule of the game” (Keohane and Nye 1977: 
50–51). 
On the other hand, the relational approach to power is in line with Dahl’s well-known 
definition of power. Building on the Weberian tradition, in which power rested on the 
“probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out 
his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” 
(Weber 1978: 152),16 Dahl proposed a succinct formula that reads as follows: “A has 
power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise 
                                                          
16 The first edition of Weber’s Economy and Society was published posthumously in German in 
1922. 
42 
do” (Dahl 1957: 202–203). The rationale behind this idea draws on historical evidence 
of discrepancies between assets and effective power, clearly pointed out by Holsti in the 
1960s as follows: 
The deduction of actual influence from the quantity 
and quality of potential and mobilized capabilities 
may, in some cases, give an approximation of 
reality, but historically there have been too many 
discrepancies between the basis of power and the 
amount of influence to warrant adopting this practice 
as a useful approach to international relations. 
(Holsti 1964: 186)17 
In accordance with Dahl’s above-mentioned definition, scholars who favour the 
relational approach to power consider it impossible to measure power as if it were a 
liquid entity like money because of its multidimensional character, and therefore they 
focus their attention on the outcomes rather than on the resources. Baldwin stresses that 
Discussions of the capabilities of states that fail to 
designate or imply a framework of assumptions 
about who is trying (or might try) to get whom to do 
what are comparable to discussions of what 
constitutes a good hand in cards without specifying 
which game is to be played. (Baldwin 2013: 277) 
Baldwin further suggests that “If international relations researchers were to give up the 
search for a universally valid measure of overall national power, much useful research 
could be focused on measuring the distribution of power within specified scopes and 
domains” (ibid.: 280). Historical evidence shows that resources are often not fungible, 
and therefore assuming that power is a property can be misleading because “the concept 
of a power resource is a relational concept in the sense that it has little or no meaning 
except within the context of a particular situation specified (at least) as to scope and 
domain” (Baldwin 2016: 53). Besides the historical evidence, another essential element 
that compromises studies of power based on resources derives from the fact, underlined 
                                                          
17 The distance between capabilities and outcomes is also theorised in the “structuralist paradox” 
highlighted by Zartman and others (Zartman 1997; Zartman and Rubin 2000). 
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by Schelling (1960), that a resource can be an asset in a specific situation while having a 
contrary value in another. 
Given that this research is concerned with a small state case study, it is implied that it is 
studying a state which is assumed to enjoy a low degree of power. Therefore if “a valid 
measure of overall national power” (Baldwin 1989: 167) must be acknowledged as 
utopian, and if scholars such as Baldwin are right when they suggest that it is “time to 
recognize that the notion of a single overall international power structure unrelated to 
any particular issue area is based on a concept of power that is virtually meaningless” 
(ibid., emphasis added), it could be very hard to define small states. The next section 
inserts the theoretical problem of understanding which characteristics distinguish less 
powerful states from other kinds of actor in the debate on power delineated above. 
2.3 What is a small state? The struggle for a definition 
2.3.1 Qualitative and quantitative factors 
Finding an accepted definition of small states in the International Relations literature 
has so far proven nearly impossible. Too many a priori standpoints have shaped the 
issue, provoking a plethora of conceptualisations, and therefore definitions and terms, 
for less powerful states. Scholars belonging to the realist school of thought, such as 
David Vital, have tended to identify the source of smallness, and in so doing the 
rationale of the definition, in quantitative parameters such as the size or the population. 
Vital supports a thesis that reflects the strategic environment of the bipolar world at that 
time, arguing that “it is when the state is alone – not necessarily in all its affairs, but at 
least in the great and crucial ones – and is thrown back on its own resources that the 
limitations and, indeed, the possibilities inherent in its condition are best seen” (Vital 
1967: 5, cited in Keohane 1969: 298). 
Besides realist and neorealist accounts that seek measurable (quantitative, absolute and 
tangible) ways to identify a small state, others have underlined the relevance of 
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perceptions in a more constructivist way. For example, Browning (2006), in carrying 
out a case study of Finland, pursues a cognitivist approach that criticises the traditional 
rationalist and positivist one and contends that “smallness can be told in different ways” 
(Browning 2006: 681–682). 
However, apart from this divide, the picture is anything but clear, since even scholars 
who share a similar ontological position based on quantitative factors differ from one 
another in its application. As Hey (2003) pointed out in the introduction to Small States 
in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behaviour, there is not much consensus 
on the concept and its operationalisation, because 
Scholars have at least three different communities in 
mind when they speak of “small states”: microstates 
with a population of less than 1 million, such as the 
former British colonies in the Caribbean; small 
states in the developed world, especially Austria, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland; and small states in the so-called third 
world, including former colonies in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America, many of which are larger than states 
in the first two categories. (Hey 2003: 2)  
Based on this reasoning, it appears clear that looking for a quantitative definition is 
quite problematic. Apart from deciding which quantitative parameters are to be decisive 
(size, population or GDP?), the more challenging issue is establishing a threshold. Some 
scholars who have sought the clue in population size have proposed 10 million, others 3 
million (Nugent 2003: 3). Another approach has been to combine a set of economic, 
demographic and geographic data. Crowards (2002), for instance, classifies 79 countries 
as small using an analysis based on a combination of demographics, size, land area and 
income. However, rigid definitions have always failed to gain general acceptance, while 
conversely adding confusion to the process of attempting to identify small states. An 
absolute approach risks ignoring the relative nature of data: for instance, despite small 
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populations in absolute terms, small countries dominate the international ranking for 
GDP per capita (Gregson 2017).18 
In contrast to these quantitative attempts, other scholars have opted for a more 
qualitative approach, focusing on the relational dimension. Rothstein (1968), for 
instance, wrote that “a Small Power is a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain 
security primarily by use of its own capabilities” (Rothstein 1968: 29). However, as 
Keohane (1969) has underlined, “Rothstein does not specify which states in the 
contemporary world would not be small powers under this definition, but it would seem 
that only the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the People’s 
Republic of China could possibly qualify” since in a nuclear age “insecurity is constant 
and all-pervasive” (Keohane 1969: 293). The main difference in Rothstein’s approach is 
that smallness does not refer only to the internal sphere of each polity, i.e. to the values 
of different parameters, but must also be sought in the capacity of putting together 
internal resources in order to translate them into power in the international arena. In 
fact, the threshold problem remains unresolved, and it probably cannot be solved while 
at the same time avoiding rigid quantitative definitions. Hey, for instance, who uses the 
term “small”, avoids any quantitative data and focuses only on the role of perceptions, 
assuming that “if a state’s people and institutions generally perceive themselves to be 
small, or if other states’ peoples and institutions perceive that state as small, it shall be 
so considered” (Hey 2003: 3). It seems, therefore, that Hey uses “small” to indicate a 
low degree of perceived power, rather than a small size, population or GDP, since 
relative land area, economic strength and demography are not a matter of perception. 
2.3.2. Small or weak? 
Moreover, besides ontological distinctions and practical challenges even within the 
same paradigm, another obstacle to accepted common ground about small states has 
                                                          
18 In 2016 the top 10 were as follows (in order): Qatar, Luxembourg, Macao, Singapore, Brunei 
Darussalam, Kuwait, Ireland, Norway, United Arab Emirates and San Marino (Gregson 2017). 
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been how to label them. Elman, for instance, uses interchangeably the terms small, 
emerging and weak in her seminal article (Elman 1995: 171), then specifies that even 
the word “insecure” is used in the article with the same meaning. Elman’s case clearly 
epitomises the confusion in the literature and also a certain degree of ambiguity between 
causes and effects. In other words, while smallness might be somehow defined with 
reference to tangible factors such as territorial size, weakness, insecurity, and 
vulnerability are more easily seen as the effects of being small. However, following 
Rothstein’s (1968) line of thought, tangible and absolute data can say little about these 
effects if they are not contextualised. 
In this regard, Padelford and Lincoln (1962) claim that, while “lacking an adequate 
supply of natural resources (e.g. physical size), a state can rarely hope to achieve a 
strong posture in international affairs” (Padelford and Lincoln 1962: 67, cited in East 
and Hermann 1974: 271).19 Handel, in contrast, justifies his preference for the term 
“weak states” rather than “small states” by stressing that 
Strictly speaking, a small state should be small in 
area. This term, however, has been applied to 
countries with enormous territories, such as Saudi 
Arabia, Chad, Mongolia, Libya, and Mauritania. To 
be exact, the expression “small state” should be used 
to describe only those states which both lack 
strength and are small in territory. (Handel 1990: 
10–11) 
But if Handel is right that big states might possess little power, even the contrary can be 
affirmed, i.e. small states can demonstrate a high degree of power. In this respect, 
Hirsch’s preface to Steinmetz and Wivel (2010) highlights how “one of the most 
interesting consequences” of the growing literature on small states “is the conclusion 
that small does not necessarily mean weak, depending, of course, on circumstances: 
geography, the international environment, and specific issues” (Hirsch 2010: xvi). In the 
                                                          
19 The argument developed here must not be confused with the opportunity that small states 
have to win a defensive war when they are attacked by bigger states, as studied by Mack 
(1975) in the aftermath of the Vietnam debacle. 
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light of this problem and of the absence of a common and shared definition, this study 
opts for the term “small states”, by far the most used term, instead of weak states or 
small powers. The term weak, in fact, could evoke images of failed states, which are 
domestically weak and thus unable to guarantee internal order. Eizenstat et al. (2005), 
for instance, in his article about the threat posed by weak states to United States’ 
security, closely associates the two terms, stating that 
Weak and failed states and the chaos they nurture 
will inevitably harm U.S. security … The weakness 
of these states can be measured according to lapses 
in three critical functions that the governments of all 
strong, stable states perform: security, the provision 
of basic services, and protection of essential civil 
freedoms. “Failed” states – Angola, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Somalia, and 
Sudan, for example – do not fulfil any of these 
functions. But even “weak” states, which are 
deficient in one or two of these areas, can still 
threaten U.S. interests. (Eizenstat et al. 2005: 135–
136) 
This term “small states” is also preferable, being the most used so far in IR, and also, 
most importantly, given the needs of the analytical framework developed in the next 
chapter and of the nature of the MTI case studies analysed in chapter 5 and 6. Therefore, 
a relational definition of small states, such as the one proposed by Steinmetz and Wivel 
(2010) according to which “a small state is the weak part in an asymmetric relationship” 
(Steinmetz and Wivel 2010: 6), serves the specific purpose of this research well. In fact, 
the main idea behind this definition is the paramount difficulty of reaching an 
acceptable degree of consensus within the discipline on what distinguishes small states 
from other actors. Thus, avoiding pursuing such absolute target it makes good sense 
limiting to a specific and well-defined pair of states. Therefore, building on the 
definition above, this thesis adopts a working definition for which “a small state is the 
weaker part in a bilateral relationship” which, even if does not solve the debate about 
the definition of small states, facilitates operationalisation by moving the focus from 
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smallness per se to asymmetry between two given states that might be evaluated on a 
case by case basis. The scholar who adopts such definition will thus be able to establish 
which state is the weaker part in a specific bilateral relationship taking into account both 
quantitative factors such as economic parameters, military data and so on, and 
qualitative factors proper of the particular relation under analysis such as perceptions on 
their relative power, the history between the two states or the type of their relation.  
2.4 What level of analysis for small states?  
Another key issue in the debate on small states relates to the analytical level. As Elman 
underlined in 1995, “the scholarly consensus views small state behaviour from a state-
centric perspective in which foreign-policy outputs are a response to external 
constraints”, and “Changes in small state foreign policies are considered isomorphic to 
fluctuations in the structure of the international system and/or the degree of threat posed 
by the great powers” (Elman 1995: 173–175). Several accounts, indeed, have underlined 
the tremendous influence that structural factors exert on small states (Jervis 1978; 
Schweller 1992; Snyder 1991; Walt 1985). Handel, for instance, makes clear that 
methodologically he focused “at the level of analysis referred to by Kenneth Waltz as 
the ‘third image’ and by Graham Allison as the ‘rational actor’ model” (Handel 1990: 
3). The third image concentrates on the primacy of the international system for 
determining foreign policy. The rational actor model assumes that states are unitary, 
purposive, value-maximising calculators. He follows by emphasising that “Domestic 
determinants of foreign policy are less salient in weak states. The international system 
leaves them less room for choice in the decision-making process” (ibid.).  
Other scholars such as Elman (1995) and Hey (2003) more recently problematised this 
clean-cut vision by taking into account the domestic variables, providing a useful 
contribution to the discipline. In fact, they argue that small states’ foreign policy 
constitutes an opportunity to test the relevance of the domestic level, given that the 
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common wisdom is in favour of structural factors. In contrast to the systemic 
perspective proposed by scholars like Snyder, Schweller and Walt, Elman suggests that 
“even the most vulnerable states may display foreign policies explicable only in terms 
of domestic politics”. Based on a case study, Elman’s article stresses that “this is 
especially true for weak states which are also domestically liberal” (Elman 1995: 2). 
Hey (2003) builds a conceptual framework based on three levels: systemic, domestic 
and individual. The big question is: to what extent are small states manipulated by the 
world’s system and the actions of others? However, through eight case studies, the 
book, on balance, still attributes great importance to the system as a key explanatory 
factor (Hey 2003). David (1991), too, has previously given importance to the domestic 
level in analysing small states’ alignment, merging the internal and the external levels. 
David (1991), in fact, has assumed that the leaders in polities of this kind play a crucial 
role, being concerned with their own survival and internal stability in addition to the 
state’s security. 
However, geographic factors such as the country’s position, its morphology and the 
nature of its borders with a neighbour might have a role in influencing asymmetric 
relations. Yet at what level can we locate geographic variables? Certainly, internal 
geographic and morphological features fall into the domestic category, but what about 
borders that determine a country’s geographic position in the system, or the position 
itself? Geographic features may be considered either domestic (e.g. mountainous 
terrain) or external to a single country (e.g. borders shared by two or more states). As a 
result, as noted by Williams et al. (2012), geography has been conceived as a domestic 
element by some (e.g. Reardon 2002) and systemic by others (e.g. Layne 1993). The 
next section explores how geographic variables have been treated in the small states 
literature and assesses the role geography can play, adding it to the debate regarding the 
level of analysis, as a third, middle level, between the systemic and the domestic. 
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2.4.1 The overlooked role of geography  
In the debate between systemic and domestic theories, the potentially major explanatory 
factor of geography has, surprisingly, been generally overlooked. In fact, great attention 
has been paid to smallness in terms of size, but apart from such territorial dimensions of 
geography, as will be demonstrated, almost no attention has been paid to the spatial 
configuration of small states, i.e. their position on the map. This gap in the literature 
probably derives from the fact that hardly a state’s position might be generalised in 
precise propositions. In this regard, Calder (2012) stresses that International Relations 
has paid little attention to geographic variables in its ambition to achieve abstraction and 
generalisable knowledge. Another reason pointed out by Calder (2012) is that 
technological progress has diminished the salience of time and space. 
However, geographic position might offer important clues that could be tested through 
different case studies. Indeed, the position of a country, no matter how big or small it is, 
often in itself involves strategic aspects. In the case of Laos, the mere fact that the 
country is placed in a central position, making of it by default an obliged way in the 
massive interconnection project of Southeast Asia with China, mainly through the 
proposed Kunming–Singapore railway analysed in chapter 6, cannot simply be left out 
of an IR analysis. Moreover, this study will highlight how it is not only geopolitical 
features such as borders that count, but also physical geographic features such as rivers, 
mountains and mineral resources, which, when combined with different positions, could 
be of great relevance. Laos’s plans to exploit its branch of the Mekong River by 
building dams, for instance, are achievable thanks to the country’s mountainous 
morphology and, at the same time, are a potential source of tension because of its 
upstream position with respect to Vietnam and Cambodia, as will be seen in chapter 5. 
Daoudy offers another interesting example of how geographic position is a source of 
power for upstream Turkey in the management of the Euphrates and Tigris waters 
(Daoudy 2009). Moreover, position affects entry/exit options, which are often crucial 
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for states, for example as export routes or, in the worst-case scenario, and especially for 
a small state, a military attack by land that could culminate in invasion and domination. 
Consequently, the next section aims to briefly review the most important literature on 
geography from an international perspective before looking at how the issue of space 
has been handled by the scholarship about small states. 
2.4.2 The role of spaces in Classical Geopolitics, Critical Geopolitics and 
International Relations 
The Mekong River is a gateway to China and 
connects the region not only with northeast but also 
South Asia, providing access to the Indian and 
Pacific Oceans. The geostrategic significance of the 
region attracted colonial powers in the past and 
continues to be a factor in major power involvement 
in the region in the present. Today, a foothold in this 
region is seen as advantageous for a number of 
reasons: the region is rich in natural resources; it 
provides access to the huge markets of China and 
India; access to the region has maritime security and 
transport implications; and, last but not least, the 
region serves as a security belt around China. (Binh 
2006: 66, emphasis added) 
This piece by Nguyen Phuong Binh, then deputy director of the Institute for 
International Relations at the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, summarises three 
fundamental concepts that combine geography with politics, forming what is called 
geopolitics. First, the mere position of the Mekong River is relevant. Second, natural 
resources count. Third, when we add socially constructed political variables to the 
picture, such as sovereignty, boundaries, power and historic relations, we end up with a 
geopolitical conceptualisation. Before the arrival of the Europeans with their 
Westphalian borders, the Mekong River had always simply run through its 4,350 km 
towards the south-east before plunging into the sea. Now it flows through six nation 
states based on sovereignty on one territory (with its resources) and the resident 
population, but a river can hardly submit itself to a border checkpoint. All this could 
appear trivial, but it is at the very heart of the Geopolitics field – that suggests taking 
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into account the meanings of physical spaces - as well as of this research. Looking at the 
development of the literature, it can be clearly seen how intimate the relationship is 
between power and geography, looking at constructed factors together with natural 
ones, with the latter emerging in the early modern era as “not something already 
possessed by the earth but an active writing of the earth by an expanding, centralizing 
imperial state” (Tuathail 1996: 2). To put it simply, Classical Geopolitics, to which 
authors such as Sir Halford Mackinder (1904), Alfred Thayer Mahan (1918) and Karl 
Haushofer (1928) contributed, was more connected with the dimension of power and, 
since it postulated geodeterminism, which could have been used to justify foreign policy 
decisions such as expansionism on the basis of superior “geographic” determinants, it 
fell from grace after being associated with with imperialism and Nazi ideology (Flint 
2012). In fact, Haushofer was the founder of the German school of Geopolitics in the 
aftermath of World War I, and his ideas of living space, fluid frontier and just wars 
reached and influenced Adolf Hitler in the early 1920s through Rudolf Hess, one of his 
students at the University of Munich (Kakel III 2011).20 
In contrast, Critical Geopolitics focuses on the languages of power in its effort to 
problematise and contextualise “taken-for-granted assumptions” (Tuathail 1996: 23). In 
addition, the work of the radical French precursor of Geopolitics, Yves Lacoste, is 
particularly illuminating since it stresses the procedural dimension and the role of 
geography in foreign policy decision-making. Defining the relationship between space 
and time, he writes “The map is the archetypal geographic representation. It provides 
the basic data for the study of international relations and, even more so, of foreign 
policies. Yet the map is not static” (Lacoste 1984: 224). The role of geography has even 
been considered in international relations, although not centrally. Raymond Aron, for 
instance, in his Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, has clearly written 
                                                          
20 A comprehensive account of the linkages between Classical Geopolitics, power and 
imperialism can be found in Tuathail et. al (1998).   
53 
“According to the space they occupy, the political units have different resources, 
different objectives, different dreams” (Aron 1966: 97). However, International 
Relations accounts have often abstracted themselves from the material context, focusing 
on abstract structures and therefore on the systemic level. Kadercan (2015) provides an 
effective and succinct explanation of the reasons for the overlooking of geography in 
IR: 
We can associate the lack of a definition in 
mainstream IR to the reification of the territorial 
state, which, partially thanks to the impacts of 
Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics 
(TIP), “became not just a political hegemon, but a 
conceptual one as well” … From a territorial 
perspective, TIP treats the global landscape as 
“homogenous empty space” comprising 
interchangeable pieces of land where borders 
merely exist by definition and are rarely, if ever, 
scrutinized, perpetuating the reification of the 
Westphalian view of territory in IR … Such 
reification, to be sure, is not limited to neorealism; 
while they are known for problematizing many 
assumptions or conclusions of neorealism, neither 
neo-institutionalism nor constructivism, nor even the 
English School, are immune to this conceptual and 
analytical trap. (Kadercan 2015: 128, emphasis 
added) 
An interesting exception is Gleditsch (2002), who stresses the role of geography in the 
title of his work All International Politics is Local, in which he develops the concept of 
“political neighbourhoods” on the basis that states are not stand-alone polities but act 
within contexts. Another exception is represented by Grygiel (2006) who, as underlined 
by Kadercan, “suggests that students of international politics should move beyond the a-
geographic and ‘abstract’ theoretical frameworks privileged by modern IR theorists 
(especially Kenneth Waltz) and reclaim the key insights offered by classical geopolitics 
about the role of geography” (Kadercan 2015: 133). 
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2.4.3 The paradoxical geographic gap in the International Relations literature 
on small states 
What space has been granted to geographic factors in the small states literature apart 
from recognising – and debating – the relevance of small size in terms of power? 
Several studies have implicitly combined geography and small states, Kaplan’s 
reflection on the role of geography for the Low Countries in his popular The Revenge of 
Geography being a good example (Kaplan 2013). But so far, a systematic reflection of 
the role of geography for small states is still missing, and this gap in the small states 
literature appears to be paradoxical because geographic position could be crucial for the 
latter, both in the case of a favourable position and in a negative context. 
In fact, small states are affected by a higher degree of exposure than bigger actors and, 
being more exposed, they are arguably made more susceptible by their geographic 
position. In this regard, Womack underlines how distance is the primary factor that 
might “lower the salience of asymmetry in the relationship of A and B” (Womack 2016: 
45). In a study on China’s rise, Chung (2016) also puts distance at the top of the list of 
factors that cause countries to worry about China’s assertiveness and rise, intensifying 
the security dilemma. Apart from their geographies, relative to those of other states, the 
combination of their internal characteristics and geographic position can contribute to 
making small states vulnerable: 
In cases of infrastructure failure and accidents, a 
lack of redundancy on the one hand and of 
specialized response assets and expertise on the 
other are the default aspects of small-state 
vulnerability. Island states lack neighbours to bring 
immediate aid, but land-locked states relying on 
cross-border systems for energy, transport and 
communications are doubly at risk: their own access 
is hostage to others’ actions, but they also suffer 
from the knock-on effects of neighbours’ disasters. 
Across this whole threat/risk spectrum, it bears 
repeating that there is no “typical” small state 
profile. The problems looming largest for each 
nation are determined by objective factors of 
territory size, geography, climate and habitat; but 
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also by political features of the neighbourhood and 
larger region, the level and direction of economic 
development, and human and societal factors 
including population movements and tourism. 
(Bailes et al. 2014: 34) 
Nonetheless, as underlined above in the IR literature on small states, geographic 
variables have sometimes been highlighted, yet this effort arises more 
extemporaneously than consciously and often in an unstructured fashion. When 
geography is mentioned, it is often just bypassed quickly.21 Vital, for instance, writes 
that the small state’s “two most effective weapons” are “manoeuvre and exploitation of 
position” (Vital 1971: 298), but he is convinced that without alignment strategies these 
two weapons are of much less importance. Moreover, in Vital’s view, size, which is the 
aspect that governments cannot alter except through occupation of nearby territories, is 
consequently crucial in determining a given state’s role (Vital 1967). This is surprising 
since, even more so than territorial size (which, as indicated above, can be increased 
through occupation), geographic position is nearly impossible to change since it 
concerns the entire neighbourhood in which a country is located. Singer, for instance, in 
his classic work, focuses mainly on the roles of people in international interactions and 
does not address the role of physical spaces; he investigates “the nature of the ties 
between weak and powerful states”, maintaining his focus on the “degree and kind of 
perceptual, communication, economic, military, and political ties”22 (Singer 1972: 5–7). 
East and Hermann (1974), in their efforts to build a theory of foreign policy by 
conceptualising eight genotypes of countries with different combinations of size, level 
of economic development and degree of openness, develop a remarkable set of 
propositions, but in relation to geography stop at the quantitative and highly general 
concept of size. Kassimeris, surprisingly, while underlining the great importance of the 
                                                          
21 See, for instance, Lee and Smith (2010). 
22 Singer, who was writing in the last years of the Vietnam War, makes clear from the 
introduction that the motivation behind his research is the puzzling question of why a 
superpower was failing to win against the weaker Vietnam, despite deploying every 
instrument of power. 
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external environment for small powers, forgets to include any geopolitical 
considerations. Moreover, in his analysis, despite fully analysing the different 
conceptualisations of the terms small, size and power and criticising the rigidness of 
definitions based on size, he ends up suggesting the territorial variable be eliminated to 
give prominence to the procedural manifestation of power in the degree of participation 
in international affairs (Kassimeris 2009). Again, the position is ignored and sacrificed 
to the imperative of generalising. Let us recall, as an example, the case of Singapore, 
which in recent decades has exploited its strategic hub position, turning in 50 years from 
an extremely poor country into one of the foremost economies in the world in terms of 
GDP per capita and being repeatedly invited to high-level diplomatic tables such as the 
G20. Jurkynas (2014) acknowledges the necessity of taking into account the type of 
neighbourhood in which a small state is located to understand the security implications 
but omits to systematise the issue beyond the case study of the Baltic states in the 
Russian periphery or to indicate how geography could be conceptualised or 
scientifically treated. 
However, despite the prevailing absence of interest in the value geographic variables 
might have in small states’ international relations, a few authors address them in their 
analysis. Handel (1990) includes a section on the geographic position of “weak states” 
and, noteworthily, he positions it in the chapter about “internal sources of weakness and 
strength” (Handel 1990: 70–76, emphasis added). He recognises that “among the most 
important elements determining the international position of a weak state is its 
geographic location” and then underlines how “weak states” on the periphery of the 
system have advantages over countries “in the center of their relevant system” (Handel 
1990: 71). The second important point raised by Handel concerns the strategic location 
of small states; for Handel, this has negative implications, and to demonstrate this 
proposition he cites various historical examples, from Finnish control of routes to 
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Leningrad that attracted Russian ambitions, to Turkey’s critical position in the 
Bosphorous, to Egypt’s control over the Suez Canal as the cause of British occupation 
until 1956. From these arguments, Handel concludes that geographic isolation, distance 
from powerful actors and non-strategic location are all advantages for small states 
(Handel 1990). In addition, an account that falls slightly outside the International 
Relations literature on small states provides two case studies, Nepal and Andorra, 
which, interestingly, show how the geographic position of small states can play a major 
role. However, both the editors and the authors fail to recognise the theoretical 
relevance of geographic position, because they focus on a general theory of how 
symmetry and asymmetry of power influence the outcomes of negotiation, and do so 
without individuating or underlining the role of geography. It is worth noting that both 
case studies, in addition, challenge Handel’s conclusion that being strategically located 
means being in a disadvantageous position. Gyawali, examining Nepal–India relations 
in the water resources realm, starts by underlining how “on the one hand, landlocked 
Nepal, often described as India-locked, does not have much power in conventional 
quantitative terms. It does, however, enjoy power as the upper riparian nation owning 
the sites where storage dams can be built” (Gyawali 2000: 129–130, emphasis added). 
Gyawali then concludes with a very interesting framing of power asymmetry in the 
negotiations between India and Nepal, arguing that the two countries 
present a case of negotiations under asymmetric 
conditions, in both aggregate power and issue-
specific power … the latter is understood as control 
over the interactional process, and Nepal, by owning 
the sites where hydroelectric plants can be built, has 
been endowed with veto power. (Gyawali 2000: 149, 
emphasis added) 
The second case study is an analysis of the Andorra–European Community Trade 
Agreement negotiations between 1979 and 1987. The authors found that 
58 
The Mitre disposed of a positional power … It 
concerned the capacity of the Mitre to lock up the 
process by its position within the structure. Such 
power does not enable one to act, but rather 
paralyzes the actions of others. It is a power of 
inertia, structurally unavoidable … Andorra could 
have been reduced to nothing by its two powerful 
neighbors, but this was not the case. Andorra owes 
its millenary survival to extremely clever 
management given its location. (Faure and Klaousen 
2000: 119, emphasis added) 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter carried out a review of the small states literature within IR, beginning by 
exploring the different notions and approaches to power, which has constituted a core 
element of the discipline and has led to a general overlooking of less powerful actors, 
which have traditionally been treated as a residual category. 
Before moving on to discussing small states, the second section provided a synthesis of 
the different notions of power in IR, underlining the difference between power intended 
as capabilities – and thus coincident with the material resources possessed by a state – 
and a relational concept of power based on the outcome within a social interaction. It is 
the problems inherent in understanding a state’s power as the sum of its capabilities, 
emerging especially from the historical discrepancies between material power and 
outcomes and actual influence, that have motivated the choice in this research to adopt 
the concept of relational power. This approach assumes that power is neither congruent 
across issues (a measure of overall power is then unrealistic), nor fungible (power is not 
liquid like money), and requires the investigation of power within specific scopes and 
domain. 
In the light of the reflection on power contained in the first two sections, the third 
section summarised the key concepts relating to small states, pointing out the 
disagreement among scholars (even within the same paradigm or school) about which 
distinct characteristics define small states. It emerged that there is no shared definition 
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of small states, to the extent that there is even disagreement about the best way to label 
them (small states, weak states or small powers?). However, considering that the aim of 
this research is to investigate two specific interactions between two pairs of states that 
present a clear asymmetry in material power, the relational definition of small states 
provided above – “a small state is the weaker part in a bilateral relationship” – is a good 
fit for this thesis’s needs. 
The fourth section then questioned at what level of analysis small states are (and must 
be) observed, showing that the literature has traditionally privileged the systemic level 
over the domestic. Nonetheless, the role of geography, which can be considered a third 
level, has so far not been systematically explored by small states scholars. In order to 
establish the context of the potential implications of geography for small states, the 
section began by summarising how space and geography have been treated by 
Geopolitics (Classical and Critical) and by International Relations, stressing how the 
latter has usually conceived states as homogenous spaces and paid scant attention to 
their geographic elements. However, if in the broader IR field there are instances of 
studies that address geography, in small states studies a substantial gap emerges in this 
regard, although, intuitively, the less powerful a state is, the more susceptible to the 
external environment (and thus to its geographic position) it will be. 
The next chapter will build on the concepts, definitions and knowledge gaps that 
emerged from the literature review of this chapter in order to develop an analytical 
framework capable of exploring the relation between geography and the relational 
power of small states. 
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CHAPTER III 
DEVELOPING AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK TO 
INVESTIGATE THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL 
TRANSBOUNDARY INFRASTRUCTURES (MTIs) ON THE 
RELATIONAL POWER OF SMALL STATES 
Nothing tells us more about the future of 
geopolitics than tracing the outlines of 
planned infrastructure projects – Parag 
Khanna 201623 
3.1 Introduction 
Through the literature review in chapter 2 we have seen how small states have often 
been analysed as isolated and abstract entities and we have hypothesised that in the real 
world they could be greatly affected by their geographic position, which could 
challenge the validity of general propositions. Therefore, what has been identified is a 
paradoxical “geographic gap” in the International Relations (IR) literature on small 
states; however, beyond generic examples it is now necessary to investigate in much 
greater detail how in practice geography may impact the power position of these actors 
and whether it indeed becomes significant. It has in fact been noted in chapter 2 that at 
times small states studies have looked at the impact of geography but have failed to do 
so in a systematic manner. Therefore, this chapter takes stock of the unsystematic 
insights into the relation between geography and small states available in the literature – 
especially those included in Handel (1990), Gyawali (2000) and Faure and Klaousen 
(2000) – and provides a very specific and well-defined lens through which this relation 
can be studied. An initial question that can be deduced from chapter 2 is whether a 
central geographic position increases or reduces an asymmetric relationship. In other 
words: is being centrally located an advantage or a disadvantage for a small state 
intended as the weaker party in an asymmetric relationship? 
                                                          
23 Khanna (2016: 210). 
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To answer this question, this chapter develops a new analytical framework based on an 
independent variable that so far has been neither conceptualised nor studied in 
International Relations: multinational transboundary infrastructures (MTIs). The 
research question at the core of this analytical framework is as follows: how do MTIs 
affect the relational power of small states?24 The framework is intended to make it 
possible to study the relation between these two variables assuming that power is the 
dependent variable and MTIs form the independent one. The framework isolating the 
variable of MTIs will thus make it possible to observe the impact of one aspect of 
geography on the relational power of small states. In fact, if it should be the case that 
MTIs allow small states to increase their power, it follows that holding a strategic 
central position could also be a source of power, and not vice versa as hypothesised by 
Handel (1990). 
This chapter will provide a systematic definition of MTIs. However, it must be 
underlined here that MTIs may not be relevant to all states, depending on the states’ 
spatial configuration. In fact, MTIs are made feasible by particular configurations of 
geographic position and internal characteristics that determine whether it is possible to 
build infrastructure directly linking the country with bordering states, or with indirect 
cross-border effects as in the case of the Nepal–India relationship. That said, it is likely 
that MTIs will concern almost every country, apart from very isolated islands. However, 
it is easy to figure out that MTIs undoubtedly apply to all landlocked states, as 
excellently stressed by Parag Khanna in Connectography, a recent work on the 
intersection between connectivity and geography further discussed below, in which he 
wrote “Landlocked countries are prisoners of geography, and infrastructure is the only 
way out. But their infrastructure depends on neighbors to connect through, thus it isn’t 
fully sovereign” (Khanna 2016: 203). This passage by Khanna is crucial because it 
                                                          
24 Here, the terms power and small states adhere to the definitions provided in chapter 2. It is 
worth restating that this research adopts a relational approach to power based on Dahl’s 
definition, as explained in chapter 2. 
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captures in a few words how important geography could be for small states and how 
crucial infrastructure could be in this respect. However, despite pointing out that the key 
question is “who controls and profits from it” (ibid.), Khanna’s study does not explore 
who exercises power through infrastructures and leaves this dilemma unanswered. The 
quote above is emblematic of this since it suggests that, for landlocked countries, 
transboundary infrastructures might represent both a resource and at the same time 
another potential source of dependency on their neighbours. 
The framework developed in this chapter will therefore set up a clear and systematic 
analytical tool that will then be applied to this research’s two MTIs–relational power 
case studies. The first section of this chapter focuses on the independent variable, MTIs, 
defining them and underlining why they are a promising variable for small states 
studies. The second section develops the analytical framework by focusing on the 
dependent variable: relational power. 
3.2 The independent variable: multinational transboundary infrastructures 
(MTIs) 
3.2.1 Defining MTIs 
According to the distinction made by Fung et al (2005: 409), in this thesis the term 
infrastructure will refer only to so-called “hard infrastructure”, i.e. physical networks 
such as roads, railways, pipelines and power stations, and not to “soft infrastructure” 
(services) such as the education system and the financial system. Having clarified the 
definition of infrastructure adopted by this thesis, we must formulate what exactly 
multinational transboundary infrastructures (MTIs) are. For our purposes a clear 
geographic implication is crucial since the rationale behind the concept of MTIs is to 
consider them a geographic variable useful in interpreting international politics and in 
particular the impact of geography on relational power within asymmetric relationships.  
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Therefore, only material infrastructure matters, since only by having a concrete 
territorial impact do they become geographic and potentially cross-border concretely 
modifying the geographies, spaces and territories in which they are built. Therefore, the 
material/physical criterion should not be understood as indicating the necessity of a 
material element external to the space (e.g. a pipeline) but might also be constituted by 
an intervention on the space to differently manage it (e.g. an irrigation scheme). 
Infrastructures might be directly transboundary when the infrastructure is located in at 
least two countries (e.g. a cross-border road) or indirectly transboundary in two cases. In 
the first case, the infrastructure could be located in a place from which it generates 
unequivocal transboundary effects (e.g. a dam on a transboundary river but located 
within the borders of a single country). In the second case, the infrastructure might in 
itself be non-transboundary but have accessory infrastructures in the same development 
plan that are directly transboundary, and which at the same time would be pointless 
without the main project (e.g. a cross-border power grid linked to a dam). Moreover, as 
it will be seen in full details below, small states, being often small economies, might 
need external capital to fund the construction of transboundary infrastructures. For this 
reason, given that the weaker side in the asymmetric relationship (the small state) in 
most cases might need foreign financial resources to build cross-border infrastructures, 
MTIs are those transboundary infrastructures also funded by foreign capital. It means 
that at least a section of the infrastructure is also funded by financial resources 
originating from public or private bodies outside the country in which the section is 
placed. It must be noted, however, that besides the main criterion of foreign capital, the 
multinational dimension might include the need for an inflow of other elements such as 
foreign technologies, or expertise and labour, without which the infrastructure cannot be 
constructed. Given these premises, we can now formulate a comprehensive definition of 
MTIs as ‘Directly or indirectly transboundary physical infrastructures built using also 
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foreign resources’. Finally, it must be specified what kinds of infrastructure may fall 
into the MTI category. It can be divided into five major groups: a) transport 
infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, railways and tunnels (both underground and 
underwater); b) infrastructure for energy transport, such as pipelines and power grids; c) 
infrastructure for energy production, such as dams; and d) telecommunications 
infrastructure, such as optical fibre or submarine cables; e) other interventions that 
modify the space (e.g. an irrigation scheme).  
However, despite the financial resources invested in projects of this kind and their 
political implications, and even though increasing attention is being paid to 
transboundary issues such as hydropower, the IR literature has so far failed to isolate 
them as a category. One of the rare articles that merges the two defining attributes of 
MTIs (cross-border scale and the presence of foreign investment) is a working paper 
published by the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) and titled “Foreign Direct 
Investment in Cross-Border Infrastructure Projects” (Fung et al. 2011). However, Fung 
et al. fail to clearly point out that the peculiarity of such projects derives from the 
combined effect of geography (transboundary) and financing (multinational). Instead, 
they focus more on the financial dimension of these projects than on their physical, 
transboundary nature. It seems that, in their view, transboundary infrastructures, which 
often involve large projects and consequently require foreign investment, become 
automatically transnational–multinational. The consequence is that in five of their six 
case studies the focus is on regional cooperation programmes focusing on infrastructural 
integration and cooperation (e.g. the Black Sea Basin European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI) or the Initiative for the Integration of Regional 
Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA)) rather than on specific physical 
infrastructures. By chance, the only individual physical infrastructure observed, the 
Nam Theun 2 Hydropower Project, is located in Laos.  
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3.2.2 Why are MTIs relevant? 
Infrastructure is one of the main drivers of globalisation and interdependence, and at the 
same time an economic priority in the developing world, where the lack of 
infrastructure is one of the most serious obstacles to economic development. A report 
by the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) estimated that 57 trillion dollars of investment 
in transport power, water and telecommunications infrastructure will be required 
between 2013 and 2030 and that the lion’s share needs to be invested in developing 
countries (Dobbs et al. 2013). With respect to the Asian continent, in 2009 the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) stressed that from 2010 to 2020 8 trillion dollars were 
needed in “overall national infrastructure”, together with some 290 billion dollars on 
“specific regional infrastructure projects in transport and energy” already under 
construction (ADB 2009: 4). When it comes specifically to Southeast Asia, these 
impressive estimates remain very high, as shown in the ASEAN Investment Report that 
in 2015 pointed out the big infrastructure investment gap in the region, equal to some 
110 billion dollars per year; to fix this, the budget allocated by ASEAN members needs 
to be supplemented by external and private resources (ASEAN 2015). 
Therefore, the result of these two pressures – infrastructure being concurrently key to 
both globalisation and development – is an upsurge of multinational infrastructure 
projects. Mahalingam et al. (2005) clearly show how the discourses of globalisation and 
MTIs are intimately intertwined. They do so by explaining how the increase in overseas 
subsidiaries set up by multinational corporations from the developed world – and 
increasingly from the BRICS countries, as underlined by Gammeltoft (2008) – in sync 
with developing countries’ increased interest in attracting foreign capital creates an 
environment in which 
large-scale infrastructure projects involving 
participants and stakeholders from multiple 
countries are being undertaken in many parts of the 
developing world. To obtain an idea of the 
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magnitude of this trend, Engineering News Record 
magazine estimates that the top 25 international 
firms alone perform work worth $98 billion 
annually. (ENR Sourcebook 2004 cited in 
Mahalingam et al. 2005: 1–2) 
The multinationalisation of infrastructures is also brilliantly underlined by Jackson et al. 
(2007), who also note the potential political (and power) frictions deriving from this 
phenomenon: 
The nation-state has historically been the single most 
important “container” for the development of 
infrastructure: its most common geographic scale, its 
principal financier, and in almost all cases the 
ultimate source of its governance. At the same time, 
a good deal of the power of infrastructure lies in its 
ability to connect above or beyond the level of the 
state … This sets up a potential conflict, frequently 
realized, between the objectives of national 
advantage and those of transnational connection. 
(Jackson et al. 2007, emphasis added) 
As the strong economic and diplomatic interest in the set-up of the China-led Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) testifies, there is increasing interest worldwide in 
enhancing the physical connectivity (to which the newly established international bank 
is primarily committed25) within and among countries and regions. Also emblematic of 
the ever-increasing interest in infrastructure is the concept of “economic corridors”, first 
developed by the ADB in 1998 and conceived as a multimodal network of 
infrastructures with the function of stimulating economic development. Several cases 
could be brought up as examples of this trend, such as the agreement reached in April 
2015 between Beijing and Islamabad to develop the China–Pakistan Economic 
Corridor, a broad scheme based on several development projects, from hydropower to 
                                                          
25 The “Who we are” section of the AIIB’s website in fact begins with the following claim: “The 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is a new multilateral financial institution 
founded to bring countries together to address the daunting infrastructure needs across Asia. 
By furthering interconnectivity and economic development in the region through 
advancements in infrastructure and other productive sectors, we can help stimulate growth and 
improve access to basic services”. Retrieved from https://www.aiib.org/en/about-
aiib/index.html. 
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mining, that will include an integrated network of roads, railways, pipelines, ports and 
industrial hubs, and which will be more than 3,000 km long and worth around 46 billion 
dollars (Shah and Page 2015).26 
Such projects have an implicit strategic meaning that will be further analysed below. In 
this regard, Lesser et al. (2001) point out that 
the development of regional infrastructure is a way 
to increase interdependence among states, 
facilitating greater political cooperation and 
fostering a shared stake in regional stability. Since a 
number of key projects need to be multinational to 
be efficient, investments in common networks are 
high-profile ways to cement ties with neighbours. 
(Lesser et al. 2001: 74) 
This is a crucial point, since from it there derives the recognition that with respect to 
other kinds of international negotiation, agreements regarding MTIs, which are physical 
and intended to be permanent, are most probably very long term and binding. 
Investments in connectivity infrastructure are, in fact, different from other types of 
investment mainly because they require large-scale mobilisation of capital and because, 
being located across borders, are sensitive to domestic and foreign policy issues. 
Nonetheless, we must not forget that there is always the option of interrupting a 
network, as happened with the Kunming–Hai Phong Railway between China and 
Vietnam, which was interrupted in 1979 during the Sino–Vietnamese War. Therefore, 
another aspect of the ties that MTIs could favour is the risk of disruption involved in 
any such project related both to single infrastructures and to the wider supply chains of 
which these infrastructures are the nodes. The risk of disruption is, for instance, 
reflected by restrictive regulatory frameworks, like those in the United States (Tingley 
et al. 2015), which are designed to limit foreign intervention in critical infrastructural 
projects. 
                                                          
26 All the official information is also made available in the corridor’s official website: 
http://cpec.gov.pk/. 
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However, the path of multinational investment in infrastructure in emerging markets 
was not linear in the past, because these investments faced economic and political 
obstacles. Lesser et al. (2001) also specify that efforts to rebuild the infrastructure in 
south-eastern Europe  
will, over time, enhance stability in the region, but 
specific infrastructure plans are often motivated by 
distinct, even competitive, rationales. Some actors 
seek to enhance their geopolitical weight by 
promoting projects, as in the case of some planned 
transportation arteries or pipelines. (Lesser et al. 
2001: 73) 
As a matter of fact, a disparity in the cost–benefit distribution among different countries 
and actors “may arise due to differences in geography, economic size, institutional 
history and capacity” (Fujimura 2004: 2). For instance, the European Union focused on 
balancing infrastructure development with the needs of peripheral regions in order to 
avoid the risk of stimulating asymmetric gains and increasing disparities. In Brunner’s 
words, 
the EU did not want to embark on an early 
infrastructure and connectivity investment program 
without developing the capacities of the lagging 
regions at the same time … Peripheral regions need 
integration into larger networks and production 
chains to become economically viable. (Brunner 
2013: 13) 
Similar concerns are raised by the ambitious Chinese One Belt, One Road (OBOR) 
policy – thoroughly examined in chapter 6 – and policymakers, analysts and scholars 
around the world are struggling to understand its very nature, and whether is it inclusive 
or in fact China-centric (Arase 2015b), and all the opportunities and challenges it 
involves. 
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3.2.3 Strategic, political and economic implications of MTIs 
This section briefly sketches the economic, political and strategic value of MTI projects. 
It is obvious that these three dimensions would often overlap, considering their 
international nature, but it seems useful, before proceeding to address the analytical 
implications, rationale and purposes of an MTI framework for studying power, to point 
out what their empirical meanings could be. 
First of all, economically MTIs could present a myriad of complex issues to be 
addressed by the countries involved. For instance, the project could necessitate a loan 
from a foreign bank, resulting in financial exposure for the borrowing country. The 
hosting country may lack the necessary labour to carry out the construction work for the 
infrastructure as well as for operating and maintaining it once built and find itself forced 
to rely on large numbers of foreign workers. In addition, this kind of investment is often 
framed in Build–Operate–Transfer (BOT) or Build–Own–Operate–Transfer (BOOT) 
agreement schemes, resulting in the possibility of a long-term concession to foreign 
actors. Such a concession would probably include the land on which the infrastructure is 
to be built and therefore straddle the borders between the economic and political 
spheres. 
Second, for these reasons, and thanks to their scale and temporal horizon, MTIs require 
a significant amount of political commitment. Khanna (2016) argued that 
connective infrastructures across sovereign borders 
acquire special properties, a life of their own, 
something more than just being a highway or a 
power line. They become common utilities that are 
co-governed across boundaries. Such connective 
infrastructures thus have their own essence, a 
legitimacy that derives from having been jointly 
approved and built that makes them more physically 
real than law or diplomacy. (Khanna 2016: 17, 
emphasis added) 
In fact, such long-term projects require numerous coordinated efforts from the multiple 
actors involved at the various levels. Internally, this means balancing between different 
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interests and stakeholders and manage the unequal benefits for different regions or 
interest groups in the country (Fung et al. 2011). Externally, among other issues, there is 
the crucial need for multilateral coordination (e.g. managing transit rights), which is 
made extremely complex by the duration and complexity of MTIs and because the 
different phases of the projects (negotiation, planning, construction, operation, transfer, 
management) involve several decision-making levels. Moreover, this complexity 
implies a high degree of uncertainty; therefore, the bilateral and multilateral 
relationships among the states involved play a crucial role, and even if an MTI touches 
only two countries it is often contextualised in a power play that includes the broader 
regional or sub-regional environment. All these elements, thus, influence governments’ 
decisions when selecting from competing proposals for huge infrastructure projects, 
which usually leads to choices that are informed by parameters beyond mere financial 
ones (Chan 2016). 
Finally, at the strategic level MTIs have great impact since they represent a case of 
transnationalisation or even outsourcing (at least temporarily, as in the case of a BOOT 
agreement) of an asset that is always considered strategic per se. Transport routes, 
telecommunications or energy facilities that provide vital services to the country are 
usually considered as strategic national assets. That said, it follows that foreign 
investment in strategic national infrastructure by definition will become a strategic and 
high-level issue both for the recipient country and for the investor, which faces the 
expropriation risk. Moreover, the transboundary dimension of MTIs has strong 
implications for the relationships between neighbours; as Jackson emphasises, 
sometimes 
the disconnect or decoupling is consciously and 
strategically pursued, often for reasons of national 
security (e.g. the varying rail gauges of Europe, 
designed in part to thwart the advance of potential 
enemy armies) or economic advantage (e.g. the 
enduring division between North American (NTSC), 
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pan-European (PAL), and French (SECAM) colour 
television standards). (Jackson et al. 2007, emphasis 
added) 
If the investment (the multinational dimension) comes from the country whose border is 
crossed by the MTI project, the infrastructure in such cases could have even greater 
strategic meaning and implications. Two other critical strategic factors must not be 
forgotten. First, such costly projects need to be protected and this interest will be 
international by definition. The coup d’état carried out by Bozizè in 2003 in the Central 
African Republic, with support from Chad’s president, Idriss Deby Itno, in order to 
secure the pipeline from Chad to Cameroon is a good example of this (International 
Business Publications 2007). Second, MTIs might also become a tool of aggression as 
has been the case with the Ataturk Dam on the Euphrates, which was closed by Turkey 
to damage the Islamic State (Yaakov 2014). 
To conclude, it must be clarified that this research does not try to establish the role of 
MTIs (or connective infrastructure more generally) in relation to war, peace or conflict, 
nor in relation to how these infrastructures shape the global order. The scope of this 
thesis is much narrower and precisely consists in looking at the effect of MTIs on the 
relational power of small states through two MTI cases in Laos and based on the 
recognition of the relevance of geography pinpointed in the previous chapter. Therefore, 
the sections above had the function of defining the independent variable of the 
analytical framework – MTIs – and introducing their constitutive elements and their 
implications. The following sections will therefore focus on the development of the 
framework linking MTIs to relational power, the dependent variable. 
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3.3 The dependent variable: relational power 
3.3.1 The rationale behind the framework 
The rationale behind the development of an analytical framework to investigate the 
relational power of small states using MTIs as the independent variable rests on the 
assumption that we are witnessing a rapid, simultaneous increase in three phenomena: 
a) the rise in the number of states – and consequently also of small states – worldwide, 
provoked by the fall of empires, decolonisation and fragmentation27 (in the immediate 
aftermath of WWII in 1945, there were only 74 sovereign states (Alesina and Spolaore 
2005), compared to the current 193 members of the United Nations28); b) uninterrupted 
growth of globalisation and interdependence; and c) an increase in investment in 
infrastructure, especially in the developing world, and the likelihood of significant 
investments in the coming decades to fill the development gap, as detailed above. 
Therefore, MTIs can at the same time be seen internationally as a product of 
globalisation and interdependence and domestically as a tool of development for the 
least developed and developing states, which in many cases also fall into the category of 
small states. They can also be seen as a type of project likely to experience rapid growth 
in the coming decades, not only for these two reasons, but also because the more 
politically fragmented the world becomes, thus increasing the number of sovereign 
states, the higher the likelihood of cross-country infrastructure, for the simple reason 
that there will be more kilometres of international borders to be crossed by future MTIs. 
For small states, therefore, the relevance of the MTIs independent variable rests on the 
following three points: 
• Small states are often also smaller economies in terms of GDP, and for this 
reason they are more likely to need foreign investment to develop their 
                                                          
27 At the time of submission of this thesis, the headlines were dominated by the independence 
referendums in Catalonia and in Iraqi Kurdistan, while speculations persisted in relation to the 
possible future independence of Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
28 The list can be consulted on the United Nations’ website http://www.un.org/en/member-
states/. 
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infrastructure. Moreover, since their economies are often smaller than those of 
neighbouring countries it seems fair to argue that small states might need a 
greater number of MTIs in proportion to their economic size because, besides 
meeting their own needs, such projects could also be used by neighbouring 
countries for their own purposes (e.g. export-oriented production of energy). 
• Small states are often perceived as posing no danger to other states, yet this 
supposes that they cannot actively threaten more powerful states. But what if 
they could cause problems by preventing a more powerful state from doing 
something it would have otherwise done (for instance, precluding the 
interconnection of two big powers that need to use the small state’s territory)? 
The outcome could be a turn in Dahl’s definition of relational power, which 
could be reformulated as ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B 
NOT to do something that B would otherwise do’.29 In this way, small states 
could exercise a power of inertia. 
• Although it has been acknowledged that, thanks to the increasing global 
interdependence and interconnection already underlined, MTIs also hold a high 
strategic value for powerful states, it seems fair to estimate that the value such 
projects could have for smaller states is far greater, because of their higher 
susceptibility to geography (underlined in chapter 2) and to financial exposure. 
Moreover, and equally importantly, from a relational perspective it can be 
argued that a given MTI project could be of great relevance for B (the bigger 
state), but A’s government (the smaller state) would probably emphasise and 
prioritise it proportionally more, since compared to B it probably has fewer 
MTI projects to evaluate, build or oppose. Therefore, besides the overall 
                                                          
29 This phrase is the author’s reformulation of the quoted classic work by Dahl (1957: 202-203). 
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asymmetry of power between A and B, an MTI, even within the limited scope 
of a single project, is likely to be far more important for the smaller state. 
3.3.2 Making the analytical framework operational 
Chapter 2 has highlighted the difference between the two main approaches to power in 
international relations: on one hand, power-as-capabilities, and on the other hand, the 
relational conceptualisation of power proper to the Weberian tradition and systematised 
by Dahl (1957) and other scholars including Holsti (1964), Zartman (1997) and Baldwin 
(1989; 2013). This research, as already stressed, looks at power as the dependent 
variable, and therefore it needs a framework that does not try to individuate what means 
of power a small state might use (hard, soft, etc.) when it comes to negotiating MTIs. 
Rather, given that MTIs are the origin of the observed impact on relational power, the 
framework must accommodate the needs of a relational power analysis limited to a 
certain scope (i.e. the sector of the MTI in question, for instance road or transport 
development) and with respect to a specific domain (i.e. a specific bilateral 
relationship). In so doing, despite being limited to a specific scope (MTIs), this 
framework aims to take up the challenge raised by scholars like Baldwin (2013) to 
further explore research avenues using power as the dependent variable, which is often 
neglected because of the focus on capabilities. 
The original framework developed below builds on the theoretical, analytical and 
methodological intuitions contained in Hagström’s (2005) study on Japan’s China 
policy30, which was the first attempt to carry out a theoretically and methodologically 
rigorous relational power analysis. This thesis combines Hagström’s approach with a 
recent framework of influence developed by Goh (2016) and applied in a collective 
volume addressing China’s actual influence in developing Asia. Both studies sit well 
with the needs of this approach. First, Hagström (2005), despite avoiding treating power 
                                                          
30 The study focuses on the negotiations about bilateral investment protection and about the disputed 
Pinnacle (Senkaku or Diaoyu) Islands.  
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as the independent variable, recognises that “if power is defined as certain outcomes in 
the relationship between A and B, it would certainly be ‘a dubious analytical exercise’ 
to use ‘power to explain those outcomes’” (Wohlforth 1993: 4, cf. Waltz 1979: 175, 
quoted in Hagström 2005: 399). He considers “the exercise of power to be the only 
relevant context of the power context” (ibid.). Second, Goh (2016)’s study offers a well-
developed framework on which it is possible to draw for different reasons. For one, 
although it is called an “influence framework”, Goh’s research purpose is coherent with 
a relational power analysis as it tries to understand China’s “actual power” looking at 
how (and how effectively) it attains its goals. Goh’s definition of influence as actual 
effect overlaps with the concept of relational power applied in this research. As 
Womack points out in his review of Goh’s work, “while for some authors ‘power’ 
implies the capability to compel and ‘influence’ implies softer forms of prevailing, for 
Goh, ‘influence’ covers the full range of the efficacy of power on the behavior of 
others” (Womack 2016). Nevertheless, Goh builds the influence framework from the 
perspective of China, i.e. of the supposed influence-wielder, the agent, whose actions 
are investigated in order to see how effectively power (capabilities) is translated into 
“actual influence” in interactions with the target of such influence. However, since 
negotiations about an MTI project between a small state and a more powerful actor 
might transcend the intentionality of exercising power/influence, and might at the same 
time originate from both the former and the latter, for our purposes the distinction 
between relational power and actual influence is of no relevance. 
This framework is intended to be applicable to every asymmetric bilateral relationship – 
even if extremely asymmetric, as in the case of China and Laos – to see through the 
empirical observation of a specific scope (MTIs) how the asymmetry of absolute power 
(capabilities) works in practice and what concrete effects can be seen, both for the small 
and for the powerful, in their social encounter of negotiating an MTI. The only 
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difference, thus, is location of the agency, since here the objective is to test, not the 
actual influence of a powerful actor, as in Goh’s study on China, but the actual change 
in relational power within an asymmetric bilateral relationship during negotiations on 
one or more MTIs. Therefore, thanks to the consistency between Goh and the approach 
of this research, the elements contained in Goh’s framework fit well the needs of a 
relational power analysis in which power is used as the dependent variable. Given this 
premise, combining the works by Hagström (2005) and Goh (2016) with the relational 
power approach an analytical framework with relational power as the dependent 
variable can now be formulated in its operational components which consist in the 
following four analytical tasks. 
1) Assessment of preferences 
The first task that the investigator must carry out is an analysis of the preferences of A 
and B about the independent variable, i.e. the selected MTI. In fact, as power is not 
conceived as a possession but instead as a relation, as pointed out by Guzzini (2010), it 
is impossible to study power without knowing the relative importance given by the 
actors to the different options. The clearest case, in fact, is represented by a situation in 
which there is a strong and explicit divergence between the preferences of the two 
actors. In this case, ceteris paribus, it would be enough to link the outcome with the 
extant preferences to see which state has been more successful in the MTI interaction. 
In contrast, a situation of perfect convergence might well end up in a win–win scenario 
in which identifying an exercise of power observing the initial preferences might be 
challenging. However, in reality preferences could arguably be much more complicated 
and multi-levelled, encompassing all kinds of approaches to power present in the IR 
literature, spanning from situations of conflict in which preferences diverge, to forms of 
soft power in cases of converging interests that produce contexts of co-optation and 
consent, and, in the middle, the exercise of indirect power, for instance by agenda 
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setting (Goh 2016). In fact, even when general preferences are aligned, disagreement 
can easily arise over the details of specific facets of the negotiations, such as the speed 
at which one state complies with the other’s requests (Zartman 1997).  
If negotiations about a potential MTI begin, it automatically means that at least one of 
the countries involved has an interest in building it. Therefore, MTIs constitute a scope 
in which there cannot be a preference vacuum. However, MTIs might be originally 
planned in countries external to an A–B pair of countries investigated, and thus reflect 
interests that originated elsewhere (think of an intercontinental pipeline that at some 
point crosses two states that share an asymmetric relationship such as the Trans-
Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) that on its way from Azerbaijan to Europe 
crosses the Georgia-Turkey border). For this reason, it might well happen that within a 
bilateral negotiation process on MTIs, external states have a direct stake and thus 
participate indirectly in the negotiations, pursuing their own interests. Therefore, in the 
process of reconstructing A’s and B’s preferences, it is essential to examine the role of 
the wider geopolitical context and how it interact with the MTI negotiations.  
To conclude, it must be underlined that this research takes preferences as autonomous, 
coherently with the assumption of rationality implied in the rational actor model and the 
conception of states as unitary and purposeful entities, as described in chapter 1. It 
shares Goh’s and Hagström’s rationalist approach, who underlines how, “in the end, 
interests’ analysis thus focuses on express wants, preferences and choices (as revealed 
through political participation), and on signs of B’s grievances, opposition or veto 
towards A” (Hagström 2005: 402–403). 
2) Conditions of power 
Once A’s and B’s preferences have been assessed, the second step of the relational 
power analysis is verifying that the empirical analysis can trace the presence of two 
conditions that are constitutive components of a relational power relations: a) causality 
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– causal relation between A and B through the MTI needs to be traceable in order to 
prove the presence of relational power in which an actor cause another actor “behave in 
a manner in which [it] otherwise would not have done” Goh (2016: 7); and b) goal 
attainment – the outcomes must be consistent with A’s and/or B’s preferences for the 
observed MTI. 
3) Forms of power 
Second, after having assessed A’s and B’s preferences, and once evidence of the 
presence of a power relation is also found, it needs to be understood how this power is 
exercised, and through what tools. Power can in fact be exercised through a) hard forms 
of power such as coercion – forcing the other actor to accept/stop the MTI and 
signalling the consequences if it does not comply; and b) soft forms of power such as 
persuasion (offering a reward) or inducement (convincing the other that the MTI is in its 
own interest). These tools, borrowed and adapted from Goh, represent a complementary 
analytical step. In fact, if the empirical analysis does not show signs of either of these 
forms of power it would be difficult to conclude that the relation between A and B in 
the MTI negotiations is indeed a power relation. 
4) Outcomes 
The fourth and last analytical task to strengthen the results of the analysis is to provide 
an assessment of the balance of absolute gains and costs, since for a small state they are 
far more relevant than relative ones. In fact, small states can hardly represent an 
existential threat to more powerful countries. So the non-competitive nature of the 
relationship is what makes only absolute gains important (Baillie 1998). In addition, 
costs are also relevant in assessing relational power (Baldwin 2013). The impact on 
relational power, however, is assessable only in qualitative terms since it is hard to 
quantify the value and the increments of power (Zartman 1997). 
  
79 
3.3.3 What is the expected impact of MTIs on power? 
It appears very difficult to predict what the impact of MTIs on power might be without 
a systematic study to support the question. Signals could in fact lead to opposing 
scenarios, as shown by the examples provided by Handel (1990) and Gyawali (2000) 
mentioned in the previous chapter. If we think, for example, of technology, we could 
intuitively challenge the thesis developed by Vital and Rothstein who believe “that 
advancing technology has reduced the relative military power of small states” (Keohane 
1969: 298). However, if technology is brought in by big states to build an MTI that is in 
their own interest, but in the small state’s territory, it might also create advantages for 
the small state and thus making the effect of technology double-edged. Conversely, as 
Johnson and Derrick (2012) highlight in their study on the geopolitics of energy 
infrastructure in Eurasia, if a place is simply bypassed by an infrastructure, this may act 
against the interest of the hosting countries because states “such as Poland, Ukraine, 
Belarus, etc., have interests, and these interests do not necessarily align with economic 
considerations that cause companies to build infrastructure projects such as Nord 
Stream” (Johnson and Derrick 2012: 484–485). They recognise that infrastructures such 
as gas pipelines are “embedded in the territories through which they pass – subject to 
what might be termed political geographic frictions that can interrupt the provision of 
the service or commodity to its intended consumers”, but they also stress that pipelines 
“can also be nearly disembedded from their territorial contexts” (ibid.). As this 
reasoning seems to suggest, small states may face negative externalities of MTI projects 
that benefit mainly remote and bigger countries. On the other hand, if we think, for 
instance, of Switzerland or Singapore, we might assume that a small state with few 
internal resources could take advantage of favourable geographic and external systemic 
conditions arising from being strategically located at the heart of a continent or of sea 
routes. 
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Finally, indications of the potential impact of MTIs can also be found within the rich 
literature on natural resources that, sharing an intimate relationship with geography, are 
assets potentially important for small states. This might be valid especially if small 
states are able to display a network of MTIs that facilitates, for instance, energy exports. 
In fact, as Hadfield has clearly pointed out, energy has the 
ability to dramatically transform the fortunes of 
states … Energy resources are inherently 
territorialized, meaning that they constitute the very 
material of a country giving greater definition to 
both the physical contours and political boundaries 
of a state. In addition, the revenue raised by the sale 
of energy exports usually outweighs that of any 
other national industry … Natural resources are 
capable of providing states with internal order and 
external influence, and thus are a source of relative 
power. (Hadfield 2008: 442) 
Hadfield’s reference to the effect on power of natural resources suggests that is crucial 
also to observe the impact of the network through which small states can mobilise such 
resources, which in the case of gas is likely to be a multinational transboundary 
pipeline such as the above mentioned Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) 
that will allow Azerbaijan to export its gas to Europe. 
3.4 Conclusion 
Through the perspective proposed in this framework, it will be possible to see in the 
MTI case studies whether or not MTIs can be a source of power in a small state such as 
Laos or whether, by contrast, they constitute just another tool of influence in the hands 
of more powerful actors. In general terms, it has been argued that MTIs might be 
transformative of their strategic, political and economic implications, compared to the 
limited resources of a small state. The two MTI cases of Laos will provide a concrete 
example of this argument since their combined value is close to a year of national GDP. 
By adapting Khanna’s (2016: 17–18) metaphor, it will be possible to see whether David 
or Goliath gains more from connectivity within an asymmetric relationship and whether 
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MTIs serve Goliath’s purpose of increasing its power projection and leverage or, on the 
other hand, provide David with a tool for balancing the asymmetry. In fact, the case 
studies presented in chapters 5 and 6, analysed by applying this analytical framework, 
will provide answers to the question of which is more successful in achieving its 
preferences in two particular cases of connectivity through MTIs. 
Moreover, this path is worth the effort given the complete overlooking of MTIs in the 
literature and given that this attempt could stimulate a greater awareness of geographic 
attributes in scholars focused on small states. To some extent, the overlooking of this 
variable could also partly explain the lack of literature on small states since, as 
Neumann and Gstöhl (2004) argue, 
The idea seems to hold sway that, regardless of its 
theoretical worth, at least writings on great-power 
politics have a certain inherent interest due to the 
importance of the subject, whereas writings on small 
states do not. In empirical terms, the study of small 
states may only be apposite if small states have 
pertinence for outcomes. (Neumann and Gstöhl 
2004: 19) 
So, if small states have “pertinence” for vital multinational and multi-billion 
infrastructures that are going to last for decades, they might become ever more relevant 
for International Relations research. In fact, the discipline of International Relations 
could benefit from a structured analytical framework of what could fairly be considered 
the nervous system of the world. It has been stressed that MTIs have plenty of political 
implications, since they are crucial for linking countries, regions and borders for long 
periods, if not permanently, as well as being prompted by a range of motives and having 
various economic effects, thanks to the average magnitude of such projects. Discussing 
integration and infrastructure in Latin America, Tanzi (2005) clearly implicitly relates 
the process of economic integration to the need for MTIs, underlining how 
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In the past, autarchic economic policies created 
conditions that forced markets to develop 
prevalently within national borders. For most 
products, services, and activities, the market and the 
country were often the same thing … Thus, little 
cross-country infrastructure was built. For this 
reason trade among Latin America countries 
developed much less than it could have developed 
and certainly less than trade between these countries 
and the rest of the world. (Tanzi 2005: 5, emphasis 
added) 
In a world shaped by globalisation, combined with the increasing segmentation of 
political sovereignty mentioned above, cross-border flows of people, commodities, 
energy, manufactured goods and information will experience tremendous growth. 
Therefore, going along with the themes introduced in chapter 2, it appears to be 
inconceivable to analyse international politics while paying little or no attention to 
geographic variables, and in this regard this research tries to fill this theoretical gap, 
applying the MTIs–relational power analytical framework developed here to the 
negotiations on two large and crucial MTIs in the context of the asymmetric relations 
between Laos, on one side, and Vietnam and China, on the other. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
Even with his four legs the animal slips; 
even with all his knowledge the scholar 
makes mistakes – Lao proverb31 
 
4.1 Introduction 
It has already been stressed in the previous chapters that this research is a case study. It 
in fact respects the principal criterion of “one among others”, which is essential to any 
case study (Stake 1995: 2). Moreover, this research does not aim to build a comparison 
between similar processes in different contexts, as in cross-case studies; therefore, it 
constitutes a within-case analysis. As outlined in the previous chapters, the main 
purpose of this study is to observe the impact of multinational transboundary 
infrastructures (MTIs) on the relational power of small states through a case study of 
Laos. To this end, two MTI projects have been selected for the reasons presented in 
chapter 1: the Xayaburi dam and the Boten–Vientiane high-speed railway. These two 
MTIs have been selected as a result of the observation of surprising and counter-
intuitive facts within the interactions over the two projects between Laos, on one side, 
and Vietnam and China, on the other. The two MTIs were therefore used as case studies 
in this research being the most relevant such projects in the country from an 
international relations point of view as a result of their magnitude; the fact that they 
involve Laos’s two most important neighbours and partners and their key interests 
(connectivity for China and water security for Vietnam); and the regional scope of both 
projects. Given that this research represents the first attempt to use MTIs as the 
independent variable, on one hand it cannot deductively apply already well-developed 
theories (theory-confirming), and, on the other hand, it does not seek to establish 
                                                          
31 Cited in Dakin (2003: 89). 
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regularities and to find out laws inductively (theory-building). That does not mean, 
however, that this thesis rejects a scientific approach pursuing a typology of case study 
defined as atheoretical by Lijphart (1971) and configurative-ideographic by Eckstein 
(1975). Instead of testing theories that are already available in order to understand 
whether the case study of Laos confirms or contradicts those theories, this research aims 
to generate new hypotheses (Lijphart 2007) that, if tested through further studies, might 
lead to new theories. In view of the lack of previous research and of the fact that this 
thesis is a within-case study, it follows that a reconstructive approach best fits the 
research needs. As suggested by Della Porta and Keating (2008), immersing oneself “in 
the situation to be studied, to empathize with the population and see things from their 
perspective”, is the only way the researcher can explore highly sensitive political issues 
(Della Porta and Keating 2008: 31). Nonetheless, to some extent it is evident that “even 
the most comprehensive description done by the best cultural interpreters with the most 
detailed contextual understanding will drastically simplify, reify and reduce the reality 
that has been observed”, and by using the lens of analysis of the MTIs–relational power 
analytical framework this study will “avoid being overwhelmed by the massive 
cacophony of potential and actual observations about the world” (King et al. 1994: 43–
46). 
It must also be underlined that the selection of Laos for a case study of how MTIs might 
affect the power of small states does not derive from the assumption that Laos is 
“typical of a category”, but from what Laos “tells us about complex social processes” 
(Della Porta and Keating 2008: 28). The rationale, in other words, is that the chosen 
within-case study might generate new hypotheses that further research might test 
(Lijphart 2007). In fact, this case study aims to provide insights that could lead to 
further research on the role of MTIs, even in a more deductive perspective. In this way, 
it would be possible to “acknowledge and uncover its specific meaning while extracting 
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generalisable knowledge actually or potentially related to other cases” (Vennesson 
2008: 226). That is to say, while this thesis does not have a theory-building nature, it 
aims to formulate new hypotheses and, in so doing, stimulate the theoretical debate 
around power, asymmetric relationships, small states, connectivity and infrastructures in 
the field of International Relations. Moreover, the goal of obtaining data that can be 
replicated and compared is coherent with an analytical framework that adopts defined 
variables instead of providing mere description of the phenomena. 
Translated into operational terms, a reconstructive methodology requires methods and 
techniques to gain in-depth knowledge and in so doing penetrate the structure to 
highlight actors, spaces and processes – in this case, those that compose the issues of the 
two MTIs studied in this thesis. The next section will highlight how the method of 
process tracing, combined with elite interviews, meets the specific needs of the 
research. 
4.2 Applying process tracing and qualitative elite interviews to the case study 
Since the focus here is not a crystallised event but rather, and especially as far as the 
Boten–Vientiane railway is concerned, ongoing processes influenced by several actors 
and interests, process tracing, “a research procedure intended to explore the processes 
by which initial conditions are translated into outcomes” (Vennesson 2008: 224), fits 
the needs of this research. Moreover, besides exploring causal mechanisms, process 
tracing also provides a tool to analyse complex decision-making (Tansey 2007: 765). In 
fact, process tracing means looking “at the observable implications of putative causal 
mechanisms in operation in a case … The goal is to establish which of several possible 
explanations is consistent with an uninterrupted chain of evidence from hypothesized 
cause to observed effect” (Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2004: 22). Using this 
methodology, for instance, it might be noticed that the actions and interests of a specific 
actor, which at first glance are overlooked, are of great importance. In this way, using 
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process tracing in this research can shed light on misunderstood drivers that in generic 
and shallow analysis could be ignored or wrongly associated with the MTI issue. Yet, if 
process tracing is used as a logical strategy to follow causes and effects, it needs to draw 
on a comprehensive knowledge of the subject, which can be achieved only through 
intensive analysis, reconstruction and description. The necessity of a wide evidence 
base is stressed by Bennett, with particular concern for politics, since “participating 
actors have strong instrumental or ideational reasons for hiding or misrepresenting 
information about their behaviour or motives” (Bennett 2010: 211). 
In addition, process tracing is consistent with the purposes of the analytical framework 
developed in chapter 3 because it allows possible causes to be linked with observed 
outcomes and can be used to generate new theories (Vennesson 2008). Importantly, 
with particular regard to studying relational power, both Hagström (2005) and Goh 
(2016), i.e. the two scholars on whose work the analytical framework proposed in 
chapter 3 draws most significantly, stress that a reconstructive methodological approach 
“consisting in process-tracing, interest and intentional modes of analyses” (Hagström 
2005: 401) meets the needs of a relational power analysis. Goh proceeds along similar 
lines, emphasising that “modes of influence cannot remain a matter of conceptual 
definition and deduction; they must be applied to and further refined through empirical 
observation and process-tracing” (Goh 2016: 15). Process tracing represents a flexible 
tool in the hands of a researcher involved in a very focused project who needs to 
approach the observed subject of investigation without rigid preformed hypotheses in 
mind; however, it is different from descriptive case studies for three main reasons: a) it 
is much more focused; b) it is structured through an analytical framework; and c) it 
follows a causal path. As Vennesson points out, “process tracing based on intensive, 
open-ended interviewing, participant observation and document analysis helps to 
understand the meaning and role of established regularities and can help to suggest 
87 
ways to uncover previously unknown relations between factors” (Vennesson 2008: 
234). 
Given the particular context of Laos and the scarcity of documents related to the 
diplomatic dimension of the two MTIs to be collected and analysed, the most feasible 
way to generate evidence was carrying out open-ended semi-structured elite interviews, 
a powerful method capable of feeding process tracing’s requirements. Because the 
actors directly involved in the negotiation, development and planning of the Xayaburi 
dam and the Boten–Vientiane high-speed railway (as well as the observers and experts) 
are well defined, this research opted for the method of elite interviews, a suitable tool 
considering that the within-case study helps to “identify key political actors – those who 
have had the most involvement with the processes of interest” (Tansey 2007: 765). 
Among the purposes of elite interviewing, those most appropriate to this research are 
reconstruction of events; adding new information to documentary evidence; and 
corroborating findings from other sources to increase their reliability. In the particular 
case of Laos’s elite, considering the lack of literature both in Lao32 and in English 
(especially on issues related to the country’s foreign policy, as underlined in chapter 1, 
and more broadly involving international politics) and its one-party political system, in 
which the flow of information is strongly controlled, elite interviews were the only way 
to “shed light on the hidden elements of political action that are not clear from an 
analysis of political outcomes or other primary sources” (Tansey 2007: 767). 
As a consequence of the targeted elite sample and of the sensitivity of the issues to be 
discussed, semi-structured face-to-face qualitative interviews were deemed the best 
technique, given the need to guarantee confidentiality to the interviewees, the cultural 
differences between the researcher and the researched context and the preference of 
members of the elite to express their opinions without pre-formulated, closed options 
                                                          
32 Since the author does not speak Lao, in order to research material published only in Lao, the 
assistance of Lao-speaking contacts, especially colleagues at the Faculty of Law and Political 
Science at the National University of Laos, was necessary. 
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(Harvey 2011). Moreover, in respect of surveys, semi-structured interviews have the 
advantage of granting a high degree of flexibility and the possibility of adjusting the 
questions to a specific interviewee’s personal and professional background. As 
Hensengerth points out, 
in foreign policy research quantitative interviewing 
would not yield usable results, since the viewpoint 
of the respective expert depends a lot on his or her 
personal and professional background … It is 
therefore indispensable to be not only personally 
present at the interview, but it is essential to observe 
how the interviewee reacts to questions (body 
language), how he or she formulates answers, and if 
the interviewee gives only implicit answers. 
(Hensengerth 2006: 32) 
Given the need for flexibility, the need to rapidly create a positive relationship and a 
comfortable environment for conversation and for building trust with the interviewee (at 
least to some degree), and the need to achieve in-depth conversation in which all 
potential nuances and signs are intercepted, it was decided to conduct all interviews face 
to face and on an individual basis. These were the factors that motivated the research 
design before the data collection stage conducted during the fieldwork in Laos, but ex 
post it was clear that it was an unavoidable method since, as can be seen in the table 
below, only 2 out of 48 interviewees agreed to having the conversation recorded, which 
meant that telephone or email interviews would have been almost impossible and, even 
in the best-case scenario, would have yielded very little information given the desire of 
the vast majority of the sample to avoid any formal record of the conversation. Besides 
working around this aversion to being recorded, as Harvey emphasises, carrying out 
interviews in person greatly facilitates the building of trust between the researcher and 
the interviewee, which is crucial in order to obtain valuable information (Harvey 2011). 
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4.3 Data collection and analysis 
Once the most suitable research method had been selected, at the beginning of the 
second year of the PhD programme the planning phase for the data collection and 
analysis could begin. These two activities constituted an iterative and inextricably 
interconnected process because of the ongoing nature of the negotiations around the two 
selected MTIs. In order to trace the two negotiation processes and individuate and 
evaluate the key components of the MTIs–relational power analytical framework, it was 
necessary to understand a) the actors’ preferences; b) the presence of the conditions of a 
power relation; c) the forms taken by this relation; and d) the outcomes emerging from 
this relation. Therefore, the research developed into four main data collection and 
analysis phases to achieve these goals. 
First, a preliminary collection and analysis of the available primary and secondary data 
was carried out. The priority tasks before starting the interviews during the fieldwork in 
Laos, planned for the second part of the second year, were a) collecting and analysing 
all primary and secondary sources related to the two MTIs available in English; b) 
becoming familiar with the stakeholders involved in the two MTI negotiations in order 
to select the first group of potential interviewees from which to begin the snowball 
sampling process, which is the best strategy for elite interviews, as explained below; 
and c) compiling a set of guiding questions for each of the two MTIs in order to make 
the most of the semi-structured qualitative interviews and obtain the data necessary to 
feed the analytical framework. The documents that were collected and analysed in order 
to get as many primary data as possible included the following: government documents 
that could be retrieved from specialised databases (e.g. www.laofab.org) or from 
institutional websites, press releases, transcripts of public speeches by policymakers, 
documents of international organisations, both governmental and non-governmental 
(e.g. the Mekong River Commission), policy briefs, legislative documents, and official 
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publications available on institutional websites. Besides primary sources, all the books, 
scholarly articles and newspaper articles on the two MTIs available in English were 
collected and analysed. Moreover, the author obtained access to the Vientiane Times 
archives starting from 2012. Despite being a newspaper, and thus providing secondary 
data, given the political context the Vientiane Times – the leading Laos daily newspaper 
published in English – can be closely associated with the GoL and thus represents to 
some extent a middle ground between primary and secondary sources. Second, after 
completion of the activities of the first phase of data collection and analysis listed 
above, a three-month period of fieldwork was carried out in Laos at the Faculty of Law 
and Political Science at the National University of Laos in Vientiane, where the author 
was hosted as a visiting researcher from 3rd March 2015 to 9th June 2015, during which 
period 47 (out of 48) semi-structured elite interviews were conducted. The strategies, 
achievements and analysis of the interviewing process will be fully described and 
discussed in the next section, but here two things must be stressed: a) the data obtained 
from the interviewees proved to be necessary to make sense of the confusing (and 
scarce) openly accessible information on the two MTIs (especially with regard to the 
railway case), and it thus became the core component for the findings of this research, 
as the two next chapters demonstrate; and b) the interviews were also crucial to 
discovering primary and secondary data overlooked during the first phase and also, 
most importantly, to adding to the data available in English some key sources in the Lao 
language, accessed and translated thanks to the cooperation of colleagues at the host 
institution, the Faculty of Law and Political Science at the National University of Laos. 
The third phase consisted of the transcription of the interviews from the notes and audio 
records, followed by the analysis of the transcripts through manual codification of the 
themes, which were then grouped into key categories. It was decided to carry out the 
data analysis without using electronic software such as NVivo because the data were 
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already focused and because the analytical framework led the selection and analysis of 
the results emerging from the textual data. Once the key themes and categories were 
individuated, they were triangulated with preliminary collected data and with the other 
data that emerged from the interviews in order to verify the information provided by 
individual interviewees. In order to do this, the author looked at single pieces of the 
transcripts and triangulated all relevant information without looking at which 
interviewees provided it in order to avoid being influenced by personal feelings. The re-
association of the data with the interviewees quoted in the next two findings chapters 
happened only after the conclusion of the triangulation phase. Moreover, to avoid 
including misleading, speculative or non-verifiable data in the findings, information that 
was not confirmed in the triangulation process was discarded unless it appeared to be 
very structured and motivated by the interviewee, with richness of detail, or unless the 
author regarded the informant as extremely credible and knowledgeable about a specific 
issue that could not be confirmed by other primary or secondary sources or by any other 
informants. The fourth, and last, phase of the data collection and analysis research 
process took place contemporaneously with the beginning and the continuation of the 
writing-up stage. In fact, as one of the two MTIs, the Boten–Vientiane high-speed 
railway, was still under negotiation at the end of the fieldwork in Laos in June 2015, it 
was considered necessary to continue updating the data throughout the data analysis and 
the writing-up period until almost the very end of the PhD programme. This was 
achievable thanks to the wide network of contacts developed in Vientiane, which 
allowed the author to quickly gain reliable information on the high-speed railway by 
following up with colleagues at NUOL and some of the interviewees in a fast and cost-
effective manner (in most cases, in fact, the follow-ups took place in the forms of 
telephone and Skype calls or email, Facebook and WhatsApp messages). This allowed 
the author to follow the development of the Boten-Vientiane railway project that 
92 
occurred from the end of 2015 (six months after the end of the fieldwork in Laos) to the 
beginning of construction, which constituted the end of the negotiation, at the end of 
2016. The excerpts taken from the answers to these additional follow-up questions are 
cited as personal communications.  
The following section will focus on the second phase of the research, the interviews, 
which were the decisive source of information necessary to understand the negotiations 
of the two selected MTIs, as will be seen in chapters 5 and 6. The process and 
achievements of the research strategy described above, in which the interview stage 
plays a central role, will be highlighted, and both the strengths and the challenges of a 
research method based on semi-structured qualitative elite interviews will be reflexively 
evaluated. 
4.4 The semi-structured qualitative elite interviews: strategies, results and 
assessment 
The fieldwork research and thus the vast majority of elite interviews (42) were 
conducted in Laos’s capital, Vientiane, for both methodological and practical reasons. 
Methodologically, this was because the two MTIs were located in Laos and the vast 
majority of the stakeholders of the two MTIs were also in Laos and concentrated in its 
capital city. Certainly, in investigating two international infrastructures in their 
relational (bilateral) dimension with Vietnam and China, it could have been beneficial 
to also conduct interviews in the decision-making centres of these two states. However, 
not only was this not feasible due to budget and time constraints, but China’s and 
Vietnam’s stakeholders could also be (and were, as is seen below) accessed in 
Vientiane, starting with their diplomatic representatives. The only exceptions are 
represented by the five interviews carried out in Bangkok 20th–24th April 2015, which, 
as the researcher was based in Vientiane, were conveniently reachable, and the one 
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conducted in Newcastle upon Tyne (United Kingdom) in January 2016, a few months 
after the fieldwork in Laos was completed. 
4.4.1 Snowball sampling 
The decision to interview key actors implies that a random sampling strategy is not 
suitable. Instead of randomly selecting the sources to be interviewed, the process tracing 
method, combined with elite interviews, requires a full knowledge of the issue 
observed, which leads to selection of the most informed and relevant interviewees. 
Moreover, it is often impossible to find all the required information in advance using 
publicly available resources such as the websites of institutions, newspapers or social 
networks, so the author opted for the snowball sampling method, a non-probability 
sampling strategy that requires only an initial set of potential respondents to be 
identified in advance and involves asking this initial group of people to suggest other 
potential interviewees for subsequent stages. As Tansey points out, non-probability 
sampling meets the needs of process tracing since the purpose is not generalisation 
(Tansey 2007). Snowball sampling also makes it possible to penetrate the network 
(Burnham et al. 2008) and this task might be feasible in contexts such as Laos, where 
networks, as will be seen below, are very dense. 
4.4.2 Guiding questions 
Guiding questions were prepared based on background knowledge and the literature 
review carried out before the beginning of the interview process, but flexibility was 
applied both in the order in which these questions were posed and in the focus, 
depending on the interviewee’s role and attitude and on the interview situation, and 
allowing the interviewer the chance to react flexibly to issues that were raised during an 
interview. Considering the very scarce information available on the diplomatic aspects 
of the Xayaburi dam and the then planned Boten–Vientiane railway, the short set of 
basic questions developed before the start of the fieldwork, and listed below, was then 
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refined under the guidance of scholars at the Faculty of Law and Political Science at the 
National University of Laos in Vientiane. 
The questions on the Xayaburi dam included the following: 
• What are the pros and cons of the Xayaburi dam for Laos and for the other 
countries involved, with particular reference to Vietnam? 
• What are the costs and benefits, in particular for Laos and Vietnam? 
• How was the Government of Laos able to go ahead with the construction of the 
Xayaburi dam in 2012 despite Vietnam’s opposition to the project? 
• Wasn’t Laos concerned about compromising its special relationship with 
Vietnam? 
• How important has support from other actors been? 
• How do you see the overall relationship between Laos and Vietnam? Have 
changes occurred since the green light was given to the Xayaburi dam in 
November 2012? 
The set of questions on the Boten–Vientiane railway included the following: 
• What are in your view the most relevant pros and cons of the Boten–Vientiane 
high-speed railway project for Laos and for the other countries involved? 
• How exactly do you think Laos will benefit or be at risk from the development 
of the project? 
• Why is the project still under negotiation even though an agreement was reached 
back in mid-2010 with a plan for completion by 2015? 
• In your opinion, was the delay caused more by China or by Lao, and why? 
• How much room for manoeuvre has Laos had so far during the negotiation 
process? 
• How relevant do you think the railway is for the countries involved? 
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These questions evolved constantly during the process as additional information led to 
new questions and subquestions. 
4.4.3 List of informants and analysis of the sample 
As already noted, because the focus of this work is Laos, and because of resource and 
time constraints, 42 interviews out of 48 were conducted in Laos’s capital, Vientiane. 
Nonetheless, as the table below shows, foreign stakeholders, especially from the 
countries involved in the two MTIs studied, have been interviewed intensively in order 
to gain a wider and more balanced spectrum of data. 
Table 4.1 – List of interviews33 
CODE DATE LOCATION ORGANISATION ROLE LENGTH ANONYMOUS 
1-2015 18/03/2015 Vientiane 
National University 
of Laos, Faculty of 
Law and Political 
Science 
Vice Dean 1.5h No 
2-2015 18/03/2015 Vientiane 
National University 
of Laos, Faculty of 
Law and Political 
Science 
Lecturer 1.5h No 
3-2015 18/03/2015 Vientiane 
National University 
of Laos, Faculty of 
Law and Political 
Science 
Associate 
Professor 
1.5h No 
4-2015 19/03/2015 Vientiane 
CominASIA,  
Power Division 
Engineer  1h Yes 
5-2015 19/03/2015 Vientiane 
National University 
of Laos, Faculty of 
Law and Political 
Science 
Lecturer 1.5h Yes 
6-2015 21/03/2015 Vientiane None 
Independent 
Senior 
Researcher 
1.5h Yes 
7-2015 23/03/2015 Vientiane 
Banque Pour Le 
Commerce 
Exterieur Lao 
Analyst 1h Yes 
                                                          
33 All affiliations contained in the table refer to the date of the interview.  
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8-2015 25/03/2015 Vientiane 
Lao private 
company 
CEO 1h Yes 
9-2015 26/03/2015 Vientiane 
Mekong River 
Commission 
Senior 
Officer 
1h Yes 
10-2015 01/04/2015 Vientiane 
Mekong River 
Commission 
Senior 
Officer 
1h Yes 
11-2015 01/04/2015 Vientiane 
Mekong River 
Commission 
Former 
CEO 
1h No 
12-2015 02/04/2015 Vientiane 
Embassy of a 
European country 
in Lao PDR  
Senior 
Diplomat 
1h Yes 
13-2015 02/04/2015 Vientiane 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Lao PDR 
Diplomat 1h Yes 
14-2015 03/04/2015 Vientiane 
Asian Development 
Bank, Lao PDR 
Resident Mission 
Senior 
Officer 
1h Yes 
15-2015 03/04/2015 Vientiane 
Consultative Group 
for International 
Agricultural 
Research Program 
on Water, Land and 
Ecosystems 
Senior 
Researcher 
1h Yes 
16-2015 07/04/2015 Vientiane Vientiane Times Editor 45m Yes 
17-2015 15/04/2015 Vientiane 
Thammasat 
University, Centre 
for Logistics 
Research 
Director 1h No 
18-2015 17/04/2015 Vientiane 
Ministry of Energy 
and Mines of Lao 
PDR 
Senior 
Advisor 
1h Yes 
19-2015 20/04/2015 Vientiane 
Embassy of India in 
Lao PDR 
Senior 
Diplomat 
1h Yes 
20-2015 21/04/2015 Bangkok 
Dawei SEZ 
Development Co. 
Ltd 
Senior 
Officer 
1h No 
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21-2015 21/04/2015 Bangkok 
Neighbouring 
Countries 
Economic 
Cooperation 
Agency, Thailand 
Ministry of Finance 
Senior 
Officer 
1h No 
22-2015 22/04/2015 Bangkok 
Thailand 
Development 
Research Institute 
Foundation 
Senior 
Researcher 
1h Yes 
23-2015 24/04/2015 Bangkok 
Chulalongkorn 
University 
Professor 1h Yes 
24-2015 24/04/2015 Bangkok 
Chulalongkorn 
University 
Professor  1h Yes 
25-2015 02/05/2015 Vientiane 
Qinghai Institute of 
Salt Lakes, Chinese 
Academy of 
Sciences 
Senior 
Engineer 
1h Yes 
26-2015 12/05/2015 Vientiane 
Embassy of the 
United States in 
Lao PDR 
Senior 
Diplomat 
1h Yes 
27-2015 13/05/2015 Vientiane 
Embassy of an 
ASEAN country in 
Lao PDR 
Ambassado
r 
1h Yes 
28-2015 13/05/2015 Vientiane World Bank 
Senior 
Consultant 
1h Yes 
29-2015 14/05/2015 Vientiane 
International Water 
Management 
Institute 
Senior 
Researcher 
1h Yes 
30-2015 14/05/2015 Vientiane 
Ministry of Natural 
Resources and 
Environment, 
Department of 
Water Resources 
Senior 
Officer 
1.5h Yes 
31-2015 15/05/2015 Vientiane 
Consultative Group 
for International 
Agricultural 
Research Program 
on Water, Land and 
Ecosystems 
Senior 
Researcher 
45m Yes 
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32-2015 16/05/2015 Vientiane 
Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für 
Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit, 
Economic 
Development 
Programme 
Senior 
Officer 
1h Yes 
33-2015 18/05/2015 Vientiane 
National University 
of Laos, Faculty of 
Agriculture 
Associate 
Professor 
1h Yes 
34-2015 19/05/2015 Vientiane 
Xayaburi Power 
Company  
Technical 
Officer 
45m Yes 
35-2015 23/05/2015 Vientiane 
Mekong 
Environment and 
Resources Institute 
Researcher 1h Yes 
36-2015 23/05/2015 Vientiane 
National University 
of Laos, Faculty of 
Economics and 
Business 
Management 
Associate 
Professor 
1h Yes 
37-2015 26/05/2015 Vientiane 
Embassy of 
Thailand in Lao 
PDR 
Senior 
Diplomat 
1.5h Yes 
38-2015 27/05/2015 Vientiane 
Vientiane Capital 
Government, 
Department of 
Foreign Affairs 
Senior 
Officer 
1h Yes 
39-2015 27/05/2015 Vientiane 
Prime Minister’s 
Office of Lao PDR 
Senior 
Officer 
30m Yes 
40-2015 27/05/2015 Vientiane 
Xinhua News 
Agency, Lao PDR 
Office 
Editor 45m Yes 
41-2015 29/05/2015 Vientiane 
Ministry of Public 
Works and 
Transport of Lao 
PDR 
Senior 
Officer 
1h Yes 
42-2015 01/06/2015 Vientiane 
Embassy of 
Vietnam in Lao 
PDR 
Senior 
Diplomat 
1h Yes 
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43-2015 02/06/2015 Vientiane None 
Independent 
Senior 
Advisor 
45m Yes 
44-2015 02/06/2015 Vientiane 
Ministry of Energy 
and Mines of Lao 
PDR 
Senior 
Officer 
1h Yes 
45-2015 02/06/2015 Vientiane 
Ministry of Public 
Works and 
Transport of Lao 
PDR, Lao–Sino 
Railway Project 
Senior 
Officer 
1h Yes 
46-2015 02/06/2015 Vientiane 
China Chamber of 
Commerce to Lao 
PDR 
Senior 
Officer 
1h Yes 
47-2015 05/06/2015 Vientiane 
Embassy of China 
in Lao PDR 
Senior 
Diplomat 
1h Yes 
1-2016 30/01/2016 
Newcastle  
upon Tyne 
Vietnam National 
University of HCM 
City 
Lecturer 1h Yes 
 
In the table above, we can note four principal characteristics. First, the variety in terms 
of institutional affiliation: eight officials of the Government of Laos, seven non-Lao 
diplomats, one official of the Government of Thailand, ten academics, five researchers, 
four members of international organisations, two journalists, seven members of the 
private sector and four consultants (working between the public and the private sector). 
Second, the prevalence of senior respondents (41) over lower-level informants (seven). 
Third, almost all the interviewees preferred not to be recorded because of the sensitivity 
of the issues explored, in terms of both diplomacy and internal politics, but also because 
of their great economic relevance: the two MTI investments account for 3.7 (the 
Xayaburi dam) and 6.04 billion dollars (the Boten–Vientiane high-speed railway), and, 
besides the concerns of political sensitivity, in the case of the railway project the fact 
that during the interview process it was still in the negotiation phase meant that the 
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details might have had to be kept secret for business reasons. Therefore, as indicated in 
the table, in all those cases the researcher had permission only to take notes. Fourth, 
seven respondents agreed to be quoted. In these cases, the interviewer assured them they 
would be provided with the final version of the sections in which the quotes were to be 
inserted in order to make sure that no misunderstanding had taken place. Moreover, it 
can also be noted that the interviews with academics and junior respondents were 
concentrated in the first phase as a result of the academic environment in which the 
researcher was involved. In fact, being based at a local university made it quite easy to 
start interviewing experts belonging to the Faculty of Law and Political Science. As for 
the junior respondents, they were the contacts whom it was easiest to contact in the 
early stage thanks to personal contacts or contacts provided by the Faculty. 
What the table does not say is that besides the variety of affiliations, the 48 interviewees 
include nationals of 14 different countries, and a balance is struck between the 
perspectives of Lao and non-Lao respondents since 24 of the total of 48 interviewees 
were Lao nationals and 24 non-Lao nationals. Apart from the Western experts 
interviewed, the majority of informants are from Asia (40) and especially from ASEAN 
countries (36). 
The assortment of respondents favoured rich data collection and was achievable thanks 
to the particular context in which the research was carried out. In fact, Vientiane, being 
a capital city with a population of fewer than 800,000 people, has a dense network. 
During the research process the author was able to appreciate how intensively its elite is 
interconnected while obtaining appointments using the snowball method thanks to 
recommendations made by previous interviewees, in the same sectors or from different 
fields alike. Finally, the interviews with Western expatriates, who have often worked 
and lived in the country or in the region for several years, if not decades, also 
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contributed to the collection of information that was very valuable for improving the 
questions and adding new ideas and hypotheses vital to the triangulation phase. 
4.4.4 Strengths and challenges 
Despite the high sensitivity of the issues researched, especially considering Laos’s 
internal political features,34 after assuring each interviewee that his/her name would not 
appear in any thesis or report (which sometimes needed to be done several times during 
the conversation), in most cases it was possible to establish a good relationship with the 
interviewee from the very beginning of the meeting. There were probably a number of 
reasons for this, beginning with the fact that the research did not touch too sensitive 
issues of domestic politics. Infrastructure development, in fact, is at the top of the 
Government of Laos’s agenda, as will be seen in the next two chapters. That said, since 
most of the interviews were conducted with senior, non-Western people, the interviewer 
always paid great attention to being extremely respectful, beginning with arriving on 
time at the appointment, and observing the appropriate dress code and, after exchanging 
business cards in order to demonstrate as officially and reliably as possible the author’s 
identity and affiliation, expressing his sincere gratitude to the interviewee for having 
sacrificed some of his/her time to meet the author. 
As already stressed, the questions, and their order, changed from interview to interview, 
but the strategy normally followed was to start slowly, introducing the purposes of the 
research and asking general questions; then, if the interviewee appeared relaxed, 
positive and cooperative, more sensitive questions were posed, and previous answers 
were sometimes even indirectly questioned. Even though at this point the attitudes of 
some of the interviewees changed, becoming more defensive, most of them actually 
went with the flow of the conversation and demonstrated their willingness to provide 
                                                          
34 A one-party communist regime that exercises control over the whole of political life, 
including the information process. It is worth remembering, for instance, that when it comes to 
writing their dissertations, Lao students of International Politics avoid topics related to their 
own country (Interview 5-2015). 
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more in-depth information or even to voice their doubts and speculations. Without a 
doubt, in order to reach this result it was crucial to build trust from the start of the 
meeting, and formal affiliation with the Faculty of Law and Political Science at the 
National University of Laos helped a lot with this. In fact, this was discussed at the 
beginning of the conversation and in many cases the interviewee was already aware of 
this as he/she had been directly contacted by the staff of the Faculty. Another factor that 
surely helped in building trust can be seen in the similarities between the researcher’s 
background and the backgrounds of some of the interviewees, who in a number of cases 
had pursued PhDs themselves, meaning they could empathise with the author from the 
very beginning of the meeting. In such cases the conversation often began with talk of 
general PhD-related issues before moving on to the interview and in this way paved the 
way for a much more relaxed encounter. 
In addition, an advantage of interviewing members of the elite was that it was possible 
to use the English language in all of the interviews apart from two, thus avoiding all the 
problems related to the use of interpreters. In the two cases in which an interpreter was 
necessary because the interviewee did not speak English, the selection of the interpreter 
was based on his/her English skills but also on the interpreter’s knowledge of the 
subject and familiarity with academic discourses and practices, in order to minimise the 
risks of mistranslation and of loss of control by the interviewer over the process proper 
of interviewing with an interpreter’s assistance (Kapborg and Berterö 2002). For these 
reasons, and also to avoid the high rates charged by interpreting agencies, in both cases 
an interpreter from the National University of Laos was chosen. In consideration of the 
difficulties typical of interviews conducted through an interpreter, the author prepared 
for the meeting with the interpreter beforehand in order to brief him/her on the topics 
and questions that would be raised and to agree on what to do in particular 
circumstances that might arise during the meeting (e.g. what to do if the interviewee 
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appeared suspicious or became more defensive). It also seems worth stressing that the 
research experience proved that in most cases junior respondents did not appear very 
comfortable about talking freely and dealing with a foreign researcher, perhaps because 
they did not exactly understand the purpose of the exercise or because they were 
worried about the risks of talking without their superiors’ permission. Conversely, the 
high-ranked interviewees were generally much happier to enter into discussion and 
readier to provide information. 
4.4.4.1. Getting access 
In order to access the first set of key informants, a formal letter of request for an 
interview was submitted in both Lao and English and using the National University of 
Laos letterhead. It also included email and mobile contacts for the author and for the 
hosting professors in Laos. As suggested by Harvey (2011), the letter contained the 
following information: the identity of the researcher, a brief description of the research, 
the estimated duration of the interview, details of where the data would be published 
and whether the interviewee names would be public or anonymous. However, this 
process did not yield good results at all: in all cases, if a reply was given it arrived 
weeks later and said that the office/person in question could not provide information on 
the topic. It is the author’s belief that this has to do with the level of seniority of those in 
the offices and the presence of an intermediary. In fact, sending formal request letters to 
offices or submitting them via email to official email addresses meant going through 
administrative personnel or low-level contacts established by the author. The normal 
answer to a request to meet a superior was that he/she would of course be very busy, 
and then, usually after a long wait, it would turn out not to be possible to schedule an 
appointment. In one case, after submitting the official request letter and after over 10 
follow-up calls, it was still impossible to arrange the interview. In addition, in many 
cases staff required a file containing the questions to be submitted in advance. 
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Conversely, in the cases in which the author was able to establish direct contact, 
especially via mobile phone, with elite members, in 100% of the cases a meeting was 
granted within a short time (normally within one or two weeks at the most) and the 
researcher was never asked to submit the questions beforehand – providing information 
on the broader issues to be discussed was sufficient. It is important also to stress that 
among the meetings arranged with elite members through direct contact via mobile 
phone or private email, or thanks to recommendations from former interviewees 
(snowball method), only in one case did the interviewee, a very high-level official, not 
cooperate at all, even though the appointment had been agreed, avoiding almost all the 
questions and merely suggesting that the interviewer go to this or that ministry to obtain 
the information requested. It seems reasonable to think that in this case the appointment 
was granted simply to avoid being impolite to the acquaintance who had arranged the 
meeting. 
A highly emblematic case was the interaction with the embassy of China, which had 
initially been approached in the usual way (sending the formal request letter) in order to 
arrange a meeting with someone involved in the Boten-Vientiane high-speed railway 
project. Not having received any reply to the letter or to a couple of emails and phone 
calls, the author showed up at the reception of the embassy and was given a landline 
number to call the next day that turned out to be the number of a mobile phone shop in 
Vientiane that had nothing to do with the Chinese embassy. It seemed either that the 
receptionist had been explicitly instructed to avoid contact with people without any 
previous link or appointment with someone in the office or that the receptionist himself 
did not feel comfortable passing on the request, which was probably not usual practice. 
Whatever the answer to this, the interview was granted, and conducted within a week, 
only after the author obtained the mobile number of a high-level Chinese diplomat from 
a personal contact. 
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Of course, there is no unequivocal right way to access members of elites; it largely 
depends on the cultural and political context in which the research is framed. As a 
matter of fact, one clear example of cultural difference concerns the attitude to the use 
of mobile numbers. In Laos, mobile numbers appeared not to be regarded as private, as 
they are usually in Europe. Therefore, the author learned from experience that it was not 
impolite to contact people on their private mobile phones. It was actually much better 
and faster than using email, as the attempt to meet a senior Lao ministerial officer 
demonstrated: when the researcher finally called him, and after having introduced 
himself and mentioning that he had already tried to contact the officer a couple of times 
via email, the answer was “Received nothing! Do you want to come tomorrow morning 
at 9am?”. 
4.4.4.2 Power and cultural divides 
 In elite interviews the power relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee 
is generally in favour of the latter, given the disparity in knowledge of the subject under 
investigation (Burnham et al. 2008). Moreover, as a postgraduate student interviewing 
members of the elite there was also an imbalance in terms of seniority. Because of such 
imbalances, in elite interviews there is always the risk that interviewees will manipulate 
information (Bennett 2010). This could be motivated by an interviewee’s desire for 
personal advantage or by the wish to avoid the publication of sensitive data. This risk is 
particularly relevant for interviews with officials who might be interested in presenting 
the reality in a different fashion or covering it up. To deal with this risk, the author 
adopted two strategies: he made the interview sample as large as possible and included, 
along with members of the elite from Laos, China, Thailand and Vietnam who were 
directly involved, other nationals both within and outside the region, with the purpose of 
accessing different perspectives, minimising the risk of manipulation and facilitating the 
triangulation of the data provided by the respondents. The problem of deciding how 
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many interviews should be done in order to obtain reliable evidence is one of the most 
common in research projects of this kind (not only for elite interviewing) and the 
answer varies from project to project. Burnham et al. (2008) suggest that for a project 
principally based on elite interviewing, a number between 20 and 30 would be good. 
Therefore, as highlighted above, the author considered a larger sample of respondents to 
be vital for collection of relevant and reliable data setting the target of carrying out at 
least 30 interviews (that ended up being 48). 
The power relationship leads to another common issue faced by qualitative 
interviewers: the problem of positionality. As Mullings underlines, 
a researcher’s knowledge is therefore always partial, 
because his/her positionality (perspective shaped by 
his/her unique mix of race, class, gender, nationality, 
sexuality and other identifiers), as well as location in 
time and space will influence how the world is 
viewed and interpreted. (Mullings 1999: 337) 
Therefore, the qualitative interviewer finds himself/herself forced to manage the 
difference in positionality with the interviewee. With regard to this research the cultural 
differences between the author and the majority of the respondents were to some extent 
relaxed by the opportunity to use the English language during the interviews (apart from 
two cases, as pointed out above), which avoided the use of interpreters. Moreover, the 
similarities in the professional backgrounds of the interviewees and of the researcher 
(especially in the case of academics) helped reduce the cultural differences. In sum, it 
emerged that the issue of power imbalance was a much more serious challenge to be 
faced than that of belonging to different cultures and countries. However, in one case 
these problems manifested themselves very seriously, and not surprisingly it was during 
one of the two interviews that needed an interpreter. In this case, the interviewee asked 
the interpreter several times why a European researcher should care about relations 
between Southeast Asian countries, even suggesting to the interpreter that he should not 
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have been helping the interviewer. Although in the end it was possible to obtain some 
valuable information from the conversation, this interviewee firmly refused to 
recommend other informants. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter systematically showed how the research strategy was developed and how 
the data collection and analysis were conducted, explaining why the mixed method of 
process tracing and elite interviews was a good fit for the research’s needs and 
providing details of the different phases of the research. To summarise, conducting 
research on politically sensitive issues in a one-party state that was until recently 
isolated from the international system, as is the case in Laos, could seem an extremely 
complex and challenging endeavour. However, the present chapter shows that, despite 
several constraints, such as the author’s inability to speak the Lao language and the 
limited time and financial resources at his disposal, it has been possible to carry out, in a 
relatively short period of time, a significant number of elite interviews with high-level 
stakeholders belonging to key offices who are involved in or experts on the two MTI 
negotiations. Two key drivers enabled this achievement. First of all, the research focus, 
despite involving foreign policy issues often considered sensitive in a political system 
like that of Laos, was on the area of infrastructural and economic development, which is 
crucial for the Government of Laos, and this helped the author to obtain attention and 
access. Second, the author perceived that in general the members of the Lao elite 
approached appeared to react very positively to the young European researcher who was 
devoting attention to their country, which is very often overlooked by academic 
research. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE IMPACT OF THE XAYABURI DAM MTI ON THE 
RELATIONAL POWER OF LAOS VERSUS VIETNAM 
If water is stored upstream for irrigation, 
the flows downstream for agriculture may be 
less than downstream users are expecting. 
Whenever a river is contaminated, pollution 
always flows downwards. When a dam is 
constructed, benefits are generated but at 
the same time change of flow regime will 
impact downstream users. Such examples 
may explain why the word “rival” comes 
from the Latin “rivalis” meaning one using 
the same river as another. Within this 
context, diplomatic negotiations for water 
sharing are a fundamental and always 
conflicting basis of relation between States – 
Benedito Braga 201435 
5.1 Introduction 
In chapter 2 it was shown that small states literature in the broad spectrum of 
International Relations displays a paradoxical lack of attention to geography. In order to 
fill this gap in the literature, chapter 3 developed the MTIs–relational power analytical 
framework to observe how the geographic variable of MTIs might affect a small state’s 
relational power. Chapter 4 then identified process tracing and elite interviews as the 
best methodological tools to investigate the negotiations on MTIs in order to understand 
the effect of this variable on relational power. This chapter applies the MTIs–relational 
power framework to the Xayaburi dam within the Laos–Vietnam relationship, the first 
of the two case studies in this research, and presents the findings generated from the 
analysis of the primary and secondary data collected on the Xayaburi MTI negotiations. 
  
                                                          
35 Braga (2014: 17). 
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Figure 5.1 – Xayaburi: the first mainstream dam in the Lower Mekong 
 
Source: Energy in Asia 
The outcome of such an investigation will highlight the effect of this specific MTI on 
the relational power of Laos with respect to downstream Vietnam (the domain) and 
within the scope of the management of the Mekong River, in which the Xayaburi dam is 
being built (Figure 5.1). 
According to the definition provided in chapter 3, the Xayaburi dam can be classified as 
an MTI. It is multinational, being built thanks to foreign investment by the Thai 
construction company Ch. Karnchang funded by Thai banks. At the same time, the dam 
is also indirectly transboundary because it is located on the mainstream of the Mekong 
River – which crosses several national borders, flowing from the Tibetan Plateau in 
China to its Delta in Vietnam – and it will likely have an impact on downstream 
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countries (i.e. Cambodia and Vietnam). This is the transboundary dimension of the 
Xayaburi dam, of interest for this research since it has an impact on Vietnam, in respect 
to which its effect on the relational power is observed. However, it must be noted that, 
as detailed in the reconstruction below, the dam has also been transboundary in another 
way since 29th October 2011, when the Xayaburi Power Company Limited and the 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) signed a Power Purchase 
Agreement (PPA), according to which EGAT will buy 95% of the electricity 
produced.36  
The focus of this study is on the interaction between Laos and Vietnam in relation to 
Laos’s plan to build the Xayaburi dam. The role of Cambodia is of no relevance in this 
respect because the analytical framework requires the observation of the effect of MTIs 
on the relational power of small states with regard to more powerful actors. Therefore, 
while the Vietnam–Laos relationship is clearly asymmetric, as already explained in 
chapter 1, the relationship between Cambodia and Laos is not. Laos and Cambodia, in 
fact, hold a similar asymmetry of power with Vietnam and, interestingly, a recent 
academic paper analysed Cambodia’s foreign policy towards Vietnam in the framework 
of small state diplomacy (Leng 2016). Moreover, this research focuses on the state-to-
state level, looking at the international diplomatic side of the Xayaburi dam issue rather 
than at the environmental, social, economic and legal dimensions, which are equally 
important but which have already been addressed by, among others, Jakkrit (2015), Le 
(2013), Baran et al. (2011), Rieu-Clarke (2015) and King (2015). Therefore, examining, 
for instance, whether or not the dam will hurt the Mekong’s biodiversity or the 
                                                          
36 The installed generating capacity of the Xayaburi dam will be 1,285 MW, which will allow it 
to produce 7,370 GWh per annum. The official website of the dam states that “The project 
comprises 7 turbine generator units of 175 MW each that will generate and transmit power 
through the 500 kV transmission system to EGAT, and one 60 MW unit that will distribute 
power through the 115 kV transmission system for domestic use in Lao PDR”. Source: 
Xayaburi Power Company Limited, available at 
http://www.xayaburi.com/Power_GC_eng.aspx. On doing the maths, it emerges that EGAT 
will receive 1,225 MW out of 1,285, i.e. a share equal to 95.3% of the dam’s total production. 
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livelihoods of people who rely on the river’s resources, inside and outside Laos, and 
whether or not it is economically and socially sustainable, are all matters beyond the 
scope and aims of this research. The issue, which involves several countries and 
interests, does in fact have far-reaching international implications. The extraordinary 
diplomatic relevance of this specific multibillion-dollar hydropower project is 
evidenced not only by the large number of newspaper and magazine articles – when 
googled together, the words “Xayaburi dam” return more than 60,000 results – but also 
by the academic research carried out by political scientists, who have focused on the 
political dimension of the problem – see in particular works by Cronin and Hamlin 
(2012), Thabchumpon and Middleton (2012), Geheb et al. (2015), Hensengerth (2015), 
Mirumachi (2015) and Suhardiman et al. (2015). 
The above-mentioned studies all stress the conflict between Laos’s interests and 
Vietnam’s regarding the dam, but a crucial question remains unexplored: how was the 
small state of Laos able to pursue its interest with regard to Vietnam, in so doing 
prevailing over one of its closest allies, by far more powerful than itself? The bilateral 
relationship between Laos and Vietnam, as already explained in chapter 1, is clearly 
asymmetric both in quantitative and qualitative terms. Here it is sufficient to remember 
that, on the quantitative side, in 2014, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIU), Vietnam’s GDP was nearly 16 times that of Laos and its population 13 times 
bigger. On the other hand, from a qualitative-relational perspective it is crucial that 
since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, the two countries have shared a “special 
relationship” that builds on the 1977 Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation in which 
Vietnam is without doubt the stronger party (Pholsena and Banomyong 2006). 
Therefore, applying the relational definition of small states proposed in chapter 2, in 
which a small state is the weaker part in a bilateral relationship, Laos can without doubt 
be defined as small in its bilateral relationship with Vietnam.  
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Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to provide an in-depth analysis of the interactions 
and negotiations between Vientiane and Hanoi without delving too much into technical 
and institutional details already addressed by the above-mentioned studies and available 
through reports published by governments,37 the Mekong River Commission and NGOs 
(e.g. International Rivers). Therefore, by focusing on the international and diplomatic 
dimensions of the issue and thanks to the data collected through the elite interviews 
with key stakeholders and policymakers, this chapter provides first-hand original 
information, shedding new light on the aspect of the Xayaburi negotiations that have 
received least coverage. The chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section 
sets the context in which the dam has been planned and in which construction has begun 
by illustrating Laos’s policies related to hydropower development. The second section 
provides a full reconstruction of the negotiations between Laos and Vietnam, tracing the 
process at both the bilateral and the multilateral levels and highlighting stakes, priorities 
and implications. The third section takes stock of the data provided by the previous one 
in order to interpret and explain the different phases and steps of the negotiations. 
Finally, the last section discusses the findings: first, carrying out a relational power 
analysis in the light of the data that have emerged and in accordance with the analytical 
framework developed in chapter 3; and second, analysing the theoretical implications of 
the findings. 
5.2 The policy context: the Mekong River as a key development resource for 
Laos’s “battery of Southeast Asia” policy 
Plans to exploit the lower stretch of the Mekong River – the twelfth-longest river 
worldwide38 – by damming its mainstream, with the objective of producing electricity, 
emerged in the late 1950s, when the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia 
                                                          
37 See, for instance, the webpage the Lao Ministry of Energy and Mines has dedicated to the 
project, available at http://www.poweringprogress.org/new/news/articles-presentations/207-
xayaburi-hydroelectric-power-project. 
38 More data on the Mekong River can be found here: https://wle-mekong.cgiar.org/mekong-
river-facts/. 
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and the Far East (ECAFE) indicated the need for dam building to serve the region’s 
economic development (Jacobs 2002). However, only with the end of the war in the 
region did the plans become politically viable. As Bakker points out in her abstract, 
With renewed economic interest in the Southeast 
Asian region following the “peace dividend” of the 
early 1990s, numerous hydrodevelopment plans 
have been initiated in the Mekong basin. The river-
as-resource, in a glibly bioregional metaphor, has 
been transformed from a Cold War “front line” into 
a “corridor of commerce”, drawing six riparian 
states together in the pursuit of sustainable 
development through economic and infrastructural 
integration and cooperation, promoted by multi- and 
bilateral donors and lending institutions. (Bakker 
1999: 209) 
The potential of the Mekong River and of its tributaries in the post-war context made it 
appear to be one of the few resources at hand for the underdeveloped and politically, 
economically and geographically isolated, landlocked, communist Laos. Pholsena and 
Banomyong (2006) describe this dynamic, stressing that from the 1990s, interest 
emerged in dam construction in the country thanks to the impetus towards it from the 
GoL and simultaneously from foreign investors and international lenders, who saw in 
the exploitation of water – blue gold – the best development strategy for Laos. The 
authors refer here to the Country Operational Strategy Study for Lao People's 
Democratic Republic, developed and published by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
in 1996, quoting the following passage: “the exploitation of hydroelectric resources 
represents for the Lao People’s Democratic Republic the most direct route to increase 
exports and raise GDP growth” (Pholsena and Banomyong 2006: 86). When it comes to 
the Mekong River, it cannot be forgotten that in this case the small Laos has been 
blessed by geography since it accounts for the largest share (25%) of the Mekong’s 
drainage basin of 790,000 sq. km (above Thailand’s 23% and China’s 21%) and for 
35% of the water discharged into the sea, followed by Thailand and Cambodia (18%), 
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China (16%) and Vietnam (11%), as shown on the map below (Figure 5.2). Equally 
important is Laos’s mountainous morphology: thanks to the beneficial elevation of its 
territory, Laos has high hydropower potential. 
Figure 5.2 - The whole Mekong Basin 
 
Source: UNESCO 
It is no surprise, then, that the country has sought – and seeks – to tap the river’s 
potential in order to increase its exports and improve its poor account balance. To this 
end, the GoL signed the first government-to-government (G2G) memorandum of 
understanding (MoU), which initiated the power exchange programme with Thailand in 
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1993.39 It was then renewed in 1996, 2006 and 2007, bringing the agreed amount of 
electricity to be supplied by Laos to the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand 
(EGAT) up from 1,500 MW to 7,000 MW. These agreements were followed by similar 
deals with Vietnam (5,000 MW under the 2006 MoU) and Cambodia (Vongsay 2013). 
The interest in hydropower and the related policy of focusing on it to increase the 
country’s exports potential and attract foreign exchange was then conceptualised in the 
formula of becoming the “battery of Southeast Asia” in the coming decades as a key 
national strategy (Weatherbee 1997). Hydropower promised to be the best solution to 
the structural problem of a poor external account record, not only thanks to the MoUs 
signed to export electricity to neighbouring countries but also because at the same time 
it would have reduced the need for hydrocarbons imports (Cooper 2014: 156). 
Therefore, for the GoL, implementing hydropower facilities became a necessary path 
towards economic development and poverty reduction40 and the sector was identified as 
a priority in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals with the aim of 
graduating from the status of least developed country (LDC) by 2020 (Vongsay 2013). 
In addition, given Laos’s lack of financial resources and technologies, hydropower 
development concurrently appeared to be a viable method of attracting foreign direct 
investment (FDI) (Geheb et al. 2015). Therefore, hydropower became a key area for the 
application of the liberal policies on foreign investment pointed out in Chapter 1, 
leading to a boom of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and Build-Operate-Transfer 
(BOT) agreements in the hydropower sector, facilitated regional investors such as 
                                                          
39 Before the signature of the 1993 MoU with Thailand, however, Laos already exported to 
Thailand the electricity produced by the Nam Ngum Dam, the country’s first hydropower 
facility, completed in 1971 with a potential of 150 MW and built on the homonym Mekong’s 
tributary. Despite its limited capacity, in the mid-1990s the Nam Ngum Dam still accounted 
for some 25% of Laos’s foreign exchange (Hirsch and Warren 1998). 
40 See for reference the National Policy “Environmental and Social Sustainability of the 
Hydropower Sector in Lao PDR”, signed on 7th June 2005 by the current Lao prime minister, 
Thongloun Sisoulith, then deputy prime minister as well as chairman of the Committee for 
Planning and Investment and chairman of the Lao National Committee for Energy. 
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Thailand and China as well as by international financial institutions such as the World 
Bank, the International Finance Corporation and the Asian Development Bank 
(Middleton and Dore 2015). This resulted in a significant privatization of the electricity 
market where in 2015 Independent Power Producers (IPPs) accounted for some 87% of 
the total generation capacity of electricity (ERIA 2017). These drivers have informed 
Laos’s policymaking on hydropower from the mid-1990s and continue to guide the 
action of the GoL, as can be seen from the Seventh Five-year National Socio-Economic 
Development Plan (7th NSEDP), which sets the socio-economic agenda for the period 
2011–2015. The document in fact states that 
[Over] 5 years, it is aimed to construct 8 hydropower 
plants with a combined installed capacity of about 
2,862 MW during the plan period. The next target is 
to expand medium voltage power transmission lines 
of 22 KV, provide off-grid electricity in rural and 
remote areas, and make electricity accessible to 80% 
of the total households in the country by 2015. Laos 
PDR has set rural electrification as an important 
factor for achieving MDG41 target. (Ministry of 
Planning and Investment of the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic 2011: 103) 
The draft of the 8th NSEDP, published in 2015, then focused on highlighting the cross-
border dimension and the need to develop the transmission system in order to increase 
exports, particularly to Thailand, Vietnam, China and Cambodia (Ministry of Planning 
and Investment of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 2015). Indeed, the 
hydropower sector was a key component in leading Laos’s economic growth, as 
underlined by Hansakul and Wollensak (2012). It is estimated that together with the 
mining sector it accounts for some 25% of Laos’s economic growth and for 15% of its 
total export revenues (Ministry of Planning and Investment of the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic 2015). These fulfilments were made possible by the rapid 
economic growth of the region, which stimulated a steady increase in demand for 
                                                          
41 Millennium Development Goals (http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/).  
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electricity among Laos’s neighbours. As can be seen in the figure below (Figure 5.3), 
the tremendous increase in electricity generation that took place in Laos in 2010 – 
provoked by the 1,075 MW Nam Theun II dam coming into operation – was almost 
completely absorbed by exports. 
Figure 5.3 - Laos’s electricity market (MW, 1994–2011) 
 
Source: Vongsay (2013) 
Moreover, the prospects for a further rise in electricity exports look promising, not only 
because of the rising demand from current importers42 and the expansion of cross-
border transmission lines, but also thanks to the likelihood of exporting to non-
neighbouring countries. For instance, in 2015 Laos was negotiating electricity exports to 
Singapore going through Thailand and Malaysia (Interview 18-2015).43 It is very likely, 
therefore, that the GoL will continue pursuing its “battery of Southeast Asia” policy and 
                                                          
42 To meet its great electricity needs, Vietnam is also developing nuclear facilities, with a target 
of over 10,000 MW of nuclear power capacity by 2030. To this end it has signed an agreement 
on civil nuclear cooperation with the United States (Wroughton 2013). 
43 There is a pilot project between Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Laos to see whether it is 
feasible to export electricity from Laos to Singapore. In 2014 a working group was formed to 
study technical details and in early 2015 a visit to study Singapore’s energy market was 
organised. Singapore, which currently imports only liquefied natural gas (LNG), would 
initially buy 100 MW. Given the very high prices of energy in Singapore it might be a 
tremendous opportunity for Laos: prices per kW are 7 US cents in Laos but 20 US cents in 
Singapore, due to its high taxation (Ministry of Energy and Mines of the Lao PDR 2015). 
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developing transmission lines to connect with the rest of the Greater Mekong Subregion 
(GMS) and other ASEAN countries. 
In this context, it certainly comes as no surprise that the Mekong River is at the core of 
Laos’s hydropower policy. The GoL in fact has plans to use the river’s unexploited 
potential to build a cascade of nine mainstream dams that, once operational, will have a 
total capacity of nearly 10,000 MW, about 38% of Laos’s total theoretical hydropower 
potential, which is estimated at 26,000 MW (Vongsay 2013). 
Figure 5.4 - Mainstream hydropower projects planned in the Lower Mekong in 
Laos and Cambodia 
Source: Phomsoupha (2015) 
These nine mainstream projects (Figure 5.4) combined thus have an enormous 
economic relevance for the GoL as they are expected to attract some 25 billion dollars 
in FDI and generate 2.6 billion dollars of yearly revenues from electricity exports, i.e. 
more than two thirds of the country’s total (Stone 2011, cited in Matthews 2012: 394). 
However, such projects have been delayed for years as a consequence of their economic 
119 
and technical complexity and of the uncertainty regarding their environmental impact, 
which has especially worried downstream Cambodia and Vietnam. The Xayaburi dam 
changed this story, becoming the first mainstream hydropower facility under 
construction in the lower branch of the Mekong and thus providing a great opportunity 
for a MTI case study. Moreover, when this research began the other eight mainstream 
dams in Laos that can be seen in the figure above were not started yet44. The next 
section provides an analysis of the process that led to the official groundbreaking 
ceremony for the Xayaburi dam project in November 2012. 
5.3 Reconstruction of the negotiations on the Xayaburi dam MTI 
Once completed, the Xayaburi dam, a 3.8-billion-dollar and 1,285 MW power plant 
currently under construction in the Xayaburi province of Laos, will be the first 
mainstream dam in the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB). As with general plans for 
hydropower development in the Lower Mekong, highlighted in the previous section, the 
origin of the Xayaburi project can be found in the Indicative Basin Plan drafted by the 
Mekong Committee, the predecessor of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) in 1970: 
as pointed out by Geheb et al., in that plan the location was “identified as a potential 
mainstream dam site” (Geheb et al. 2015: 112). The Government of Laos (GoL) dusted 
off the project in the first few years of the 21st century and appeared to be ready for 
concrete steps in 2007 when the negotiations and the bidding process took place, 
leading to an MoU signed on 4th May 2007 between the GoL and the Thai construction 
company Ch. Karnchang, whose proposal won against those of another Thai company 
and the American AES Corporation (WikiLeaks 2007). In order to build the dam on 
22nd June 2010, the Xayaburi Power Company Limited (XPCL) was registered in Laos, 
where the headquarters were established. Three months later, on 29th October 2010 the 
                                                          
44 Then in 2016 the construction of the Don Sahong dam at the border with Cambodia commenced, being 
followed by progresses on the Pak Beng dam in the North (see the dedicated pages provided by 
International Rivers and accessible respectively at: https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/media-
kit-on-the-don-sahong-dam-8103 and https://www.internationalrivers.org/node/10852).  
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company signed a Build–Own–Operate–Transfer (BOOT) agreement with the GoL, 
according to which, XPLC, after having built the Xayaburi dam, would operate it for 29 
years from the beginning of commercial operation, i.e. until 2048, before transferring 
the dam to the GoL.45 
From that time onwards, until the official groundbreaking ceremony held on 7th 
November 2012 at the dam site, complex negotiations were carried out that involved the 
four MRC members (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam). The negotiation process 
could be conceptualised as having developed along three main lines: economic, which 
mainly involved Thailand and Thai financiers and contractors and Lao counterparts; 
environmental and social impact, which involved MRC members as well as donors and 
NGOs; and foreign policy. As pointed out in the previous chapters, this study is an 
international relations analysis and therefore looks at the international dimension of the 
issue through the lens of the analytical framework of chapter 3 and in the light of the 
theoretical concepts that emerged from chapter 2. Therefore, it focuses on the 
preferences and actions of Laos and Vietnam during the process, with the aim of 
observing the effect of the Xayaburi MTI on the relational power of Laos versus 
Vietnam. 
5.3.1 The first phase: the multilateral negotiations within the Mekong River 
Commission 
Being a mainstream dam, the Xayaburi project needed to go through the Procedures for 
Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement (PNPCA) required by the 1995 Mekong 
Agreement (Mekong River Commission 1995). The Xayaburi case therefore became the 
first case in which the MRC applied this six-month long process, which formally began 
on 22nd October 2010 following the submission from Laos one month earlier (Mekong 
River Commission 2011). As Hensengerth emphasises, “during the following six 
                                                          
45 All the information regarding the Xayaburi Power Company Limited can be accessed at the company’s 
official website: http://www.xayaburi.com 
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months, the standard duration of the PNPCA, the four governments were unable to 
reach a compromise” (Hensengerth 2015: 918). On 15th April 2011, just a week before 
the end of the six-month period, Vietnam submitted the “Form for Reply to Prior 
Consultation” to the MRC through the Viet Nam National Mekong Committee (The 
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam 2011). The document clearly identifies Vietnam’s 
concerns related to upstream dam developments in terms of food and water security for 
its vital Delta region: 
Located further downstream, the Mekong Delta is 
vital to food and water security of not only Viet 
Nam, but also the region and the world. The 
livelihood of nearly 20 million people of Viet Nam 
has long started to observe the changes caused not 
only by the natural variation but, as evidence shows, 
also by the fast developments in the upper reaches of 
the Mekong River. The threats would become more 
severe if combined with the possible impacts caused 
by climate change and sea level rise, and 
mainstream development. Recent studies conducted 
by the Mekong River Commission as well as other 
international organizations have shown that 
upstream hydropower development, especially the 
mainstream cascade, will present serious threats to 
the Mekong Delta, in particular saline intrusion, 
reduced fisheries and agricultural productivities, and 
degradation of bio-diversity. They also point out that 
no benefits, for example from electricity 
productivity or unconfirmed regulation in dry 
season, would be able to outweigh the potential 
damages. (Socialist Republic of Vietnam 2011: 2, 
emphasis added) 
The document concludes by appealing to the close friendship between Hanoi and 
Vientiane and for cooperation among Mekong riparians, which should prevent unilateral 
benefits and damage to other states. It asserts that 
Viet Nam expects that its requests will be taken 
thoroughly and seriously into account by Lao PDR 
in the “Mekong Spirit”46 and fully in line with all 
                                                          
46 As underlined by Mirumachi (2015), the discourse about the management of the shared water 
resources of the Mekong “is often associated with the ‘Mekong Spirit’, or the goodwill of the 
states to work together despite being political adversaries” (Mirumachi 2015: 106). 
122 
principles set forth in the 1995 Mekong Agreement 
and the recent Hua Hin Declaration. Viet Nam 
wishes to reiterate its strongest commitment and full 
cooperation with other Member Countries, 
especially Lao PDR, the close friend of Viet Nam, in 
their respective endeavours toward its own 
prosperity, but not at the expense of the 
environmental health of the Basin as well as of other 
riparian countries. (The Socialist Republic of Viet 
Nam 2011: 3, emphasis added) 
Four days later, the MRC members attended a special session of the MRC’s Joint 
Committee in Vientiane, in which they recognised the impossibility of reaching an 
agreement and the need for the issue to be discussed at the ministerial level 
(International Rivers 2014). As an MRC technical advisor explained in an interview, the 
various riparian countries had different opinions and this led downstream ones to 
demand a 10-year moratorium to allow a comprehensive assessment of the 
environmental risks: 
The special session took place on 19th April and the 
four countries met to discuss the review of the 
Xayaburi project and to actually come to a 
conclusion on the prior consultation process. What 
was really the result of the meeting is that the 
countries had different opinions on the issue, for 
example Vietnam took the position that the 
knowledge was not strong enough. There are a lot of 
uncertainties and further investigations would be 
needed, so they were asking to have the project 
deferred by 10 years. (Vogel 2011) 
Vietnam’s request for a 10-year moratorium was based on the Strategic Environmental 
Assessment (SEA) of Hydropower on the Mekong Mainstream, prepared by the 
International Center for Environmental Management (ICEM) for the Mekong River 
Commission and published in 2010 (ICEM 2010). 
Once the six-month period was over, Laos claimed that the PNPCA was automatically 
finished (International Rivers 2014). According to a senior researcher, Laos did not see 
the Xayaburi dam as a transboundary project, and it considered that the PNPCA had 
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forced Laos to do something that it did not want to and that had never happened before. 
So the Government of Laos felt that it was already granting considerable concessions 
(Interview 15-2015). As a matter of fact, Suhardiman et al. (2015) stress that “fearing 
opposition from its downstream neighbors, and from Vietnam in particular as its closest 
ally (Inter Press Service 2011; Voice of America 2011a), Laos agreed to conduct more 
studies to assess the dam’s environmental impacts” (Suhardiman et al. 2015: 212).  
5.3.2 The second phase: negotiating at the government level 
So, despite the Laos prime minister’s reassurances to his Vietnamese counterpart, 
Ngueyn Tan Dung, during the 18th ASEAN Summit, which was held in Jakarta in early 
May 2011 (Thanh Nien News 2011), the GoL did not actually stop the project. This 
became evident shortly after the meeting in Indonesia, since Laos went ahead with its 
arrangements with the Thai developer, communicating to Ch. Karnchang in June of the 
same year that the PNPCA process was over and that the project could move forward 
(International Rivers 2014). This happened even though the compliance report 
commissioned from Pöyry Energy AG, the Swiss subsidiary of the Finnish consulting 
company, by the GoL in May 2011 was yet to be released. The GoL had to commission 
such a report given the divergences – and pressures from downstream countries – that 
emerged during the PNPCA process and the lack of an MRC mechanism to assess 
compliance with its standards (King 2015). The report aimed to alleviate downstream 
concerns and did confirm that the GoL complied with the MRC Design Guidelines and 
that it had taken into consideration the comments submitted by the other parties within 
the Prior Consultation process. However, it also pointed to the need for “adaptations and 
improvements” related to “sediment transport through the reservoir” and to “fish 
passing facilities” to be carried out during the construction (Pöyry Energy AG 2011: 9).  
In an interview with the author, Hans Guttman, chief executive officer of the MRC from 
14th November 2011 for three years, recalled that  
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In April 2011, Cambodia asked for more studies and 
Vietnam for a moratorium of 10 years with respect 
to the proposed Xayaburi Dam. Thailand’s position 
was unclear, probably it was uncertain. Laos took 
note of this and discussion followed until the MRC 
Council meeting of 8th December 2011, where it was 
agreed to conduct more studies, but in which 
Vietnam and Cambodia did not change their opinion 
since they deemed the degree of uncertainty 
unacceptable. From the perspective of Vietnam and 
Cambodia the PNPCA process has never been 
completed, but has been suspended. However, Laos 
(who considered the PNPCA completed after 6 
months) informed Thailand that the process was 
complete, therefore Vietnam and Cambodia cannot 
say, as happened on a few occasions, that Laos acted 
unilaterally, increasing the tension. Laos, on its part, 
insisted that it discussed with other counterparts all 
the relevant issues. (Interview 11-2015) 
On 17th April 2012 Ch. Karnchang publicly informed the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
that its Lao subsidiary had signed a contract with the Xayaburi Power Company: the 
“Engineering, Procurement and Construction Contract for the Xayaburi Hydroelectric 
Power Project” (The Nation 2012). Declaring that the construction had commenced on 
15th March 2012, it appeared clear that Laos was determined to go ahead with the 
project. In July 2012, the diplomatic repartee showed a new surge, with Vietnam and 
Cambodia asking to halt the construction. The Lao Minister of Foreign Affairs said it 
had actually stopped but was contradicted by the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) 
of Laos on the same day and these declarations were followed by a visit to the dam site, 
organised by the MEM in response to an MRC request, which was attended by some 70 
foreign delegates (International Rivers 2014). The last phase of the negotiations, before 
Laos officially gave the green light to the project, took place in early September 2012. 
On 7th September, just one day after the Vientiane Times reported that the Xayaburi dam 
would have gone ahead (Vientiane Times 2012), the then president of Vietnam, Truong 
Tan Sang, intervening at the APEC 2012 CEO Summit in Vladivostok (Russia), defined 
water as the oil of the 21st century and mentioned Vietnam’s recent proposal for getting 
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the Mekong countries to cooperate with Japan in conducting “research on sustainable 
utilization and development of the Mekong River, including research on the impact of 
hydro-power dams on the mainstream” (Truong 2012). The Vietnamese president did 
not mention Laos or the Xayaburi dam directly but the timing of the speech and his 
references to upstream Mekong mainstream dams, as well as to the threat to the “largest 
granary of Vietnam” (the Delta), left very few doubts about the target of his discourse. 
5.3.3 Laos begins the project 
The groundbreaking ceremony for the Xayaburi dam in Laos held on 7th November 
2012 demonstrated that the decision by the GoL to go ahead was anything but easy. In 
fact, the news came out in the press suddenly on 5th November, while dozens of heads 
of state were engaged at the ASEM 9 meeting in Vientiane. The next day, Prime 
Minister Thongsing Thammavong of Laos denied that a groundbreaking ceremony was 
scheduled, saying to the Wall Street Journal that the event was just a visit for the press 
and for experts and that it did not signal the start of the project (Otto 2012; Radio Free 
Asia 2012). This, however, was not the case at all as the banner prepared for the day and 
visible in the figure (Fig. 5.5) below made clear. 
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Figure 5.5 - Laos’s deputy prime minister Somsavat Lengsavad cuts the ribbon for 
the Xayaburi dam 
 
Source: Ben Otto 
Diplomatic representatives of the neighbouring countries attended the event, including 
the ambassador of Vietnam, Dr Ta Minh Chau (Latsaphao 2012), and there were 
rumours that the Thai prime minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, sent last-minute apologies 
because of fears of potential tensions in Thailand (Interview 18-2015). Somsavat 
Lengsavad, deputy prime minister of Laos, who superintended the ceremony, declared 
that “We had the opportunity to listen to the views and opinions of different countries 
along the river. We have come to an agreement and chose today to be the first day to 
begin the project” (Chenaphun 2012). 
The report of the event by the state-owned Vientiane Times ran along the same lines, 
stating that “There has been much conjecture about the project, but the Lao government 
is now confident it has satisfied all parties with a redesign of the dam, and has 
undertaken hydrological and fish migration studies” (Latsaphao 2012: 1) and claiming 
Laos’s right to exploit its own resources by building a run-of-river dam similar to many 
projects developed in the United States and in Europe. The redesign mentioned in the 
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quotation above, as well as in the next one, refers to the changes introduced to the 
project following the above-mentioned compliance report prepared by Pöyry and can be 
understood as proof of Laos’s willingness to be (and appear) cooperative despite 
remaining firm in its intention to begin construction. According to a subsequent report 
by Pöyry, the redesign resulted in additional costs of 100 million dollars and in changes 
to the seismic design, a navigation lock to allow fish migration, and the introduction of 
low-level outlets and turbines to permit sediments and fish to pass through (Schmidiger 
and Sierotzki 2015). 
The article, which can be considered very much equivalent to an official declaration 
released through the newspaper’s pages concludes that 
The government is now of the firm opinion that the 
project has been properly and thoroughly researched. 
Every effort has been made to consider the various 
processes required to improve the design in order to 
build a “transparent” dam that will have no impact 
on the geology of the Mekong. The redesign has 
been tested and found to be viable through the use of 
a specially constructed hydraulic model. Friendly 
countries no longer oppose the dam’s construction, 
and the Lao government is now fully confident 
about making the decision to go ahead with the 
project. (Latsaphao 2012: 3) 
 
5.3.4 Laos pursues its interests despite Vietnam’s divergent preferences 
The outcome of the negotiations, after the public opposition to the dam brought to the 
table by Vietnam, seems clearly to have gone in favour of Laos. After all, through the 
Xayaburi dam Laos secured its economic-strategic interest by developing one of its few 
available resources, i.e. hydropower, which is considered crucial both for domestic 
consumption and for export opportunities, in direct contrast to downstream Vietnam’s 
interest in environmental safeguards, which were explicitly linked by Vietnamese 
officials to food and human security. For Vietnam, the main risk especially concerns 
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sediments because of their potential impact on agriculture in the Mekong Delta region 
(Geheb et al. 2015). 
The strategic relevance of the Mekong Delta for Vietnam has been anticipated above 
and was vividly explained by Nguyen Thai Lai, the Vietnamese Deputy Minister of 
Natural Resources and Environment, in May 2013: 
In Vietnam, the Mekong Delta area is 71,000 km2, 
accounting for over 8% of the whole basin, and 
being an economic center, with strategic 
significance, in ensuring food security and 
sustainable development of communities in the 
South of Viet Nam and the whole country. Cuu 
Long Delta in particular, with an area of over 40,000 
km2, accounting for 12% [of the] total natural area, 
including 13 provinces & cities, with a population of 
over 17 million people, contributes 27% GDP 
annually with 90% [of the] rice exports and 60% [of 
the] aquaculture exports of Viet Nam. (Lai 2013)   
Geheb et al. (2015) argue that the statement released to the BBC47 by the Lao Vice 
Minister of Energy and Mines, Viraphonh Viravong, on the eve of the groundbreaking 
ceremony in which the latter expressed his confidence that an agreement with Vietnam 
and Cambodia was reached having them understood that Laos took and addressed their 
concerns seriously, indicates that Viraphonh Viravong “was certain that Laos had 
finally won them over” (Geheb et al. 2015: 118, emphasis added). Indeed, from Laos’s 
point of view the end of the process appears to be a clear success once the distance 
between, on one hand, the project’s economic benefits for Laos and, on the other hand, 
the risks and costs caused to Vietnam are taken into account. In addition to this 
development constituting an advancement in its national policy of becoming the 
“battery of Southeast Asia”, Laos, as stressed by the former CEO of the MRC Mr. Hans 
Guttman, 
expects 150 million dollars per year from the 
concession period of 27 years. Even though official 
                                                          
47 The interview can be found here: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-20203072  
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records in 2013 estimated that the revenue would be 
around 130 million dollars, this is a huge amount of 
money for Laos, higher than the 80 million dollars in 
yearly revenue generated by the Nam Theun 2 Dam. 
(Interview 11-2015) 
The reference here is to a report released by the Ministry of Energy and Mines in 2013, 
according to which the GoL “expects to earn US$3.9 billion from the Xayaboury dam 
throughout the 29 year concession period” (Vientiane Times 2013: 21), i.e. 134.4 
million dollars per year. 
Therefore, considering all the direct and indirect public statements reported above in 
relation to Vietnam’s standpoint on the Xayaburi dam, the generally accepted 
interpretation of the issue is one of Vietnam disagreeing with the dam but somehow 
inexplicably being forced to accept the fait accompli and Laos’s unilateral course of 
action – see, for instance, Otto (2012) or Herbertson (2013). For some analysts, Laos’s 
decision to move forward had the potential to destabilise the diplomatic ties of the two 
countries sufficiently to jeopardise the peaceful and prosperous equilibrium the entire 
region had finally achieved after decades of war (Cronin and Hamlin 2012). A few 
weeks after the groundbreaking ceremony, Dao Trong Tu, director of the Centre for 
Sustainable Development of Water Resources and Adaptation to Climate Change 
(CEWAREC), a Vietnamese state-affiliated organisation, besides criticising the 
decision to go ahead without sufficient and reliable assessments, asserted that the 
Government of Vietnam was still really concerned (Giovannini 2012). 
However, the length and complexity of the negotiation process, along with the 
economic – and political – interests at stake for the two countries, suggest it is important 
to critically examine what appears to be a clear-cut diplomatic victory by Laos 
(supported by the investor country, Thailand, as highlighted by, among others, 
Matthews (2012) and Hensengerth (2015)) over the downstream riparian Vietnam (and 
Cambodia), and also to investigate how the smaller state could have prevailed. Hanoi 
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reacted to the groundbreaking by sending the Vietnamese ambassador in Laos to attend 
the ceremony, and it must also be highlighted that a statement released by Vietnam’s 
Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Luong Thanh Nghi, the next day avoided openly 
criticising the GoL’s decision to go ahead, simply saying in general terms that “he 
hoped Laos will work with Viet Nam, Cambodia and Thailand in conducting careful 
and comprehensive research on the cumulative impacts on the environment, economics 
and society of all hydro-power plants expected to be built on the Mekong River”, 
apparently accepting the fait accompli (Viet Nam News 2012). However, during the 
MRC Council meeting of January 2013 in Luang Prabang, Nguyen Thai Lai, Vietnam’s 
Deputy Minister of Natural Resources and Environment, asked for the works on the 
dam to be halted, obtaining a sharp response from Viraphonh Viravong, who said that 
Laos would not continue the consultation and that his country had already gone beyond 
the Mekong Agreement. He put an unquestionable end to the discussion, saying 
assertively that “After six months, all you can do is record the difference of opinions 
and that is the end of the process” (Chen 2013). 
Therefore, in order to understand how Laos managed to achieve such a result, an in-
depth analysis has been conducted to explore the negotiation process that led to the 
groundbreaking ceremony summarised above, drawing extensively from the primary 
data provided by the interviewees, which enabled the author to look behind the scenes 
and beyond what has already been publicly said by the two sides and reported by public 
sources. The first purpose of the analysis is to understand how Laos prevailed over 
Vietnam despite the asymmetry of power. Since the outcome has been known – 
construction of the Xayaburi project began in 2012 and has never stopped, and the dam 
is expected to start operations by 2019 – the main unanswered question is this: how did 
Laos manage to start the project unilaterally, avoiding, at the same time, strong 
retaliation from Vietnam or any other strong diplomatic reaction? 
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Inevitably, the Xayaburi issue falls within the wider bilateral – and asymmetric – 
special relationship and involves all four members of the MRC and has a regional 
scope. A senior Lao official illustrates the bigger picture in this regard, which includes 
four countries: two that have already developed their water resources (Vietnam and 
Thailand) and two later developers (Laos and Cambodia). Since all the planned 
mainstream hydropower plants are in Laos and Cambodia, there is no natural harmony 
of interests (Interview 9-2015). During the interview, the same informant offered the 
author an illuminating description of the role of the Xayaburi dam in the broader 
framework of contemporary Laos’s geopolitics: 
If one understands Lao history, one can see how 
Laos has been dependent on outside forces in recent 
decades and especially on Vietnam. Now this 
relationship is being challenged by the rise of China 
and by the development underway in Laos itself. 
Therefore, the Xayaburi dam is a perfect case to 
illustrate both the connection between the two 
countries and the willingness of Laos to test this 
partnership. In fact, Laos, with the financial and 
diplomatic support of Thailand, is going ahead with 
an infrastructure which might be costly for Vietnam. 
Nonetheless, Vietnam cannot be too openly critical 
because of the historical special relationship with 
Laos and because of the increasing role played by 
China in the country, especially through massive 
investment. It means that the Vietnamese 
government needs to manage its relationship with 
Laos carefully, also due to the emergence of leaders 
in the Lao political spectrum who are increasingly 
closer to Beijing than to Hanoi.48 All this would 
have been impossible only 20 or 30 years ago; 
without China, we would have had a very different 
story. (Interview 9-2015) 
Nonetheless, despite the official position of the GoL being that it has satisfied the 
downstream countries’ requests and concerns, a senior official of the Lao Ministry of 
Energy and Mines (MEM) clearly explains that Hanoi opposed the project and argues 
that Laos did not anticipate such a position, asserting that 
                                                          
48 A recent study underlining this potential shift within the Lao leadership is offered by 
Kingsbury (2017). 
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With the Xayaburi dam, Laos did not want to test the 
special relationship. Historically nobody paid any 
attention to these mainstream developments, and 
Vietnam is not traditionally against hydropower, so 
we were surprised when they officially changed their 
minds and demanded a 10-year moratorium without 
explaining in detail why they needed 10 years. 
Maybe this dam ended up being a test for 
Vietnam … Since Vietnam is in competition with 
China in the South China Sea, one theory is that they 
need support, but we cannot neglect any of our 
neighbours and China is very important for Laos. 
For this reason, blaming Laos does not influence the 
balance, so why should you make my life more 
complicated? Moreover, Vietnam signed an MoU 
with Laos for building the mainstream Luang 
Prabang dam, so I am not sure about their behaviour. 
We do not understand. We want to separate business 
from politics. It is not fair to meld the two 
dimensions. (Interview 44-2015) 
Besides the official sources quoted above, Hans Guttman also confirmed that Vietnam’s 
reaction surprised Laos, which, given their very strong relationship, had anticipated that 
Hanoi would support its economic development (Interview 11-2015). Another Lao 
official recalled that in private meetings Vietnam always said no to the Xayaburi dam 
and that even though during official visits Lao and Vietnamese leaders hug and kiss 
each other, when they move on to Mekong affairs, the atmosphere become frosty. “The 
core of the relationship is still okay, but there is an elephant in the room now that is 
changing the pattern”, the official said (Interview 9-2015). Vietnam’s opposition is also 
remarked on by two scholars of the Faculty of Law and Political Science at the National 
University of Laos (NUOL), Associate Professor Sengphet Outhay and Lecturer Sypha 
Chanthavong, who do not deny that downstream nations are worried by upstream 
development (Interview 1-2015; Interview 2-2015). 
These interviews define well the geopolitical concerns that could lie behind the 
Xayaburi dam, as well as its relevance for the Laos–Vietnam special relationship. The 
quotes above contain crucial implications that will be highlighted below, but the main 
points the interviewees raise are twofold. First, the Xayaburi dam has much to do with 
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international relations and thus with the power relation between Laos and Vietnam, to 
the extent that it can be seen as a test of the bilateral special relationship itself. This 
pinpoints the intimate link between a project of such magnitude and sensitivity as the 
Xayaburi MTI and power. Second, the issue does not relate exclusively to Laos and 
Vietnam but is framed and negotiated in a complex geopolitical spectrum where the role 
of actors such as Thailand and China must be taken into account. In the light of these 
considerations, the next section will examine the negotiations between Vientiane and 
Hanoi, showing how the former prevailed, and will also thoroughly assess the 
implications and role of the broader geopolitical and power complex within which the 
Laos–Vietnam relational power analysis is embedded, before moving on to discuss the 
findings. 
5.4 Analysis of the negotiations 
5.4.1 What prevented a stronger reaction from Vietnam? 
The interviews confirmed that there was substantial disagreement between the two 
countries, corroborating the evidence drawn from primary and secondary data. But to 
understand why Vietnam eventually gave up without taking any concrete 
countermeasures and why it could not find any leverage to stop Laos’s plan, it was 
necessary to rely mostly on the information provided by the interviewees.  
After construction began on 7th November 2012, it was possible to observe signals that 
behind closed doors the issue was being dealt with at the highest level between Hanoi 
and Vientiane given that, as already stressed, the Vietnamese ambassador in Laos 
attended the groundbreaking ceremony and the spokesperson of the Vietnamese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), speaking the next day, avoided openly blaming 
the GoL. It has already been shown that this was also the view made public by Lao 
leaders at the groundbreaking ceremony, so it is not surprising that it is also shared by a 
member of the Lao National Mekong Committee (LNMC), who explained how after the 
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PNPCA and after that the project was redesigned all countries were happy with the new 
version, which, for example, added five facilities for the passage of fish. The 
interviewee added that of course the project had to be monitored, but there was no 
problem since members of the MRC were still working together and there were visits to 
the dam site every three months (Interview 10-2015). This was echoed by an official of 
the Department of Water Resources (DWR) of the Lao Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Environment (MONRE), who emphasised the fact that transparency and focus on 
details were crucial elements in reaching a compromise and concluded that “We never 
thought to leave the 1995 agreement, although American and Vietnamese NGOs 
published statements that we were close to doing so” (Interview 30-2015). It must be 
noted that the reference to a compromise contained in this interview, and any following 
reference to a compromise or to an agreement between Laos and Vietnam on the issue, 
relates to the fact that the two countries avoided a more direct and stronger 
confrontation on the Xayaburi issue described in this section, and does not indicate any 
official or specific agreement or deal signed by the two governments. 
However, while Lao officials involved in the “Mekong affairs” put the stress on details 
and transparency, an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) of Laos, as 
well as a consultant close to the Lao Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), 
claimed that the agreement was reached at the highest level. The MOFA representative 
stressed that a compromise was possible because the Vietnamese government to some 
extent understood Laos’s position on the issue (Interview 13-2015). In addition to these 
inputs from Lao officials, similar statements were made by an ambassador of another 
ASEAN country in Vientiane, who was convinced that after going through the MRC 
procedure, and after the adoption of revisions to the dam relating to fisheries and 
sediments, Vietnam agreed (Interview 27-2015). A Vietnamese scientist who worked 
for the MRC noted that Laos went ahead after representatives of the two countries sat 
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down together and reached agreement, contending that Vietnam said “You can go ahead 
but you have to make sure the best mitigation of the impact is put in place and when we 
have problems you have to cooperate” (Interview 1-2016). However, very significantly, 
a senior Vietnamese diplomat, in an interview with the author that took place three 
years after the inauguration event, clarified the issue. The following quote represents the 
first published statement from an official Vietnamese source that explains the factors 
that lay behind the situation: 
Our two countries are very close friends, but the 
mainstream of the Mekong is also relevant for 
Vietnam so we are very concerned about mainstream 
projects in Laos. We asked Laos to provide a serious 
environmental assessment, but to some extent we are 
also supporting Laos in its plans because Vietnam 
also has hydropower plants in Laos in order to 
import electricity to Vietnam. In the Xayaburi case, 
we negotiated with Laos and after Laos conducted 
environmental studies on the impact for fish and the 
environment more generally, we agreed. It is also 
relevant that although there are concerns about 
environmental aspects, all Laos’s neighbours are 
interested in investing. If Vietnam does not invest 
there are other countries ready to replace us. It is 
also a fact that people and offices in the North of 
Vietnam are less concerned than local authorities 
and people in the South of Vietnam. (Interview 42-
2015) 
This was a key interview, and the words of the Vietnamese diplomat, who cannot be 
named, combined with the positions of the Lao sources reported above, corroborate the 
argument that, despite the divergence of interests between the two countries, at some 
point before 7th November 2012 they reached a compromise that avoided worsening the 
dispute and causing further confrontation or conflict to erupt. From the last passage, it 
clearly emerges that the issue was not dominated only by environmental and economic 
calculations, and that various factors, from geopolitical considerations to domestic 
elements, informed the negotiations, making it a multidimensional process.  
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The fact that Vietnam continued to express its concerns after the groundbreaking 
ceremony, for instance during the MRC Council meeting held in Luang Prabang in 
January 2013, might seem to contradict the findings that a compromise was reached. 
However, this actually confirms the substantial divergence between the preferences of 
the two states and can be explained by two factors. First, as indicated by former MRC’s 
CEO Hans Guttman, with respect to the evolving understanding of the likely impacts of 
the Xayaburi dam Vietnam may have preferred to save face and keep up appearances: 
“Vietnam is facing different opinions on the Xayaburi dam issue”, he said, “but it is 
difficult to change their position. Although from 2013 the pressure decreased (there 
were high-level meetings), they cannot explicitly change their position” (Interview 11-
2015). The second reason can be found in the different views and priorities of different 
ministries and agencies and, since the Xayaburi dam was the first mainstream dam in 
the Lower Mekong, and thus the first test of the incompatible interests of the riparian 
countries, this might have created problems for the Vietnamese government. Explaining 
that Laos was surprised by Vietnam’s reaction, Hans Guttman argued that “it is likely 
that different factions in the Vietnamese government had different opinions but finally 
the threat to the Mekong Delta was considered paramount”, adding that “it should be 
noted that although Hanoi had strong words over Xayaburi there was no noticeable 
reduction in other assistance and cooperation between Laos and Vietnam” (Interview 
11-2015). For the central government in Hanoi, it was also difficult to push too much 
against the Xayaburi project because such a position could hardly be viewed as 
sustainable if one considers that Vietnam’s “position to defer mainstream dam 
development contradicts its ambition to proceed with national hydropower plan (ie, 
Lower Sesan 2) regardless of its downstream impacts (to Cambodia)” (Suhardiman et 
al. 2015: 211) and that Central Highland dams in the country create similar 
environmental problems (Le 2013; Geheb et al. 2015). These two factors explain why in 
137 
the MRC the Viet Nam National Mekong Committee continued to publicly express its 
concerns without undermining the state-to-state compromise reached by its government 
with Vientiane. 
On 28th June 2011, a few months after the end of the PNPCA process, and at a time 
when the destiny of the Xayaburi project was still uncertain, Stratfor analyst Zhixing 
Zhang wrote that the construction had already begun and rightly forecasted that “Laos’ 
dam ambition is unlikely to be halted” (Zhang 2011). But interestingly, the analyst 
added “Will be interesting to see Vietnam’s response on the resumption. However, this 
may have secretly get nod from Vietnam, given the diminishing lever in influencing the 
plan” (ibid.). Indeed, from the data analysed and presented above, it emerges that 
Vietnam faced constraints that limited its leverage and its capacity to implement 
effective countermeasures. It also emerged that the core dimension that supports 
understanding of why Vietnam had to accept the fait accompli, and why Laos prevailed, 
relates to geopolitics. The next section, therefore, examines in greater depth the wider 
geopolitical and strategic context in order to explain exactly how it led to such an 
outcome, first by providing an overall assessment and then by focusing on the most 
important actors. 
5.4.2 The role of the geopolitical context 
The analysis above points to the fact that the most important factor that prevented 
Vietnam from taking an even stronger stance on Laos’s hydropower project and from 
reacting in a stronger way can be found in the common history that shapes the Laos–
Vietnam bilateral relations that inform Vietnam’s long-term foreign policy strategy. It 
can be noted, in fact, that Lao officials, in the interviews reported, highlighted the 
virtues of the dam itself as well as of their country’s open and transparent behaviour, 
while the Vietnamese ones underlined factors such as the strength of the bilateral 
relationship and the capacity to cooperate, the need to face economic competition, and 
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indirect benefits. In this respect, the reference by the Vietnamese diplomat to the need to 
take into account the fact that other countries might “replace” Vietnam as an investor in 
Laos must not be overlooked. Thanks to the context in which this statement was placed, 
and especially considering that the same interviewee also explicitly said that the two 
countries eventually reached a compromise, as well as appealing to their close 
friendship, it seems that the Vietnamese diplomat’s allusion to the problem of 
competition can be seen not only as the expression of the contingent need to cooperate 
in spite of Laos’s adverse behaviour, but also as a strategic imperative dictated by the 
common past of the two states (and leaderships), as well as by Hanoi’s long-term 
foreign policy strategy. As is evident from the Vietnamese diplomat’s words, with Laos 
having a great strategic importance for Vietnam, another interviewee suggested that 
Hanoi could have feared that making too much trouble in the Xayaburi case could have 
resulted in a less favourable attitude by Laos towards Vietnamese interests and 
investments (Interview 8-2015). This point of view is also shared by Martin Stuart-Fox, 
one of the most important Laos historians, who, in an interview with Bloomberg, 
declared that “From the Vietnamese side, they would have to be very reluctant to put 
too much pressure on Laos out of concern it would just push them into the arms of the 
Chinese” (Bloomberg 2014). Further, the role of the long and crucial bilateral 
relationship in the reaching of an agreement has been underlined in several interviews. 
The same LNMC official quoted above, while openly minimising the environmental 
risks and probably putting too much emphasis on Vietnam’s interests, highlighted the 
special relationship between the two countries by vividly asserting that 
If I meet a Vietnamese abroad we help each other. 
During the Cold War, there were many exchanges 
and trips between Laos, Vietnam and the Soviet 
Union. If we do not get a win–win solution it is very 
difficult! We cannot be unilateral; it would be very 
risky. Laos aims to improve its economy: this is not 
comparable with the case of a very small fish that 
might not be able to pass through the Xayaburi dam. 
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I cannot deny that in this case Laos and Thailand get 
all the benefits. (Interview 10-2015) 
In addition, the powerfulness of the bilateral ties must be put in perspective: in fact, the 
combined effect of fears of competition for influence over Laos and the fact that, 
despite the serious threat posed to the Delta region by the dam, the issue was probably 
not considered a matter of life or death in Hanoi. As already mentioned, the Xayaburi 
dam negotiation process can be seen as difficult but not one worth compromising good 
relations for (Interview 29-2015). The relative importance within the broader bilateral 
ties between Hanoi and Vientiane persuaded the former of the need to appear 
cooperative, regardless of how reluctantly this was done. Indeed, according to another 
interviewee, at the end of the consultation phase of the PNPCA process Vietnam did not 
agree but it preferred to keep a low profile in order to show its goodwill towards a 
harmonious coexistence (16-2015). Besides the relative importance of the issue within 
the Government of Vietnam’s priorities, it is also necessary to consider that while the 
Xayaburi MTI was not perceived as a vital matter in Hanoi, it had a much higher 
importance for other actors. As pointed out by Associate Professor Ruth Banomyong, 
Head of the Department of International Business, Logistics and Transport at 
Thammasat University in Bangkok and co-author of one of the rare accounts on Laos’s 
geopolitics49 , 
Vietnam never agreed on the Xayaburi dam, but 
could not do much. Other actors had more influence, 
especially Thailand since it will buy most of the 
energy produced by the dam. However, Vietnam 
was not very happy to say the least. (Interview 17-
2015) 
The predominance of Thai interests has also been stressed by Laos’s Vice Minister of 
Energy and Mines, Viraphonh Viravong, who explicitly claimed “It would be too 
expensive for anyone to damage the project. It's like starting a war. The stakes are too 
                                                          
49 The already cited work by Pholsena and Banomyong (2006).  
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high for Thailand” (Janssen 2015). This reasoning refers to the fact, already mentioned 
above, that the Thai company Ch. Karnchang owns the majority of the shares, Thai 
EGAT will buy 95% of the produced electricity, and funding is provided mainly by 
Thai financiers. 
Given the geopolitical context, in which Vietnam appeared to have its hands tied too 
tightly by the imbalance between diplomatic costs and opportunities to raise its 
opposition to the Xayaburi dam to the level of an open confrontation and diplomatic rift 
with the GoL, some have speculated that, despite being able to anticipate what the 
outcome of the dispute would be, the Government of Vietnam nonetheless opposed the 
project for years by adopting a preventive strategy. An official of the Lao Ministry of 
Energy and Mines acknowledged this view, saying “Vietnam knew in advance that we 
would have gone ahead in any case, so it is possible that Vietnam bluffed in order to 
observe Laos’s reaction and to obtain something” (Interview 44-2015); and Cronin and 
Hamlin (2012) envisioned that “one tack that Vietnam could consider would be to raise 
the issue of damages that may result from the Lao dams. This could at least be a 
bargaining chip to gain greater Lao consideration for Vietnam’s concerns” (Cronin and 
Hamlin 2012: 41). In fact, it was commonly thought that the Xayaburi dam would pave 
the way for all the other proposed mainstream dams in Laos and that the cumulative 
effect of the 11 planned dams in the Mekong mainstream in Laos and Cambodia might 
be extremely negative (ABC 2012), so Vietnam’s strategy was probably informed by 
this concern and involved trying to anticipate future dangerous developments and put 
pressure on the GoL in order to delay and disincentivise the rapid building of the entire 
Mekong cascade (see Figure 5.4). As a matter of fact, it must be noted that such concern 
proved to be appropriate since, as pointed out above, in the following years Laos moved 
ahead with other two of the remaining eight projects: the Don Sahong dam and the Pak 
Beng dam. Another reason to implement a preventive strategy and another way to use 
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this bargaining chip can be found in the competition with China over influence – and 
investment – in Laos, which has already been stressed. Phuong Nguyen, a research 
associate with the Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies at the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, highlighted how “At the core of the 
controversy surrounding dams on the Mekong River is China’s role in supporting and 
financing the construction of dams in Cambodia and Laos” (Phuong 2014: 2). In fact, 
even though the Xayaburi dam is being built by a Thai contractor, for three of the next 
eight dams, MoUs have been signed with Chinese companies while only one has been 
granted to a Vietnamese company50 (Lee and Scurrah 2009; Interview 18-2015). 
To conclude, it seems clear how geopolitical factors have played a crucial part in 
relation to both the very outcome of the Xayaburi dispute and the ability of the two 
parties to compromise and to not escalate the dispute. If, on one hand, the Xayaburi dam 
can be considered a conjunctural shock for the Laos-Vietnam special relationship, on 
the other hand, this very alliance facilitated a compromise between the two countries by 
providing Laos with the opportunity to avoid a costly – and probably unsustainable – 
direct confrontation, and Vietnam with a way to contain the risks and potential damage 
thanks to the assurances of long-term cooperation entailed in the special relationship. 
The findings above show that the Xayaburi dam issue involved more states besides 
Vietnam and Laos. Two of them are obvious and inevitably linked to the issue by their 
membership in the MRC, and because they are riparian countries and they have clear 
and direct interest in the dam – positive in the case of Thailand and negative in the case 
of Cambodia. China, instead, also appeared to play an indirect role, mainly by 
constituting a geopolitical competitor for Vietnam. Nevertheless, the roles of these 
actors need to be further clarified, along with that, so far overlooked, of the United 
States. 
                                                          
50 Laos and the Vietnamese Petrovietnam Power Corporation signed an MoU in October 2007 
for the construction of the Luang Prabang mainstream dam (1,410 MW). 
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5.4.2.1 Thailand’s direct support for Laos 
Considering that an action against the Xayaburi project has been compared by Lao 
leaders to a warlike act, given the stakes Thailand has in the dam (Janssen 2015), it is 
thus necessary to explore the dynamic of Thai investment in the project and what it 
represented for the Laos–Vietnam negotiations. When asked about the role of the 
Xayaburi dam in the bilateral relations, a senior official at the Thai embassy in 
Vientiane provided an answer that clearly indicated Thailand’s aspiration to become a 
source of not only economic but also diplomatic diversification for Vientiane, and the 
role of the Xayaburi project in this respect51: 
Vietnam is getting a lot of investment and 
concessions in Laos, which significantly are not 
value-adding for Laos since they are all processed in 
Vietnam. The two governments are still very, very 
close. Nonetheless, our ambassador is very proud of 
the Xayaburi dam project, the biggest Thai foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in Laos so far. In general, I 
think that Laos has not pursued its advantage too 
much so far, but this dam is an example in the 
opposite direction. Laos should get more asking for 
FDI and hydropower projects. (Interview 37-2015). 
The Thai diplomat goes on to point out how Laos’s development is a priority for 
Thailand, as demonstrated by the fact that for both the Thailand Investment Cooperation 
Agency (TICA) and the Neighbouring Countries Economic Development Cooperation 
Agency (NEDA), Laos is the first destination country, in the case of NEDA accounting 
for some 70% of its loans52 (Interview 37-2015). From the just-quoted interview a 
picture clearly emerges of the competition under way in the country and the fact that the 
Xayaburi dam was a turning point from Thailand’s perspective. 
Moreover, and equally importantly, besides the positive effect for Laos and for its 
bilateral relations, Thailand has a lot to gain from projects like the Xayaburi dam. In 
                                                          
51 Historical difficulties between Laos and Thailand were highlighted in chapter 1. 
52 TICA, for instance, cooperates with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Laos, providing human 
resources training (Interview 37-2015). 
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fact, Thailand’s stance on the project was informed by two key national priorities that 
perfectly match Laos’s “battery of Southeast Asia” policy: the internationalisation of 
hydropower production and the diversification of its energy mix, which is currently 
dominated by hydrocarbons, with fossil fuels accounting for 98% of the country’s 
primary energy consumption in 2014 (Oxford Business Group 2016). First, the purpose 
of internationalising the production of electricity from hydropower derives from the 
strong anti-hydropower social movement inside Thailand and from the fact that the 
internal potential has already been exploited; second, Thailand has a particular interest 
in diversifying its energy mix because it relies on natural gas imported from Myanmar 
for its electricity production (Matthews 2012; Jakkrit 2015; Cronin and Hamlin 2012). 
As Cronin and Hamlin (2012) have stressed, 
The Xayaburi dam and other dam projects in 
neighboring countries receive formidable backing 
from the country’s National Energy Policy 
Committee (NEPC), which is chaired by the prime 
minister. The Energy Policy and Planning Office 
(EPPO) of Thailand’s Ministry of Energy, which 
describes itself as “a pivotal agency in the 
formulation and administration of energy policies 
and planning for the national sustainability,” has 
been the lead agency in formulating the country’s 
national energy policy. EGAT is chaired by a 
permanent secretary of the Energy Ministry. (Cronin 
and Hamlin 2012: 26) 
In this framework, the “Thai dimension” is always very relevant for hydropower 
development in Laos and, according to Thammasat University’s Professor Ruth 
Banomyong, this increased significantly after the Nam Theun 2 hydroelectric project 
(Interview 17-2015). 
The combination of all these internal Thai factors resulted in a strong interest in 
investing in the Xayaburi dam, paving the way for approval by the NEPC in December 
2010 of the PPA with the Xayaburi Power Company and for overcoming the hurdles 
originating from regional foreign policy considerations. In fact, as Cronin and Hamlin 
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(2012) clearly point out, “both at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and at the highest 
political level in the former Abhisit administration, Vietnam’s strong opposition to the 
Xayaburi dam pitted domestic interests against important foreign policy and regional 
stability interests” (Cronin and Hamlin 2012: 41). Such concerns, indeed, at the time of 
the MRC’s Joint Committee meeting in April 2011 led Abhisit’s government to align 
itself with Vietnam and Cambodia, going, as Cronin and Hamlin (2012) note, 
against Thailand’s second largest construction 
company, the powerful state-owned Electrical 
Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), the 
Ministry of Energy, and the four country’s largest 
banks53 – mainly out of consideration for Vietnam’s 
strong opposition to the project. (Cronin and Hamlin 
2012: 15) 
In this respect, the fact that Yingluck Shinawatra’s government did not stop the project 
in 2012 meant that Thailand’s eagerness to secure the economic benefits achievable 
through investment in the Xayaburi dam prevailed over the above-mentioned domestic 
pressures and international concerns. The figure below demonstrates not only that all 
electricity provided to EGAT by GMS countries comes from facilities located in Laos, 
but also, and more importantly, the share the Xayaburi dam will account for. 
  
                                                          
53 Bangkok Bank, Kasikorn Bank, Krung Thai Bank and Siam Commercial Bank. Later, the 
export credit agency Export-Import Bank of Thailand (EXIM Bank) and Thai Investment and 
Securities Company Limited (TISCO) also joined the financing pool (King 2015). 
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Figure 5.6 - GMS Power Project Sales to EGAT 
Source: Moungcharoen (2013) 
5.4.2.2 China’s economic-strategic goals 
Although Thailand, despite some foreign policy concerns, showed clear and direct 
interest in pursuing the Xayaburi investment, China played a more indirect and passive 
role, but for various reasons it might be considered to have supported Laos in its 
venture. In fact, although China had no stake in the Xayaburi project itself, it is 
nonetheless a major hydropower developer in the region, had completed four 
mainstream dams in its branch of the Mekong at the time, and had signed agreements 
with the GoL for four out of nine proposed Mekong mainstream dams. Besides its role 
as a potential investor, however, China can be considered as the “enabling actor” since, 
as stressed by Trandem “China’s own upstream dam construction on the Mekong has 
helped pave the way for the Lower Mekong mainstream dams to re-emerge on the 
region’s agenda” (Trandem 2011). Therefore, being the first in the mainstream 
hydropower cascade envisioned by Laos (and Cambodia) in the Lower Mekong, the 
Xayaburi case was of crucial importance in opening the door for the other 10 planned 
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dams. Beyond China’s interest in setting a precedent in the Lower Mekong Basin, the 
Xayaburi dam was also highly relevant for Beijing from a strategic point of view. As 
stressed by a Stratfor brief published back in April 2011, 
Vientiane's hydropower ambitions run the risk of 
straining ties with its patron, Vietnam. In a rare 
move, Vietnamese government officials voiced 
strong criticism of the plan … Vietnam's criticism 
goes against a 1977 treaty of friendship and 
cooperation that enshrined a “special relationship” 
between Vietnam and Laos. Decades have since 
passed from the revolutionary period, when Laos 
aligned itself with Vietnam and the Soviet bloc. But 
Vietnam still maintains the greatest geopolitical 
influence over Laos of any country. Hanoi provides 
Laos an alternative route to the sea through the Red 
River corridor, and has long been the country’s top 
investor and benefactor. Vietnam has cultivated ties 
with Laos at the political and military levels, 
providing training to Laos’ government and military 
leaders. This has enabled Vietnam to secure its 
dominance over its fellow communist country and to 
expand its influence over the region. As Vientiane 
opened up its economy and accelerated integration 
with regional markets, especially with Thailand and 
China… a rebalancing of Vietnam's strategic 
influence appears to be under way … China has 
welcomed Laos’ expanding cooperation with 
Thailand, which it sees as helpful in setting a 
precedent on hydropower and further loosening 
Laos’ bond with Vietnam. (Stratfor 2011)  
It emerges from the analysis above that China had clear geostrategic interests that went 
together with its willingness to invest in the hydropower sector in the Mekong Region 
and in the big mainstream dams that will follow the Xayaburi project. It is thus 
important to take into account the role played by China alongside Thailand, since both 
had a clear strategic interest (although the drivers that informed Thailand were mainly 
economic in nature, the investment was seen by its diplomats as key to improving 
Thailand’s position in Laos) in supporting Laos’s decision to build the Xayaburi dam 
and it provided the GoL with sources of diplomatic support crucial to counter Vietnam’s 
opposition. 
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5.4.2.3 The overlooked role of the United States 
However, Vietnam was not alone in its attempt to prevent the building of the Xayaburi 
dam. Besides the Cambodian opposition already mentioned above, throughout 2012 the 
United States joined the two downstream Southeast Asian countries (Chang 2013), 
balancing out Thailand’s direct support to the GoL. Geheb et al. (2015) make clear how 
at the same ASEAN Summit in May 2011 at which Laos reassured Vietnam, it also 
addressed US concerns. In fact, the US’s active opposition to the project emerged 
clearly when the US Congress passed the Mekong River Protection Act of 2011, which 
was to 
instruct the United States Executive Directors of the 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank to 
oppose the provision of any loan or financial or 
technical assistance for the construction of 
hydroelectric dams or electricity transmission 
systems in the Mekong River Basin unless the 
Secretary submits a related report providing certain 
assurances with respect [to] environmental 
protection, public health, economic effect, and 
resettlement concerns to Congress. (US federal 
legislative information 2011) 
This became evident when the GoL went public and declared its intentions to hold a 
groundbreaking ceremony on 5th November 2012. On that very day, the US Department 
of State released a statement that sharply criticised Laos’s decision to go ahead: 
The United States recognizes the important role that 
dams can play in managing water resources to 
advance economic growth. At the same time, our 
own experience has made us acutely aware of the 
economic, social and environmental impacts that 
large infrastructure can have over the long-term. The 
extent and severity of impacts from the Xayaburi 
dam on an ecosystem that provides food security and 
livelihoods for millions are still unknown. While 
these are sovereign development decisions, we are 
concerned that construction is proceeding before 
impact studies have been completed. We continue to 
believe that the Mekong River Commission (MRC) 
can be a useful platform to provide access to the best 
science and facilitate consultation with all 
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stakeholders. We also understand that the members 
of the MRC have not reached consensus on whether 
the project should proceed. The United States values 
its long-standing partnership with the MRC and its 
member nations. We have a strong interest in the 
sustainable management of the Mekong River, and 
we view our robust engagement as a sign of our 
strong commitment toward a lasting and positive 
relationship with the region. We hope that the 
government of Laos will uphold its pledge to work 
with its neighbors in addressing remaining questions 
regarding Xayaburi. We encourage the MRC 
countries to continue to work together to realize 
their shared vision of an economically prosperous, 
socially just and environmentally sound Mekong 
River basin. (US Department of State 2012) 
So, why would Washington get involved in the dispute? At first glance, there are two 
potential reasons. First, it might have wished to support Vietnam (an important partner 
for the US54), or, second, it might have just wanted to counter Chinese economic 
activities in the region. It can also be argued that it was driven by a combination of 
these two considerations. In fact, as suggested by an interviewee, there is a substantial 
convergence of interests between the US “Pivot to Asia” policy – in which Laos 
becomes part of their grand vision for Southeast Asia, since many high-level US 
politicians policymakers think in terms of containment instead of a constructive 
engagement with China (Interview 35-2015) – and the ever-improving Hanoi–
Washington partnership; during a visit to the United States in 2013, Vietnam’s 
president, Truong Tan Sang, stressed that the two countries would cooperate to preserve 
the Mekong’s sustainability (Hutt 2015). Based on such possibilities, the US stance on 
the issue might be seen as an opportunity for it to strengthen its diplomatic ties with 
Vietnam by backing Hanoi’s concerns, but also as a way to exploit this good 
relationship in order to oppose more broadly mainstream hydropower development, 
                                                          
54 Washington granted to Hanoi the status of Normal Trade Relations in 2002 and the United 
States become Vietnam’s primary destination for exports (21.2% in 2015). Economic ties were 
matched by the strengthening of political ties, culminating in the achievement of a 
Comprehensive Partnership in 2013 and the lifting of the arms embargo in May 2016 
(Giovannini 2016).  
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which is – and will be – fuelled mostly by Chinese investment, and to support the 
development approach proposed by the US Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), which was 
launched in 2009 with Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam55 with the aim of 
fostering cooperation on environment and water, health, agriculture, connectivity, 
education and energy security (the six pillars of the initiative).56  
However, the United States is linked to the Xayaburi project by a specific and direct 
interest that has, surprisingly, been completely ignored by both media and academic 
debate on the issue. In fact, as already mentioned above, in 2007 AES Corporation, an 
American company headquartered in Arlington (Virginia), competed with another Thai 
company alongside Ch. Karnchang to try to win the contract for the Xayaburi dam. 
However, evidence of this can only be found in three diplomatic cables sent by the US 
embassy in Vientiane between April and May 2007 and later released by WikiLeaks in 
August 2011. Since no reference to these cables is available through other sources, and 
the content has not so far been reported or mentioned anywhere else, it is worth 
providing here a summary of the negotiations that the US government was involved in 
before the contract was granted by the GoL to Ch. Karnchang, as can be seen from the 
three cables. The overlooking of the facts summarised below could have led, and did in 
fact lead to incomplete or misleading conclusions; as in the case of King (2015), who 
studying the Xayaburi project in the framework of social and environmental regulations 
in ASEAN, argues, 
Although the Thai banks by no means stand alone as 
influential stakeholders, without the financing they 
are providing, the Xayaburi dam could not be built. 
This is particularly evident in light of international 
financial institutions such as the World Bank Group 
(WBG) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
declining to provide funding to this project due to 
the social and environmental risks in the SEA 
                                                          
55 Myanmar joined in 2012. 
56 More information can be retrieved from the LMI’s official website available at: 
http://lowermekong.org/  
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Report. This position is particularly striking in light 
of the WBG and ADB track record of providing 
technical and financial support for dams in Lao 
PDR, such as the Nam Theun 2. (King 2015: 106–
107) 
The first cable57 indicates that AES submitted its proposal for a planned investment of 
1.3–1.5 billion dollars to the GoL on 29th March with a strong letter of support signed 
by the then US ambassador to Laos, Patricia M. Haslach. The joint effort carried out by 
AES and the US embassy in Vientiane to lobby the GoL in order to get the contract is 
described in full detail in the communication, which concludes by asking the 
Department of State to “support AES’ request for a letter from the Secretary of 
Commerce in support of the project” (United States Embassy in Vientiane 2007a). 
However, what seems of particular relevance is the mention of the competition between 
the American proposal, possibly backed by multilateral development banks such as the 
Asian Development Bank,58 and the Chinese developer SinoHydro, which was believed 
to be interested in building all the four Mekong mainstream dams planned by the GoL at 
that time. The relevance of this competition emerges from a concluding comment that 
reads 
If AES is awarded the rights to develop the 
Xayabury project, it would instantly raise the profile 
of American investment in Laos. Currently, the 
stock of U.S. investment in Laos is generously 
estimated to be $15 million. AES’ success might 
also signal to the GOL that [the establishment of] 
normal trading relations, granted by the United 
States in 2004, is starting to provide the economic 
growth opportunities so far hoped for, but not yet 
seen. If SinoHydro develops the project, it would 
represent another coup for the growing Chinese 
commercial presence in Laos. (United States 
Embassy in Vientiane 2007a) 
                                                          
57 07VIENTIANE312_a, sent on 17th April 2007 and available at 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07VIENTIANE312_a.html  
58 With regard to the ADB, there is a specific reference to the interest expressed to AES by ADB 
officials in Manila in providing financing for the Xayaburi project if the AES bid were to be 
successful. 
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A clearer and more direct explanation of what the Xayaburi project represented for 
Washington could hardly be imagined. The wording of the cable, in fact, points to the 
unique opportunity for immediately skyrocketing US investment, which would have 
been raised a hundredfold by this facility alone, even though the estimated overall value 
of the investment was significantly lower, as well as to the concurrent opportunity to 
counter China’s rising influence in the region. 
The second cable59 reports that the letter of support signed off by the then US Secretary 
of Commerce, Carlos Gutierrez, was delivered to the Lao Prime Minister’s Office and 
to the Lao Committee for Planning and Investment. Reading between the lines of the 
document, it appears of great relevance that during her meeting with Soulivong 
Daravong, president of the Committee for Planning and Investment – who later became 
Minister of Energy and Mines – on 30th April 2007, the US ambassador stressed how, if 
the American bid were successful, AES had the capacity to meet high environmental 
standards, adding that 
these standards will be raised by NGOs and 
environmentalists because of both the sheer size of 
this project ($1.5 billion) and the fact it will be the 
first dam project in Laos on the Mekong River itself 
rather than on one of its tributaries. (United States 
embassy in Vientiane 2007b) 
The US ambassador’s warning statement apparently materialised when International 
Rivers, a US-based advocacy organisation, launched a strong campaign against the dam 
later in the same year. 
The third cable60, the only classified one of the three,61 sent on 11th May 2007, 
acknowledges the failure of the AES bid and so of the lobbying effort made by the 
                                                          
59 07VIENTIANE351_a, sent on 30th April 2007 and available at 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07VIENTIANE351_a.html 
60 07VIENTIANE390_a, sent on 11th May 2007 and available at 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07VIENTIANE390_a.html. 
61 The first two were listed as “Sensitive But Unclassified” (SBU). 
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United States. The message reflects the disappointment experienced, not only at having 
lost the bid but also at not having been properly notified, stating that 
notwithstanding intensive lobbying by the US 
Government on behalf of AES, there was no 
notification to either the Embassy, nor to AES, that 
the contract had been awarded to another company, 
or that a signing ceremony was to be held just four 
days after the Ambassador had called on the 
President for the Committee for Planning and 
Investment of Laos to lobby for AES. (United States 
Embassy in Vientiane 2007c) 
So, what the evidence from the three cables tells us is mainly that, in contrast with the 
generally accepted idea that the US had only an indirect interest in the issue, driven by 
their solid relationship with Hanoi and the attention to the environment and sustainable 
development highlighted in the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), they in fact had direct 
commercial and geopolitical interests in the Xayaburi dam. As an American diplomat 
told the author in 2015, the position of the United States is now as follows: “in a perfect 
world there are no dams in the Mekong River” (Interview 26-2015). Indeed, 
Washington’s U-turn on Mekong mainstream dams became evident in the years after 
the AES bid, and became official when Hillary Clinton, during the first visit of a US 
Secretary of State to Laos for 57 years, urged suspension of the construction (Hilton 
2012). Therefore, it has been argued that the outcome of the AES bid triggered 
Washington’s opposition to mainstream hydropower development in the Mekong 
because the US might have realised that all the other large mainstream dams were going 
to be awarded to Chinese or other regional competing developers: of this opinion are 
CSIS researcher Phuong Nguyen and the director of the Centre for American Studies of 
Chinese Fudan University (Hutt 2015). The latter clearly declared that 
I think what the US is doing is trying to stop China 
from gaining more power in Southeast Asia, and this 
is just another tactic … It is politically motivated, 
and is aggressive towards China. The Lao 
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government wants to build dams and China is 
helping them. (ibid.) 
In conclusion, the analysis of how the broader geopolitical context was intertwined with 
the bilateral asymmetric negotiations between Laos and Vietnam over the Xayaburi dam 
demonstrates that other states had direct or indirect interests in influencing the outcome. 
However, given the fact that such pressures were not unidirectional – Thailand and 
China supported Laos, but the United States aligned with Vietnam (and Cambodia) in 
opposition – it has been seen how the Xayaburi MTI allowed Laos to mobilise and 
leverage such interests in order to achieve its goals in spite of asymmetric opposition 
from Hanoi.  
Now that the findings that emerged from tracing the process of the Xayaburi 
negotiations have been exposed, next they will be discussed in order to evaluate the 
effect of the MTI on Laos’s power over Vietnam, as well as to point out their potential 
theoretical implications and conclusions. 
5.5 Discussion of the findings 
5.5.1 The MTIs–relational power analytical framework applied to the Xayaburi 
dam case 
In this section, the MTIs–relational power analytical framework developed in chapter 3 
is applied to analyse the empirical findings in terms of relational power. The next 
section will then discuss the relevance of the findings against the theoretical backdrop 
of the small states literature analysed in chapter 2. 
In the case study of the Xayaburi dam MTI, the empirical outcome appears to be in 
favour of the smaller party, in contrast to what the literature on small states would 
suggest. The observation of this empirical outcome generated the research question: 
how has Laos been able to go ahead with the construction of the dam despite Vietnam’s 
opposition? In the applied analytical framework developed in chapter 3, the Xayaburi 
MTI is the independent variable and the relational power of Laos – the small state – is 
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the dependent one, and therefore we now need to carry out a “relational power analysis” 
of Laos with respect to Vietnam (the domain) and within the scope of the management 
of the Mekong River, in which the Xayaburi MTI is being constructed. 
5.5.1.1 Assessment of preferences 
The divergence of interests between the two states, as well as Laos’s success, has been 
extensively examined in the previous sections, but it is important – before moving on to 
the discussion – to highlight the fact that key interviewees all agreed that Laos 
succeeded. To this end, exactly how these informants expressed these thoughts is 
faithfully reported below – to give a concrete and vivid sense of how the issue was seen 
by people who, despite having different nationalities and coming from different 
professional backgrounds, played important roles in the negotiation process themselves 
(or had access to people who played important roles). First of all, the comment from the 
Vietnamese diplomat, who said sharply that “Xayaburi to some extent can be seen as a 
test of the special relationship with Vietnam: Laos passed the test” (Interview 42-2015), 
must be reported. It is also crucial to point out that, in accordance with their Vietnamese 
colleague, diplomats of the four countries that had an interest in the issue – Laos, 
Thailand, China and the United States – agreed that the Xayaburi dam represented not 
only an economic success for Laos, but also a diplomatic victory (Interview 13-2015; 
Interview 26-2015; Interview 37-2015; 47-2015). The Thai diplomat asserted that “In 
general, I think that Laos has not pursued its advantage too much so far, but this dam is 
an example in the opposite direction” (Interview 37-2015), arguing that the Xayaburi 
investment marked a discontinuity that provided Laos with greater advantages than it 
had traditionally managed to obtain. A Western consultant underscored the novelty that 
the Xayaburi dam brought to Laos’s foreign relations, saying that “Others had never 
seen Laos in this way. It became a player” (Interview 18-2015). Finally, the senior Lao 
official already cited frequently since she/he provided comprehensive diplomatic points 
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of view again helped the author to put things in perspective by concluding that “Laos is 
nowadays internationally much more confident than it was only five to ten years ago 
(but especially in the last five years) and ready to pursue one national priority, such as 
hydropower development” (Interview 9-2015). 
However, if the Xayaburi project negotiation process clearly ended well for Laos, in 
order to observe the case in terms of relational power, investigating Vietnam’s position 
was crucial. The findings show that the consistency of this success, clearly expressed in 
the quotes reported just above, stems from the strong divergence between Laos’s and 
Vietnam’s interests. Thus, this research confirms the thesis, expressed by the vast 
majority of scholars and analysts, that Vietnam would have preferred a dam-free Lower 
Mekong River. 
Therefore, the main conclusion from the findings presented by this chapter is that the 
Xayaburi dam MTI enabled Laos (A) to get Vietnam (B) to do something (accept the 
construction of the dam) that it would not (in an ideal scenario, i.e. following its own 
preferences informed by national interests) otherwise do. This outcome, according to 
Dahl’s definition of relational power, means that the Xayaburi dam, the independent 
variable, had a positive impact on the relational power of Laos in its bilateral relations 
with Vietnam. The clear opposition of Lao and Vietnamese preferences on the issue 
leads to the possibility of power to prevail and at the same time as the “potential for 
establishing causality” (Goh 2016: 12) is strengthened. However, to control the 
consistency of this conclusion and to appreciate the ways in which this relational power 
was expressed and materialised, the analytical framework will now be fully applied. 
First, it will be highlighted that the two conditions of relational power can be identified 
in the Xayaburi case. Second, the forms of this power will be assessed. Third, absolute 
gains and costs for the prevailing state will be uncovered. 
5.5.1.2 Conditions of power 
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From the analysis above, it clearly emerges how the criterion of a causal relationship 
between the Xayaburi MTI and the impact in terms of power in the Laos–Vietnam 
relation, i.e. between the actor that is supposed to increase its power and the target, is 
satisfied. Undoubtedly, at the end the Government of Laos’s green light for the project 
was the crucial factor causing a change in relational power terms. In other words, the 
realisation of the MTI resulted in an outcome that went against Vietnam’s preferences 
and interests and thus in a situation in which Laos prevailed, because of its decision to 
build it in the first place and then because of all the necessary preliminary tasks 
(arrangements with Thai stakeholders, MRC procedures) to be carried out in order to 
reach the goal of building the MTI. With respect to goal attainment, the findings 
presented in the assessment of preferences above clearly point to the fact that the 
outcome was consistent with Laos’s preferences and against Vietnamese ones. 
Moreover, Laos, having decided to go ahead with the project, was stuck with its 
decision from 2007 to 2012 and consistently promoted its goals, pressuring Vietnam to 
adapt. The analysis of the negotiation process demonstrated that Laos acted cautiously, 
conscious of its status, but that from 2007 never stopped or changed its plans. A clear 
example of this can be found in the GoL’s behaviour in mid-2011 after the PNPCA 
procedure: it first showed an accommodating attitude when Laos’s prime minister 
assured his Vietnamese counterpart that the Xayaburi project had stopped, but in the 
meantime it was undertaking all necessary steps in order to move on with the 
infrastructure. 
5.5.1.3. Forms of power 
With respect to forms of power, the findings are in line with Goh’s (2016) key 
assumption that in a power relation shaped by opposing interests, power would take the 
form of hard power, and coercion would be the most important tool exploited by the 
prevailing actor, despite the potential coexistence of softer forms of power. As a matter 
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of fact, it has been seen that, rather than being induced or persuaded to accept the 
Xayaburi dam, Vietnam was forced to accept the fait accompli and Laos’s unilateral 
decision to go ahead with the construction despite Vietnam’s strong disagreement with 
the project. Vietnam’s opposition is indisputable (as clearly confirmed by the official 
statements against the dam made within the MRC framework by the Vietnamese 
president, Truong Tan Sang, just before Laos organised the groundbreaking ceremony, 
and by the interview with the Vietnamese diplomat reported in this chapter). However, 
despite its attempts to change Laos’s plans, Vietnam was forced to comply mainly by 
geopolitical constraints, which meant that a stronger reaction towards Laos’s plans was 
not strategically viable. In fact, in refusing Hanoi’s requests for a 10-year moratorium, 
suspending the project until more studies were conducted on its impact downstream, 
Laos coerced Vietnam into accepting the construction of the dam, displaying hard 
power. This was also manifested in assertive declarations by Laos leaders, such as 
responding to Vietnam’s further requests to stop the project by rejecting them and 
saying “After six months, all you can do is record the difference of opinions and that is 
the end of the process” (Chen 2013). Therefore, Vietnam was forced to comply in order 
to avoid the costly consequences signalled by Laos’s behaviour. As comprehensively 
pointed out in the analysis of the negotiations, Vientiane managed to end up in such a 
coercive position thanks to a skilful (and conscious) mobilisation of the geopolitical 
resources that could support its hydropower goal. First of all, Laos leveraged Thailand’s 
interests (and then its stakes), facing which it could have been compared to “starting a 
war”, as Viraphonh Viravong, the Lao Vice Minister of Energy and Mines, put it. 
Second, as acknowledged by Stuart-Fox and by the Vietnamese diplomat interviewed, 
leveraging the importance of the special relationship between Laos and Vietnam could, 
in the light of China’s potential competition for influence in Laos, have provoked costly 
consequences for Hanoi. Lao officials appeared well aware of these constraints, as was 
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made clear in the interview in which a Lao official in the MRC stated that “without 
China we would have had a very different story” (9-2015). 
Moreover, the findings are also coherent with Goh’s assumption that in practice a 
combination of coercion, inducement and persuasion is likely to occur, although in the 
Xayaburi case hard forms of power are preponderant. Laos managed to some extent (the 
findings prove that it at least tried) to persuade Vietnam by presenting itself as a small 
and poor country that might only develop its economy by becoming the ‘battery of 
Southeast Asia’. The presence of this softer form of power clearly emerged in the quote 
from an official of the Lao National Mekong Committee, who stressed the broader 
bilateral ties in conjunction with a minimisation of the Xayaburi project’s negative 
impact for Vietnam, suggesting that “a very small fish that might not be able to pass 
through the Xayaburi dam” should not compromise the excellent historical ties between 
the two countries (10-2015).62 
5.5.1.4 Outcome 
In terms of absolute gains and costs the balance appears to be clearly in Laos’s favour 
since it secured its main interest of building the Xayaburi dam and succeeded 
diplomatically by testing the special relationship, while facing only minor costs, such as 
the delay of the project caused by Vietnam’s opposition (both within the MRC and 
bilaterally) and the need to revise the original design in order to meet Hanoi’s demands, 
which led to additional costs of 100 million dollars. The costs that resulted were lower 
than the gains from pursuing one of the most important national economic policies – i.e. 
becoming a leading hydropower exporter in the region – as well as from the concrete 
and direct economic benefits that will be generated by the Xayaburi dam, which will 
generate around 4 billion dollars throughout the 29-year concession period ending in 
                                                          
62 The focus was placed on the narrative aspect of the negotiations by the interviewed American 
diplomat (Interview 26-2015). 
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2048. In addition, the infrastructure provides potential control over the flow of the river 
and so it could become a “weapon” at Laos’s disposal. 
To summarise, the relational power analysis demonstrates that the Xayaburi MTI 
allowed Laos to increase its relational power over Vietnam, securing its interests despite 
the divergence with Hanoi. The next section will point out the theoretical implications 
of this conclusion, stressing how small states studies might benefit from drawing on the 
literature on transboundary water politics. 
5.5.2 Theoretical discussion of the findings 
The most evident theoretical conclusion that can be drawn from the findings relates to 
the level of analysis for examining small states. As it is clear from the reconstruction 
and the analysis of the events how geopolitical factors were crucial in enabling Laos to 
prevail over Vietnam and concurrently avoid a strong reaction from Hanoi, it can be 
said without doubt that in the Xayaburi issue the systemic level played the most 
important role. The case study’s findings, thus, accord with the claim that the systemic-
structural level is the predominant explanatory factor when it comes to small states 
international politics, as argued by scholars such as Jervis (1978), Schweller (1992), 
Snyder (1991) and Walt (1985). This also reflects what has been found through the case 
studies collected in Hey (2003), including the chapter on Laos by Abuza (2003). 
Nonetheless, the most interesting theoretical result is represented by the role of 
geographic factors, which highlight the relevance of geography besides domestic and 
systemic levels.63 The most notable contribution to knowledge in this respect is the 
complete opposition to the thesis proposed by Handel (1990), the only IR scholar who 
has explicitly assessed the role of geographic position for small states. Handel, in fact, 
concludes with the proposition that holding a central geographic position, instead of 
lying undisturbed in the middle of an ocean, has a negative impact on small polities. It 
                                                          
63 The relation of geography with the two analytical levels was discussed in chapter 2. 
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is easy to appreciate how Laos’s central geographic position was key to the very 
possibility of altering its relational power with Vietnam thanks to a transboundary 
facility. Moreover, the analysis shows that geography must not be conceived of only as 
position and borders, since even when taking into account Laos’s location, a 
conceptualisation of the country as an empty and homogeneous space64 would probably 
have led to neglect or underestimation of the importance of its internal territorial aspects 
such as its morphology and the presence (along and across borders) of the Mekong 
River – thanks to which, Laos has hydropower potential.65 Since in this case study 
geography proved to be a powerful and crucial explanatory factor, the evidence shows 
that paying more attention to geographic elements could shed new light on hidden and 
overlooked aspects of small states’ foreign policy. 
Furthermore, the findings of the Xayaburi case appear to also be consistent with the 
above-mentioned study on Nepal–India relations around water resources (Gyawali 
2002). In fact, like Nepal, Laos successfully managed its asymmetric relations, dealing 
with its inferiority in aggregate power but enjoying power as a consequence of its upper 
hand over Vietnam. However, while Gyawali (2002) was discussed in chapter 2 in the 
literature review of small states and asymmetric relations, there is a vast and rich 
literature on transboundary water politics that cannot be overlooked by this research, 
and which promises to be very useful for small states scholars more generally. This 
literature was not included in the review carried out in chapter 2 because it does not 
explicitly investigate small states politics. However, it actually contains several 
elements of interest to this research, not only because the MTI observed in this chapter 
is a dam but, more interestingly, because of the insights into power and geography 
provided by several works on hydropolitics published by scholars of International 
                                                          
64 A reification in line with the tradition of structural-realism and his “father” Kenneth Waltz, 
but, as stressed by Kadercan (2015), common also in works belonging to neo-institutionalism, 
constructivism and the English School of IR. 
65 Studies that provided a structured critique of this approach were cited in chapter 2. 
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Relations. Geography, as noted in chapter 2, is mainly absent in small states research, 
but it has been widely addressed in in the literature on hydrohegemony, starting with the 
seminal article by Zeitoun and Warner (2006) which developed the Framework of 
Hydro-hegemony. The understanding of the importance of geographic position in this 
article shows how small states studies might benefit from taking this body of literature 
into consideration. In fact, in discussing the role of riparian position, Zeitoun and 
Warner (2006) emphasise how an upstream position can become a coercive resource 
with the capacity to alter the balance of forces among the actors involved: 
The effects of gravity and geography must be given 
their due consideration. Water conflict theorists Frey 
and Naff did not lose sight of this dynamic when 
they observed that from an upstream position: “one 
can usually take actions that confront downstream 
competitors with faits accomplis, the alteration of 
which is far more demanding than the original 
action. Diversion, overuse, contamination and flow 
delay are tactics available in accordance with one’s 
position on the riparian totem pole (Frey & Naff, 
1985: 78). Riparian position is perhaps the most 
static form of coercive resource, and one that is 
essentially outside of the struggle for a better 
position in the balance of power between States. 
Political entities blessed with such a coercive 
resource are not likely to have it eroded, short of 
territorial conquest by another. (Zeitoun and Warner 
2006: 450, emphasis added) 
This succinct proposition embeds, in a nutshell, several elements that emerged from the 
analysis of the Xayaburi dam case outlined above, to the extent that it could have been 
written with the Xayaburi issue in mind. First of all, Laos exploited its upstream 
position and forced Vietnam to face the fait accompli. Second, it has been seen how 
different constraints prevented Vietnam from altering Laos’s course of action, 
precluding a stronger reaction from Hanoi. Third, tactics such as those listed by Frey 
and Naff (1985) in the quote above – diversion, overuse, contamination and flow delay 
– show the concreteness of the weapon, as it has been described, at Laos’s disposal and 
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the related potential costs for Vietnam. Finally, the expected outcome in terms of 
balance of power is consistent with the findings on the effects of the Xayaburi MTI on 
the relational power between the two countries. Nevertheless, if a weaker state is able to 
manage an issue in which it challenges a stronger neighbour with a fait accompli and 
avoids retaliation – building on the fact that in hydropolitics interactions the use of 
“brute power” is not “cost-effective, efficient or attractive” (Beaumont 1997; Wolf 
1998; Barnett 2000, cited in Dinar 2009: 333) – it results in an increase in relational 
power for the small state. Therefore, as the case of Laos is one of geographic supremacy 
in relation to Vietnam, the findings of this chapter are in line with previous research on 
transboundary water interactions and on the relation between geography and power, 
according to which the states’ location is a key variable in understanding power 
relations and outcomes and an upstream position brings power regardless of the level of 
aggregate capabilities (see, among others, Lowi 1993; Daoudy 2009; Dinar 2009; Tir 
and Ackerman 2009; Cascão and Zeitoun 2010; Zawahri and Mitchell 2011; Warner 
and Zawahri 2012; Kuenzer et al. 2012; Hensengerth 2015; Menga 2016). Menga 
(2016) includes geographic position in the concept of material power, arguing that the 
“riparian’s position can significantly impact on material power” (Menga 2016: 411). 
Dinar (2009), for instance, underlines how upstream riparian states that are weaker in 
terms of absolute and aggregate power, could, thanks to having the “geographic upper-
hand … bring to bear issue-specific structural power and may very well influence the 
outcome” (Dinar 2009: 330). Seemingly, Cascão and Zeitoun (2010) stress that 
the so-called weaker (“non-hegemonic” is the 
preferred term) states are not always as weak or 
optionless as they are credited to be. Deeper 
examination of each case reveals evidence of 
counter-hegemonic mechanisms employed by the 
non-hegemonic states, with the aim to change the 
outcomes of water control and allocation towards a 
more equitable configuration. (Cascão and Zeitoun 
2010: 38) 
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Moreover, the outcome aside, even the tools through which this can be achieved, as 
stressed by Dinar (2009), are consistent with the findings of this research, which has 
explained why Vietnam’s hands were bound: “In general, the strategies used to alter 
state pay-offs in favor of cooperation include, but are not limited to, reciprocity, 
foreign-policy considerations and issue-linkage, and side-payments (Oye 1986: 11–18; 
Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff 1998: 12 […])” (Dinar 2009: 334). 
However, it is not only the relation between geographic position and power present in 
the hydropolitics literature that the Xayaburi dam case confirms, but also the relevance 
of the opportunity for small states to mobilise external political and financial support 
present from Zeitoun and Warner (2006)’s study. As Kehl (2011) puts it, 
Weak riparians are most successful at influencing 
water-sharing policies when they utilize the 
resources of external actors to augment their 
economic and technological capacity. With external 
support, weak riparians can assert economic 
leverage and soft power, which this study shows to 
be the most effective in achieving cooperation in 
hydropolitical complexes. (Kehl 2011: 231)   
So, Laos’s geographic position, with its cross-border implications, combined with the 
multinational nature of a large hydroelectric facility that needed external financial and 
technological support, created a mix that allowed to neutralise absolute power when 
looked at in its relational and dynamic aspect within the domain (the relation with 
Vietnam) and scope (the management of Mekong River) of a specific interaction. Thus, 
to summarise, when discussing a transboundary hydropower issue from a small state’s 
perspective, it can be seen that there is great potential for fruitful cross-fertilisation 
between the two subfields of International Relations: hydrohegemony and counter-
hegemony analyses, and small states studies. There are three main reasons for this: a) 
both fields offer a number of interesting case studies, so that could provide raw material 
for comparative research; b) power and power asymmetries, while more dominant in 
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small states studies, are crucial factors in both research subfields; and c) the 
hydrohegemony and counter-hegemony literature provides invaluable inputs related to 
the role of geography that might benefit small states scholars. The case of Laos itself 
clearly supports this argument, since, as will be further elucidated in chapter 7, Abuza’s 
(2003) cited work, developed from a small state perspective, would certainly have 
profited from taking into account hydrohegemony studies on the power interplays in the 
Lower Mekong Basin (LMB). 
5.6 Conclusion 
The conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter is that the multinational and 
transboundary nature of the Xayaburi dam represented the preconditions for Vientiane 
to prevail over Vietnam in relational power terms and make the latter do something it 
would have not otherwise done. Without these constitutive elements, we would not have 
seen the smaller side securing gains while forcing a more powerful neighbour to accept 
a fait accompli. 
The transboundary dimension, in fact, was the key dimension for increasing Laos’s 
relational power, since with a different geography Laos would simply not have had this 
opportunity to exercise its relational power, through an MTI, over a bigger neighbour. 
In other words, had there not been any transboundary river between Laos and Vietnam, 
the former would not have had provoked problems for the latter, and the latter would 
not have suffered any threat from a smaller neighbouring country through and from a 
multinational transboundary dam. If the Mekong had run outside Laos’s territory, the 
one crucial tool for gaining relational power would simply have been absent. 
Second, it has been seen how the multinational nature of the infrastructure provided 
Laos with the opportunity to gain external support thanks to the stake the Thai investor 
had in the facility. The reconstruction of the negotiations showed how Vietnam faced 
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different constraints because the Xayaburi dam involved the diverse interests of various 
public and private actors.  
To summarise, the Xayaburi case shows how with specific geographic and geopolitical 
conditions a small country such as Laos might take advantage of external financial 
resources and in so doing mobilising its geography to boost its capacity, also in relation 
to stronger states, to the extent of acting with impunity against their interests and 
increasing its relational power within a bilateral and asymmetric relationship.  
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CHAPTER VI 
THE IMPACT OF THE BOTEN–VIENTIANE HIGH-SPEED 
RAILWAY MTI ON THE RELATIONAL POWER OF LAOS 
VERSUS CHINA 
All major railway projects started as 
dreams, and many remained in the field of 
fantasy. Their number and variety is a 
reminder that railway building was a 
fundamental element in the dreams of a 
whole century – no country, no statesman, 
no businessman, no political scientist, it 
seems, was without his own locomotive 
vision – Nicholas Faith 201466 
 
6.1 Introduction 
To the study of the impact of MTIs on Laos’s relational power, this chapter adds the 
second case study: the high-speed railway project that will cross the country, connecting 
it to China in the North and to Thailand in the South, and then to its Southeast Asian 
neighbours. The MTI analysed in this chapter, besides being different in nature from the 
Xayaburi dam, concerns a different bilateral relationship since it involves Laos’s most 
powerful neighbour in absolute terms: China. As in chapter 5, the focus will be on the 
negotiations, in this case between China and Laos about the Boten–Vientiane section of 
the Kunming–Singapore high-speed railway (HSR67) project – a 427 km HSR line that 
will carry both passengers and freight – within Laos–China bilateral relations, and 
presents the findings generated from the analysis of the primary and secondary data. 
The outcome of this investigation highlights the effect of this specific MTI on the 
relational power of Laos with respect to China (the domain) and within the scope of 
transport connectivity in the broader China–Southeast Asia context. 
                                                          
66 Faith (2014: 204). 
67 Hereinafter, the terms railway, rail, railroad and rail link will be used interchangeably. 
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Consistent with the approach and the analytical framework of this research, this chapter, 
like the previous one, focuses on the inter-state level of the negotiations without delving 
into technological, environmental or social details; even if they inevitably emerge at 
some point, it is not within the goals of this work to address them if they are not 
diplomatically relevant and are not brought to the negotiation table by the two parties.  
According to the definition provided in chapter 3, the Boten–Vientiane HSR project can 
be classified as an MTI since it is multinational, being built thanks to foreign 
investment, and since it is also directly transboundary, first of all because it will cross 
the border between China and Laos, and also because the project is conceived as an 
infrastructure network that crosses multiple borders. 
However, researching the negotiations on this MTI was significantly different from 
doing so for the case study presented in the previous chapter because when this research 
began in 2013 the Xayaburi dam had already been inaugurated, while the fate of the 
railway project appeared to be far from clear and predictable. It is important to 
underline this difference here, as the status of the project during the investigation had an 
impact on the research process. The early stage of this MTI, in fact, made it more 
difficult to see through the complex and opaque negotiation process both for diplomatic 
and business-related reasons, because, understandably, as a multitude of public and 
private actors across several sectors had stakes and interests in this project of around 6–
7 billion dollars, while it was still under negotiation any information was cautiously 
preserved. The economic stakes involved in the project were clarified by a diplomat 
who told the author that an entrepreneur was calling him/her every week to get updates 
on the project, for which her/his company hoped to get a furniture contract (personal 
communication, March 2015). Such a context made all the research phases more 
complicated and time-consuming, from the literature review and the identification of the 
first group of potential interviewees with whom to start the snowballing to the interview 
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and analysis process. First, as a consequence of the project’s uncertainty until late 2016 
(unlike with the Xayaburi case), and despite several newspaper articles on the subject 
being available, the absence of in-depth (and academic) studies led to a much higher 
gap in knowledge of the two countries’ interests in and positions on the project. 
Therefore, the data contained in this chapter will provide the first comprehensive 
account of the Boten–Vientiane railway project, not only within International Relations, 
but in general. Second, one clear example of such difficulties relating to the selection of 
interviewees was the total absence of publicly available references in English to the 
official Lao body in charge of the project, the “Lao–Sino Railway Project” Special Unit 
within the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT), which appeared to be 
unknown even to several informants in Vientiane. Despite the numerous media articles 
on the issue, this unit has never been mentioned, and in early 2017 evidence of it still 
could not be found through a Google search in English. Third, with regard to the 
interviewing process, despite learning from a US diplomat of the presence inside the US 
embassy in Vientiane of a special observer dedicated to the project full-time, it was not 
possible to arrange a meeting. Fourth, it was necessary to continuously update the data 
until the negotiations were over (late 2016), using primary and secondary sources and 
following up with some interviewees with whom the author was able to establish a good 
relationship and who were therefore willing to provide additional updated information 
by email as well via phone and Skype calls. 
This chapter has the same structure as chapter 5. It begins by exploring in the first 
section the interests (and related policies) of the two states between which the 
negotiations occur (in this case, in relation to the Boten–Vientiane MTI), as in chapter 
5. However, while in chapter 5 the role the GoL gives to hydropower in its development 
goals was the focus of the analysis, since the Xayaburi MTI development was driven 
primarily by Laos, here the analysis will start from China’s interests and plans, since in 
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this case the initiative came from Beijing. The second section then reconstructs all the 
phases of the negotiations, while the third analyses the data. Finally, the fourth section 
discusses the findings in relational power terms as well as from a theoretical point of 
view. 
6.2 The policy context: China’s and Laos’s connectivity agendas 
This section aims to illustrate the context of the connectivity agenda in Beijing and 
Vientiane in order to situate both sides’ interests in the broader field in which the 
specific MTI analysed in the next section is located. The analysis will begin by 
addressing China’s main connectivity policy – the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) 
initiative launched in 2013 – because, as will be seen, the Kunming–Singapore high-
speed railway plan is a key component of China’s cross-border infrastructure ambitions. 
Then, it will be explored how, within OBOR, the diplomatic impetus relating to the 
high-speed railway has so far been overlooked by academic research. And finally, the 
way Laos’s connectivity agenda relates to China’s plans will be demonstrated. 
6.2.1 One Belt, One Road: China’s multi-billion connectivity initiative 
On 17th October 2012, just a few weeks before the opening of the 18th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in Beijing and the beginning of the 
Xi Jinping era, Professor Wang Jisi – Hu Jintao’s key foreign policy advisor68 and then 
dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, after having acted for 
nearly a decade as president of the Institute of International Strategic Studies of the 
CPC’s Central Party School – published an op-ed in Global Times titled “‘Marching 
Westward’: The Rebalancing of China’s Geostrategy”,69 which was destined to become 
a milestone and to shape China’s foreign policy under the new leadership. In it, Wang 
                                                          
68 See in this respect the interview with Professor Sukhee Han by the East Asia Institute, 
available at 
http://www.eai.or.kr/type/panelView.asp?bytag=p&code=eng_multimedia&idx=11285&page=1 
69 The article (in Chinese) can be accessed at http://news.sina.com.cn/pl/2012-10-
17/071525374379.shtml. The article was then articulated in a chapter of a book by Wang 
(2014), published in 2014. 
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argued that China needed to be strategically repositioned towards the West and to 
develop a New Silk Road to (re)connect China with the rest of the world and 
particularly with the Eurasian continent. A turn towards the West was motivated by 
systemic strategic imperatives and was perceived to be a response to Obama’s “Pivot to 
Asia” policy of reorienting towards the Pacific, capable of avoiding dangerous zero-sum 
games in troubled East Asian waters. So, the West was identified by Wang as the area 
in which China could foster its economic and diplomatic presence, allowing Beijing to 
diversify its foreign policy and acquire more options. At such a turning point, Wang’s 
analysis emerged as “the most important policy exposition of China in the past 2–3 
years” and US diplomats in China mobilised to investigate its “details and implications” 
(Sun 2013). If at first Wang’s article did not attract much attention outside foreign 
policy circles, its impact became clear at a global scale with Xi Jinping’s announcement 
of the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative one year later in Kazakhstan. In fact, as 
emphasised by several scholars and practitioners, Wang’s continental impetus 
constitutes the core component of the new Chinese grand design – see, among others, 
Fardella (2014), Zhao (2015) and Clarke (2016). Often referred to as OBOR or BRI 
(Belt and Road Initiative),70 the policy has two dimensions. The first dimension – 
terrestrial and oriented to the West, incorporating Wang’s recommendations – is the 
Silk Road Economic Belt, proposed by Xi Jinping during a speech at Kazakhstan's 
Nazarbayev University on 7th September 2013 in which, according the an official 
statement released by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs he “gave a comprehensive 
elaboration of China’s policy of good-neighbourly and friendly cooperation toward 
countries in Central Asia” and “proposed to join hands building a Silk Road economic 
belt with innovative cooperation mode and to make it a grand cause benefiting people in 
                                                          
70 This thesis adopts the term OBOR instead of BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) to allow 
consistency with the transcripts of the interviews, since the vast majority of the interviewees 
referred to it as OBOR. 
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regional countries along the route” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s 
Republic of China 2013). 
The second dimension is the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which was announced by 
the Chinese president on 3rd October 2013 during his visit to Indonesia, the first he paid 
to an ASEAN country (Wu and Zhang 2013). On that occasion, Xi advocated closer ties 
with ASEAN, which shares a common destiny with China, proposing to his counterpart, 
the then Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, along with the maritime 
road, the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as a key 
financial tool to build infrastructures in the region and implement the policy (CCTV 
2013). As a matter of fact, the new multilateral development bank was conceived as a 
tool of OBOR, and it has since been supported by the emerging facts; as noted by 
Gabusi (2017), in its first year of activity the AIIB approved 12 loans related to projects 
in 7 countries (Indonesia, Bangladesh, Azerbaijan, Oman, Myanmar, Pakistan and 
Tajikistan), which are all stretched across the six OBOR corridors.  
The two dimensions, terrestrial and maritime, were soon incorporated into a single 
formulation during the third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC), held in November 2013, during which there emerged 
the necessity of “accelerating the interconnection of infrastructure among neighboring 
countries, and facilitating the construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st 
Century Maritime Silk Road” (China Daily 2015). In March 2015, China’s National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) released a systematic document titled 
Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century 
Maritime Silk Road, through which were highlighted the background, principles, 
framework, cooperation priorities and mechanisms; the Chinese regions’ role in the 
opening-up process; and future prospects related to the OBOR initiative. The purpose of 
the release was “to promote the implementation of the Initiative, instill vigor and 
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vitality into the ancient Silk Road, connect Asian, European and African countries more 
closely and promote mutually beneficial cooperation to a new high and in new forms”, 
emphasising that the initiative had a win–win nature since it promoted international 
cooperation and common economic development in an open and inclusive way 
(National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China 
2015). As shown in the map below,71 OBOR is articulated along six economic corridors 
and encompasses several countries from the Pacific to the Mediterranean.72 
Figure 6.1 – The One Belt, One Road (OBOR) Initiative 
 
Source: Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) 
To undertake such an ambitious project, China has mobilised (and is mobilising) 
massive financial resources, equal, according to official figures, to some 890 billion 
                                                          
71 An interactive map with details regarding the individual projects has been prepared by the 
Financial Times and is available at https://ig.ft.com/sites/special-reports/one-belt-one-road/ 
(accessed 15th October 2016). 
72 A comprehensive account of countries, organisations, initiatives and projects related to OBOR 
is provided by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and is available at 
https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/database/initiatives/one-belt-one-road/fb5c5a09-2dba-48b9-
9c2d-4434511893c8/ (accessed 15 February 2017). 
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dollars and set to rise to 4 trillion (The Economist 2016). To manage this money, China 
promoted the institution of two tailored financial tools, the Silk Road Fund (SRF) and 
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB),73 into which, respectively, Beijing 
pumped 40 billion dollars (Carsten and Blanchard 2014) and over 30 billion dollars 
(Wong 2016). 
Infrastructures, therefore, are a key factor and will play a crucial role in China’s “Going 
Out” effort, in fact, as underlined by Andornino (2015), according to Zhang Yansheng, 
director of the Institute for International Economics Research of the National 
Development and Reform Commission, China aimed to pursue some 1.2 trillion dollars 
in outward FDI between 2014 and 2020. Andornino (2015) also notes that a sizeable 
share of these resources will move to countries under the scope of OBOR. Chinese 
OBOR-related investment, therefore, appears to be crucial in tapping the huge demand 
for infrastructure along the OBOR routes, as confirmed by the fact that in 2015 Chinese 
FDI in OBOR countries rose twice respect to the total increase of China’s outward FDI 
and that these countries attracted nearly half of China’s engineering projects – a quota 
rising to 52% between January and June 2016 (The Economist 2016). The implications 
for Asia and Southeast Asia are tremendous, since, as already underlined in chapter 3, 
Asia alone will reportedly need 8 trillion dollars of investment in infrastructure by 2020, 
and it must be noted here, since the country under examination is Laos, that ASEAN 
countries are estimated to need some 110 billion dollars per year by 2025 (ASEAN 
Secretariat 2015). To get a vivid sense of OBOR’s extent and how it is – or can be – 
perceived, one might also look at the LinkedIn profile of Sir Richard Heygate, a former 
                                                          
73 Though not officially linked to OBOR, the AIIB’s members consistently overlap with 
countries along OBOR’s two dimensions. Moreover, Xi Jinping referred to OBOR in his 
closing remarks at the Inaugural Meeting of the Board of Governors of the AIIB held in 
Beijing on 16th–17th January 2016. The document is available here: 
https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/board-
governors/.content/index/_download/20160816034745788.pdf. For details regarding the 
membership, shares, percentage of vote and projects under way, see the AIIB website: 
www.aiib.org. 
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senior partner of McKinsey and Company for over 20 years, hired as an international 
agent by China Railway Engineering Number 3 Group, whose summary reads as 
follows: 
I am now advisor to China Railway Engineering 
Number 3 Group, a very large state-owned company 
and part of the group that has been responsible for 
constructing much of the infrastructure that has led 
to the success of modern China. Under the Chinese 
government “One Belt One Road” policy they are 
now funding and managing infrastructure projects 
internationally. They have very substantial assets as 
well as access to Chinese institutional funds, which 
can now be invested overseas. They started in Africa 
but now want to move into the more developed 
world. They will fund/build infrastructure like roads, 
rail, airports, new towns, pipelines, science parks, 
commercial estates, affordable housing – anywhere 
where land is available and owners want a large 
infrastructure partner with access to virtually 
unlimited funds and expertise. Sums involved 
typically exceed $1 Billion. China is also interested 
in trading and operations opportunities associated 
with infrastructure and here we are developing local 
partnerships. (Heygate 2017) 
In the light of the overview provided here, it can be understood why in the last three 
years OBOR has established itself as a flagship programme, a catch-all formula able to 
capture China’s new global stance and the consequent geopolitical adjustment. 
However, this research does not aim to analyse OBOR in itself, to which, in the past 
few years, a flourishing body of academic literature has been dedicated, besides plenty 
of newspaper articles; rather, it outlines OBOR’s key facts to set the context in which 
the Boten–Vientiane section of the broader Kunming–Singapore (via Vientiane, 
Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur) high-speed railway project has been negotiated. For a 
better understanding of OBOR’s drivers, implications and prospects, see, among others, 
Djankov and Miner (2016), Sakhuja and Chan (2016), Das (2017), Shambaugh (2015), 
Summers (2016), Swaine (2015), Wan (2016), Lim et al. (2016) and Wang (2016). 
OBOR, thus, represents a global factor driving infrastructure development through 
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mobilisation of resources, international partnerships and institution building (e.g. the 
AIIB). As a consequence, OBOR is leading to rapid and huge development of MTIs, not 
only in China or Asia, but also across the Eurasian landmass and beyond. It can be 
clearly seen how OBOR is intrinsically connected to MTIs thanks to its geographic 
transboundary scale and scope, and because, China being the investor, all infrastructure 
projects under the OBOR umbrella and outside China are MTIs by definition if they are 
directly or indirectly cross-border. 
6.2.2 China’s high-speed railway diplomacy: OBOR’s overlooked facet 
Nonetheless, one OBOR facet that is significantly under-researched is China’s high-
speed railway diplomacy (HSRD), launched by the Chinese premier, Li Keqiang, only 
one week after Xi Jinping’s above-mentioned visit to Jakarta, during a meeting with the 
then Thai prime minister, Yingluck Shinawatra (The State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China 2015). The meeting was held on the occasion of the opening 
ceremony of an exhibition concerning China’s high-speed railway in Bangkok, which, 
according to the press release of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs “sponsored by 
China Railway Corporation, is aimed at further strengthening Thai public understanding 
of China's high-speed railway technology, and at promoting bilateral railway 
cooperation” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2013). 
Subsequently, Premier Li became known as China’s “high-speed railway spokesman” 
as he travelled the world promoting HSRD. 
In contrast to the great scholarly attention paid to OBOR in the past few years, China’s 
HSRD has not so far been systematically investigated by International Relations 
scholars, despite it being, as can be seen from the figure below, a key OBOR ingredient 
and despite its economic and political significance. 
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Figure 6.2 - Belt & Road Investments by Industry 
 
Source: Garcia-Herrero (2017) 
 
However, rising awareness of its relevance and of the need for more investigation 
culminated in 2016 with the publication of two working papers: Chang (2016) and 
Kratz and Pavlicevic (2016). As noted by Kratz and Pavlicevic, in fact, 
Although China-backed overseas HSR projects have 
increasingly attracted the attention of both Chinese 
and overseas media, this interest has not been 
matched by substantial academic or policy level 
research and analysis. The precise nature of China’s 
overseas HSR initiatives and the implications of its 
HSR diplomacy remain obscured. (Kratz and 
Pavlicevic 2016, page unnumbered) 
China’s promotion of its high-speed railway development preceded OBOR, but the 
timing of Li’s announcement showed that in late 2013 the new leadership in Beijing 
started to pursue it at a new level and within the clear diplomatic framework provided 
by the OBOR initiative, clearly indicating the overlap, complementarity and common 
rationale of the two diplomatic efforts, as well as the reprioritisation at the international 
level. This emerged from a study focused on the economic-technological dimension of 
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Chinese railway development in the era of high-speed railways, and not on its 
geopolitical-diplomatic aspects and implications: 
The rapid deployment of HSR infrastructure and the 
accumulated knowledge and experience gained from 
Chinese HSR projects have frequently been 
promoted in other countries through Chinese 
diplomacy … China released an ambitious 
international HSR development plan to connect 
Europe, Southeast Asia, and even North America 
through three trans-continental HSRs. Even though 
such a blueprint seems somewhat overambitious, 
given the economic concerns of its projected high 
cost and limited benefit, due to insufficient demand 
for high-speed railway travel, it does confirm the 
idea of connecting foreign nations with HSR 
infrastructure networks as an agenda item with the 
Chinese government. In fact, a new series of 
marketing endeavours has been initiated since 2013, 
after debates took place on the intellectual property 
rights of HSR technologies and concerns were 
dispelled about HSR safety, triggered by 2011’s 
HSR accident.74 Unlike previous efforts, which were 
primarily steered by the Ministry of Railways and 
Chinese railroad enterprises, China’s top leaders, 
including the prime minister (PM), have used a 
number of diplomatic visits to promote Chinese 
HSR expertise and internationally, in terms of 
technology, finance, and construction. (Chen and 
Haynes 2015: 105) 
Moreover, Kratz and Pavlicevic (2016) assert that the links between OBOR and HSRD 
are evident when looking at the overlap between the financial institutions and tools 
backing the two initiatives. This intimate relationship is also implicitly entailed in Arase 
(2015), where the author discusses the high-speed railway’s importance within OBOR 
without even distinguishing the two diplomatic endeavours. 
Although explaining in detail the internal economic, political and strategic drivers of 
HSRD would go far beyond the scope of this study, given that the purpose is to assess 
China’s and Laos’s preferences and interests in one specific MTI project, the broader 
picture in China must, however, be taken into account as China’s international 
                                                          
74 The reference is to the Wenzhou train collision, which occurred on 23rd July 2011 and resulted 
in 40 deaths and injuries to more than 200 people (Wilson 2011). 
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projection through HSRs is deeply rooted in domestic factors that have the potential to 
reverberate through all Chinese HSR investments or plans. The first and most important 
of these factors is the tremendous development of its own HSR network over the past 
decade: the first HSR line was laid in 2008, to connect Beijing to the port of Tianjin, 
and in 2013 China completed the first 10,000 km, linking 100 cities and surpassing the 
HSR coverage of the whole of Europe, surprising those sceptical observers who 
estimated that there would not be enough demand (The Economist 2013). Then in 2016 
the figure was doubled, exceeding 20,000 km, making the Chinese HSR network larger 
than that of the rest of the world combined (The Economist 2017), and there are plans to 
reach 45,000 km by 2030 (Xinhua 2016). An expansion of the HSR industry of this 
calibre led Chinese firms to become leaders in the global rolling stock sector, a position 
further strengthened in 2015 with the establishment of CRRC Corporation Limited after 
China CNR Corporation and CSR Corporation Limited were merged into an industrial 
giant of 130 billion dollars (Bloomberg 2015) with nearly 200,000 employees.75 The 
skyrocketing of the internal HSR network, combined with structural overcapacity in 
sectors such as energy and steel, and in financial as well as workforce resources 
(Lanjian and Wei 2015), makes hunting for customers abroad an almost obvious policy 
in consequence, and the creation of CRRC serves precisely this outward trajectory, 
which is explicitly mentioned, moreover, on the company’s website. In fact, in 2014 
China was already exporting 3.74 billion dollars of locomotive equipment, and CRRC is 
targeting 2.5 billion dollars of international sales up to 2020, building on the 
competitive advantage of being not only an exporter of technology and equipment– an 
industry that is one of the ten selected by the government to make of China an 
industrialised economy – but also an investor and developer, able to offer the best 
                                                          
75 CRRC’s website, accessed on 22nd February 2017, states that it has 186,963 employees. 
Available at http://www.crrcgc.cc/en/g5141.aspx. 
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railways at the cheapest price, and these functions are all packed together in the Chinese 
HSR offer model (Bloomberg 2015; Seneviratne 2016). 
Therefore, it can be clearly seen how closely the domestic and international dimensions 
of China’s HSR development are intertwined, giving birth to the so-called HSRD. In 
this framework, China, being surrounded by several countries that are poorly connected 
– if not almost completely disconnected – and sometimes, as in the case of Laos, 
lacking any railways at all, provides a logical starting point. Nevertheless, in spite of 
these terrific developments and efforts, to date China has actually completed just one 
project under its HSRD (Financial Times 2016), the Ankara–Istanbul high-speed rail 
line in Turkey, which opened to the public in 2014 (Sweet 2014), and consequently, and 
most importantly for this thesis, no transboundary HSRs at all so far. As a consequence, 
Laos will host China’s first HSR MTI within the wider OBOR and HSRD vast and 
ambitious policy and diplomatic endeavours, but despite being in all likelihood a game-
changing project that will underpin many other similar HSR links over the next decades, 
it has not yet been thoroughly investigated. 
6.2.3 The impact of OBOR and HSRD on China–Southeast Asia railway 
connectivity: from the Singapore-Kunming Rail Link (SKRL) to the Pan-Asian 
railway   
On 25th December 2016, in the picturesque and historic city of Luang Prabang in the 
North of Laos, the Chinese and Lao governments held a ceremony to initiate the first 
HSR MTI within the ambitious Chinese geopolitical strategies of OBOR and HSRD 
(Xinhua 2016b). This very project is set to become the first, and therefore the key 
showcase through which Beijing can demonstrate its HSR prowess and its capacity not 
only to export HSR technology but also, as underlined by Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies (RSIS) researcher Wu (2016), to link its national rail network with 
that of other countries, increasing its economic benefits by connecting China to the 
growing economies of Southeast Asia and especially of the city-hubs the railway will 
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pass through (and connect). In fact, as pointed out by George Yeo, Singapore’s former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and currently chairman of Kerry Logistics Network, in an 
interview with the New York Times, “The big objective is Bangkok … It’s a huge 
market, lots of opportunities. From there, Bangkok to Dawei in Myanmar – that will 
enable China to bypass the Malacca Straits” (Perlez and Feng 2013). 
China’s outward HSR strategy develops in four directions: Chongqing–Xinjiang–
Europe and Central Asia–Iran–Turkey–Europe to the west, the Sino–Pakistan railway to 
the south-west and the Pan-Asian railway to the south (Lanjian and Wei 2015). 
However, the Pan-Asian railway is the Chinese version of the Singapore-Kunming–
Singapore Rail Link (SKRL), which was first proposed during the 5th ASEAN Summit 
more than 20 years ago, in December 1995, under a Malaysian proposal. The project 
became the cornerstone of the ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation 
(AMBDC) and in subsequent years it was repeatedly placed at the centre of the regional 
association’s agenda, since, as underlined by Fau (2016), the SKRL project, along with 
the ASEAN Highway Network (AHN) plan, was the most important in the region. The 
feasibility study completed in 1999 examined six routes, all going from Singapore to 
Bangkok and then connecting to China in six different ways (Table 6.1). As Route 1, 
through Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, required fewer financial resources the 
consultancy team recommended it together with the partial development of Route 2 to 
link Myanmar to the region. Therefore, as can be seen in the map below (Figure 6.3), 
the envisioned SKRL was not supposed to run along Laos’s North–South axis.76 
  
                                                          
76 An ASEAN assessment of the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) is available at 
http://www.asean.org/uploads/archive/IDCF/pdf/INFRAS%20INSERT-5.pdf (accessed 12th 
May 2014). 
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Table 6.1 -  The alternative routes for the Singapore-Kunming Railway 
Study Route 
Total Capital 
Outlay 
[US$ Billion] 
Route 
Distance 
[km] 
Missing 
Links 
[km] 
Countries Involved 
Route 1 1.8 5,382 431 Cambodia, Lao PDR, Vietnam  
Route 2 6.0 4,559 1,127 Myanmar, Thailand, China 
Route 3 1.1 4,259 531 Lao PDR, Vietnam 
Route 4 5.7 4,164 1,300 Lao PDR, China 
Route 5 1.1 4,481 616 Lao PDR, Vietnam, Thailand 
Route 6 1.1 4,225 589 Lao PDR, Vietnam, Thailand 
Source: The ASEAN Secretariat. (2000) 
Figure 6.3 – The SKRL does not cross Laos 
 
Source: The ASEAN Secretariat. (2000) 
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By contrast, China’s Pan-Asian railway project’s major difference from the SKRL is 
that it envisages a middle line that goes straight from Yunnan in the North down to 
Vientiane in the South, through Laos and then to Bangkok after having crossed the 
Mekong River (Figure 6.4). Although the overall logic and rationale behind the two 
differently named projects is the same, i.e. linking China with Southeast Asia via a rail 
network, the name by which the project has been referred to changes “as China accepted 
to play a greater part in the Singapore–Kunming Railway project and began working on 
the track departing from Yunnan region the expression ‘Pan-Asian railroad’ was starting 
to be used in Chinese press” (Cicero 2013: 17). It must be emphasised that even though 
the SKRL is still relevant in the ASEAN agenda, as it is part of the Master Plan on 
ASEAN Connectivity (2016–2025) and of the Transport Strategic Plan (2016–2025), 
the main high-speed railway line between China and Southeast Asia is going to be the 
one through Laos that is currently being constructed by China. 
Figure 6.4 - The Pan-Asia Railway Network and the Central Route through Laos 
 
Source: Bangkok Post  
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Such a change of perspective, towards a project led and driven by China, reflects, as 
highlighted in an interview in March 2014 by Xu Liping, researcher at the China 
Academy of Social Sciences, the golden era of China–ASEAN relations experienced in 
the past decade, which opens the door for an era of even better and closer ties and high-
quality developments, in which “all transport link[s] are key to this development and the 
railway is a fitting solution” (CNC News 2014). As Xu points out, this network is in 
fact of crucial importance to Beijing since once “the Trans-Asian railway is finished the 
transport distance from China’s western areas to the Middle East and Europe will be 
shortened by about 3,000 to 5,000 km in comparison with the traditional sea route” 
(ibid.). Southeast Asia’s centrality in the OBOR trajectory is also acknowledged by Sun 
Zhang, professor with expertise on railways at Shanghai’s Tongji University, who 
stresses that the “‘One Belt One Road’ initiative starts and goes through Southeast Asia, 
thus strengthening the transportation system between Asia and Europe, and improving 
the interconnectedness of the regional economy” (Chen 2015). 
This Chinese initiative might well be seen as a harbinger of the new role Beijing was 
ready to act even before the official announcement of the OBOR strategy. At a time 
when the rapid high-speed railway network was ready to take off, China started to 
consider, and proposed, the first transboundary link to expand its domestic network 
towards the region that is often considered as its own backyard (see, among others, 
Osborne 2006; Santasombat 2015; Goh 2016). Playing a more active role in pursuing 
integration with Laos, with the Mekong Region, and thus with Southeast Asia as a 
whole was in fact also a milestone and a driver of China’s so-called “Yunnan as a 
Bridgehead” strategy, developed in 2010 with the goal of making, out of the 
underdeveloped and isolated inland Yunnan region, an economic corridor to the 
promising developing economies of Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar (Xinhua 2010). The 
“Yunnan as a Bridgehead” strategy, however, is deeply rooted in two of China’s foreign 
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policy initiatives developed from the mid-1980s and strongly related to Southeast Asia: 
the “Policy of Good Neighbourliness” (PGN) and the “New Security Concept” (NSC) 
(Haacke 2005). The main strategic goal of the PGN was (re)building trust between 
Beijing and the governments of states on China’s periphery, assuring them of the 
peacefulness of China’s foreign policy through political support and strengthened 
economic cooperation. (ibid.) The NSC policy initiated in 1997 seemingly served to 
stress China’s adherence to a refusal to use force and threat (ibid.). 
Therefore, it can be argued that all the economic power displayed through the OBOR 
and HSRD initiatives, ideally and materially, converged in this very test case. It has 
been seen that HSRD first saw daylight in Bangkok in 2013, so the Kunming–Singapore 
line becomes crucial for the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and so to “open[ing] up a 
route for China to the maritime highways of the Gulf of Thailand and Bay of Bengal” 
(Ghosh 2016). 
The Burmese historian Thant Myint-U, although discussing Myanmar and not Laos, 
brilliantly depicted the new geographic relation between Yunnan and Southeast Asia 
that results from the policies implemented in China in recent years summarised in the 
present section: 
China just completed the Longjiang Grand Bridge 
between Baoshan and Tengchong in western 
Yunnan. Billions of dollars in new roads, bridges 
and railways are bringing the Chinese interior ever 
closer to Myanmar. Whereas it once took months to 
travel from Kunming to Mandalay, soon it will take 
hours. Yunnan next door is also a far richer place 
than it was just 5 years ago. Rural incomes have 
grown faster than anywhere else in China. This is 
the shift in geography […] for which Myanmar's 
leaders need to have a clear strategy. (Myint-U 
2016) 
Seemingly, Laos, like Myanmar, needs to cope with the geo-economic transformations 
under way just behind its northern border, which appear to be of existential importance 
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for the country. The need to develop policies to face this rapidly changing economic and 
diplomatic environment appears to be at once a great challenge for a country that in 
recent decades has been very secluded from the international system, and a tremendous 
potential opportunity, since, bordering China, Laos is what Khanna (2016) has called a 
“ground zero” for these huge Chinese endeavours. Can Laos henceforth bet on its 
position, trying to exploit it by leveraging from being a key starting (and missing) link 
within China’s grand connectivity designs? The next section will outline how the 
Chinese policies and strategies summarised above interact with Laos’s own vision, 
goals and strategies. 
6.2.4 Moving from landlocked to land-linked: Laos’s own connectivity agenda 
In chapter 1, it was seen how contemporary Laos is abandoning its traditional role of 
being a buffer zone and an in-between land – a condition particularly acute during the 
Cold War and the Indochina War – and is turning itself into a crossroads (Jerndal and 
Rigg 1999; Evans 2002; Pholsena and Banomyong 2006). Nevertheless, this plan dates 
back to the colonial era when, inspired by the dream of opening up the Chinese market 
in their competition with the British, the French planned to build a railway along the 
Mekong River (Tan 2015). They were also willing to construct a railway connecting 
Laos to Vietnam as a way to develop the country’s economy: some 80 years ago, 
Roland Meyer announced that “the year 1936 will see the arrival of the locomotive on 
the bank of the Mekong, an event which will announce the economic awakening of 
Laos” (Meyer quoted in Stuart-Fox 1995: 128). Nearly a century has now passed but, 
apart from the 3.5 km line connecting Thanaleng station with the Thai border, there is 
still no trace of railway services in Laos, because decades of conflict and economic 
underdevelopment have made it an impossible project. As Tan (2012) concisely 
expressed it, China is thus succeeding in the “mise en valeur of Laos that the French 
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only dreamed of during their colonial rule but failed to implement” (Tan 2012: 73).77 In 
a subsequent study Tan also noted that, “once again, the role of Laos will be to serve as 
a transit corridor” (Tan 2015: 2). There is, however, a crucial difference from the 
situation of the colonial years, since nowadays Laos is ready to take such plans forward 
under its own governance and sovereignty, following its own geopolitical and economic 
agenda. In other words, we need to avoid neglecting Laos’s agency and the dialectic 
nature of its relationship with China, as if, being a small and weak state, it would only 
be at the service of (in this case) China’s connectivity goals and desires. In fact, besides 
having embraced openness and integration into regional and global economic and 
governance structures with the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) 
in 1986 (Kyophilavong and Lamphayphan 2014), as outlined in chapter 1, the Lao 
leadership developed a policy expressly to target the country’s connectivity historical 
deficit. Well before China’s announcement of its “Yunnan as a Bridgehead” strategy 
and the OBOR and HSRD initiatives, the GoL developed its own connectivity strategy, 
aiming to move the country from landlocked to land-linked (hereinafter the strategy will 
be referred to interchangeably as “land-linked” or with the acronym LLLL): 
Being a land-locked country with poor infrastructure 
has put a constraint to the socio-economic 
development of Lao PDR. In view of this, the 
Government of Lao PDR has introduced a “land-
linked” strategy parallel to regional and sub-regional 
infrastructure development trends, especially in the 
frameworks of, among others, the ASEAN, Greater 
Mekong Sub-region, and Triangle Development 
Area. The strategy addresses the importance of 
infrastructure development, particularly the 
road/transport sector, as the means to achieve the 
2020 vision for the country to graduate from the list 
of less developed countries (LDCs) and to eradicate 
mass poverty by 2010. Infrastructure development 
has been identified as significant both for poverty 
                                                          
77 Tan here refers to Stuart-Fox (1995), who recalls French studies published during the colonial 
period that analysed how France could have achieved the mise en valeur of Laos, such as 
those by Maurel (1894) and Deloncle (1930). 
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reduction and private sector development. 
(Oraboune 2008: 166)78 
The policy moves on from the recognition of the state of infrastructure in the country 
and especially transport infrastructure, necessary in the processes of liberalising and 
opening up the economy, increasing trade and investment volumes, and linking the 
country to regional and global supply chains. However, there is a sharp difference 
respect to the Xayaburi dam case because while Western donors, international financial 
institutions and regional partners rushed to tap the economic offered by the hydropower 
sector, the construction and transport sector was much less attractive. In fact, in the 
period between 1989 and 2014 the former accounted for over 53% of the total inflow of 
FDI, while the latter only for 3.5% (GoL 2016). As a consequence, the liberal policies 
undertaken by the GoL in line with its liberal laws on foreign investment. As a matter of 
fact, despite the economic growth, Laos is currently experiencing there is a big 
infrastructure gap: according to the World Bank’s 2016 Logistics Performance Index 
(LPI), Laos is ranked 152nd out of 160, ahead of only Tajikistan, Lesotho, Sierra Leone, 
Equatorial Guinea, Mauritania, Somalia, Haiti and the Syrian Arab Republic. Laos is 
also the least connected country in Southeast Asia (Figure 6.5), below Papua New 
Guinea, and Figure 6.6 illustrates how the sector mostly in need of investment is indeed 
that of transport infrastructure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
78 Another reference to the policy from the same year can be found in Kunze and Tolentino 
(2008). 
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Figure 6.5 - Laos: the least connected country in Southeast Asia 
 
Source: Logistics Performance Index (LPI) 201679 
 
Figure 6.6 - Southeast Asia needs €500 billion for infrastructure by 2020 
Source: The European House – Ambrosetti (2016)  
                                                          
79 The LPI index can be consulted here: http://lpi.worldbank.org/international/global/2016. 
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Looking at the Logistic Performance Index published by the World Bank, we can see 
that the perception80 of Laos’s performance is getting even worse, leaving Laos last 
among its neighbours. In fact, although in 2010 it was ranked above both Cambodia and 
Myanmar, in the past six years these countries have improved their records (Figure 6.7). 
 
Figure 6.7 - Laos’s logistic decline (2017–2016) 
 
Source: Logistic Performance Index, World Bank (2016) 
Figure 6.8, moreover, shows a negative trend from 2014 and how this decline especially 
involves infrastructure, together with all the segments of the index apart from 
timeliness. 
  
                                                          
80 The LPI is in fact built on the perception of operators who participate in the survey. The full 
methodology of the index can be accessed here: https://wb-lpi-
media.s3.amazonaws.com/LPI%20Methodology.pdf. 
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Figure 6.8 - Laos’s infrastructural decline (2007–2016) 
 
Source: Logistic Performance Index, World Bank, (2016) 
 
The data displayed in the figures above clearly highlight the rationale behind the GoL’s 
“land-linked” policy and the focus on infrastructure development.  
Officially, therefore, Chinese and Lao purposes are complementary, and against the 
backdrop of Laos’s infrastructure deficit it comes as no surprise that the GoL has 
welcomed China’s OBOR and HSRD initiatives (Vientiane Times 2012a). When on 19th 
October 2012 the National Assembly of Laos approved the project, the relevance of the 
Boten–Vientiane HSR MTI project for Laos clearly emerged from the Vientiane 
Times’s reporting: 
Laos has now decided to assume sole ownership of 
the project, as it considers that transforming the 
country from being landlocked to a land link is 
central to the future of the nation’s development … 
Deputy Prime Minister Somsavat Lengsavad 
reported on the project to the National Assembly 
yesterday, recounting developments to date. He 
stressed how important the railway is in terms of 
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turning Laos into a land link within the region, 
attracting more foreign investment, and boosting 
economic growth. (Vientiane Times 2012b) 
In this framework, the case, examined in this chapter, of the Lao leg of the China-
sponsored Pan-Asian railway, which would run for 427 km through Laos, is 
undoubtedly crucial both for China, as explained above, and for Laos. With virtually no 
railway – as seen above, so far there is only a 3.5 km link from the Thai border to the 
outskirts of Vientiane – the country also has an extremely poor road network: of 
40,000 km, only 10% meets high standards without showing “occasional or frequent 
holes” (Cooper 2014: 165). This state of development has made it impossible so far for 
Laos to overcome its traditional logistic and economic isolation,81 but with the 
construction of this HSR line the country will leap straight forward into a new, modern, 
global chapter of its history, shaped by the term connectivity. Therefore, a reader would 
certainly not be surprised by the annual review published on 31st December 2012 by the 
state-owned Vientiane Times, in which the “agreements on two highspeed railway 
projects”82 were included among the country’s “landmark achievements in the 
international arena” in 2012 (Vientiane Times 2012a: 12). For the purposes of this 
research, however, of much greater importance is the inclusion of the Boten–Vientiane 
HSR project among the GoL’s top five priorities in terms of infrastructure building that 
were made official in the 2016–2020 Eighth Five-year National Socio-Economic 
Development Plan (Ministry of Planning and Investment of the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic 2015: 92, emphasis added); the HSR project is listed in second 
place: 
                                                          
81 A study published in 2014 by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
(GIZ) highlighted that very little trade is conducted through the country’s airports and that the 
average Lao citizen cannot afford air services (GIZ 2014). 
82 The other railway project agreed by the GoL is a 220 km double electrified track railway from 
Savannakhet Province in Laos to Lao Bao at the border with Vietnam. The railway will have a 
total cost of around 6.3 billion dollars and will be built by Giant Rail Company Limited 
(GRCL), a Laos-based company constituted to develop the project, which will be built by the 
Malaysian investor Giant Consolidated Limited (GCL). 
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1. Upgrade roads that connect to the neighbouring countries such the 
Mekong Sub-region corridors (GMS), Asian Highway, East–West 
Corridor, North–South Economic Corridor. 
2. The Railway Boten–Vientiane. 
3. Create comprehensive logistic systems by focusing on 4 areas: Natoei, 
Savannakhet, Vientiane and Champasak. 
4. Upgrade domestic airports to meet the international standards and 
expand more routes to regional and international destinations in order to 
have comparable services internationally. 
5. Shifting away from enterprises that are state owned, like Nampapa to be 
privatized for more effective and more competitive, while facilitation and 
advice on pricing are provided by the government. 
In the light of the potential geo-economic transformations for Laos implicit in this HSR 
project and of the official stance of the GoL reported here, one could argue that the 
Chinese policies of OBOR and HSRD not only perfectly match Laos’s strategic needs, 
representing for the country a concrete way to achieve integration and turning into a 
“land-linked” nation, but also provide a unique opportunity to access billions of dollars 
in funding, something that a country with a GDP of only 15.9 billion dollars in 2016 
(see chapter 1) could not otherwise afford. However, the fact that the project has been 
stalled and delayed from its original agreement in 2010 until  now suggests that 
there is a gap between theory and practice and that such apparently clear-cut 
complementarity might hide difficulties, and perhaps a certain degree of 
divergence, between Vientiane and Beijing. The next section reconstructs the 
process that started in 2010 when the two governments signed a memorandum of 
understanding (MoU) to build the HSR from Boten to Vientiane, highlighting the 
various phases. It will examine why, despite the policy convergence exposed in this 
section, the project struggled to get started. Therefore, through the analysis of this key 
HSR project, the rest of the chapter will not only analyse the impact of this MTI project 
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on the relational power of Laos with respect to China, but, through the Laos case study, 
will also illuminate how China’s OBOR and HSRD work in practice. 
6.3 Reconstruction of the negotiations on the Boten–Vientiane high-speed railway 
MTI 
This section aims to reconstruct the key events that shaped more than six years of 
negotiations between the governments of China and Laos on the Lao section of the Pan-
Asian railway: the Boten–Vientiane HSR MTI. Following on from the previous chapter, 
it is necessary here to provide a more comprehensive account of what happened because 
the railway issue proved to be significantly more obscure with respect to the Xayaburi 
dam, first of all because it was still under negotiation at the time of the data collection in 
2015 and had only just been launched when this chapter was written in early 2017. 
Therefore, it has been deemed essential to provide as many background facts as possible 
to make it possible to navigate these complex negotiations before moving on to the 
analysis and then discussing them in terms of relational power. 
Nonetheless, until very recently the already underlined obscurity and confusion 
surrounding the project complicated the task of understanding what was going on, 
before the fieldwork, during it and afterwards. It was only the extensive network of 
contacts developed in Lao, Chinese and international environments in Vientiane that 
gave the author the opportunity to separate misleading from correct information. The 
map below (Figure 6.9), for instance, originally published in 2011 and then included in 
Fau et al. (2014), epitomises this confusion, because it showed the Boten–Vientiane leg 
of the link as being under construction when it was very far from that stage, as will 
emerge from the events and processes traced in this section.  
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Figure 6.9 - The Kunming–Bangkok Railway – ‘under construction’ in 2011 and 
2014? 
 
Source: Fau et al. (2014) 
Even in mid-2016, Joshua Kurlantzick, a leading Southeast Asia and Laos expert at the 
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in the United States and author of a recent 
monograph on the US’s secret war in the country83, told the New York Times that in his 
view the project had only a 50% chance of going ahead (Strangio 2016). Another 
indication of the high degree of vagueness and lack of information around the project, 
as well as of the difficulties in gaining information, even for experts on the ground, is 
represented by a request for information on the project the author received via email 
from the Land Information Working Group in March 2017, a network of civil society 
organisations based in Laos. The group works on policy with local institutions such as 
the Lao National Assembly, the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Natural 
                                                          
83 Kurlantzick, J. (2017). A Great Place to Have a War: America in Laos and the Birth of a 
Military CIA. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.  
195 
Resources and Environment (MONRE), as well as with international stakeholders 
including the World Bank, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO). The request showed how little information was available even to 
organisations with a local presence and good access, since it asked for further 
information in particular on the precise route the railway would take (personal 
communication, March 2017). Such great uncertainty made it essential to carry out a 
preliminary comprehensive study and reconstruction of the facts, which is precisely the 
content of the following sections. 
6.3.1 2009–2012: The failure of the first joint venture MoU signed in April 2010 
When, on 5th March 2009, a grand opening took place for the Lao–Thai Railway 
Operation at Thanaleng station, despite the fact that the railway, after crossing the 
Mekong River and the border with Thailand, ran for only 3.5 km into Laos’s territory, it 
was nonetheless a historic day, since this was the first rail line ever to be opened in the 
country (Ministry of Public Works and Transport Department of Railways 2014). This 
was more a symbolic achievement than a real one, as the railway was merely a branch 
of the Thai network, crossing into Laos. However, only a few months later Laos seemed 
ready for a much bigger and potentially game-changing infrastructure link that promised 
to put an end to the traditional isolation of the country: a massive HSR line all the way 
north to the Chinese border, which would have cut travel time from Vientiane to Boten 
from the 13 hours necessary to drive along Route 13 to slightly more than 2 hours 
cruising at a speed of 200 km per hour (Radio Free Asia 2012). In fact, once the 
presidents of the two countries had approved the HSR project at the end of 2009 
(Janssen 2017), and once, after that, beyond the Chinese border, the Kunming–Yuxi line 
stretching southward in the heart of the Yunnan province had begun to be upgraded and 
extended in order to link the Chinese railway network with the planned Pan-Asian 
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railway (Railway Gazette 2012), the two governments of China and Laos signed a 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) on 7th April 2010, according to which China had 
to finance 70% of the 7-billion-dollar project through a “long-term and low-interest 
loan” (Radio Free Asia 2010). A groundbreaking ceremony was scheduled for 25th April 
2011, in correspondence of the 50th anniversary of the beginning of Laos–China 
bilateral relations, and the construction should have commenced by 28th October and 
then been completed in about four years, i.e. by 2015 (WikiLeaks 2011). Yet for more 
than six years after the closing of the deal in 2010 not a single kilometre of railway was 
built.  
The first event that contributed to slowing the process down was the removal of Liu 
Zhijun, the Chinese Minister of Railways, during an investigation for corruption in 
February 2011, only a few months before the planned ceremony (Branigan 2011). This 
was then followed by the Chinese company pulling out of the joint venture for reasons 
never openly clarified but probably linked to difficulties in reaching a compromise on 
various aspects of the investment structure, with China considered to be worried about 
its profitability (Vientiane Times 2012b; Knowles 2013) and Laos concerned about the 
strategic implications of the “tough conditions demanded by the Chinese government” 
that some might have considered to be at risk of leading to a Chinese occupation of Lao 
soil (Wichit 2012). According to another source, the stalemate on the project resulted 
from Laos’s growing concerns related to China’s “involvement”, especially with respect 
to “property rights along the route” and “the social impact of a large influx of Chinese 
workers settling in northern Laos ahead of construction starting” (Railway Gazette 
2012). 
6.3.2 2012–2013: Laos refuses unsustainable conditions 
Despite the failure of the original joint venture agreement with China, the Lao National 
Assembly, during an extraordinary session held on 18th October 2012, nonetheless 
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decided to “assume sole ownership of the project”, which was going to be funded, 
according to then deputy prime minister Somsavat Lengsavad, through a loan that 
would have been delivered by the Export-Import Bank of China. On that occasion, 
Somsavat Lengsavad also clarified that, unlike with the previous project, the GoL was 
now planning to build a railway whose maximum speed was 160 km/h for passenger 
trains and 120 km/h for goods trains – thus, a slower HSR line than the one previously 
suggested, which had been planned to run at 200 km/h. The only exception was 
identified in the route between Vientiane and Vang Vieng, where trains could possibly 
have run at 200 km/h. It must be underlined here that the new structure of the project 
granted a greater role to Lao stakeholders, and that the terms of the loan agreed with 
China allowed the latter to receive royalties from Laos’s mining resources, such as 
copper, gold and bauxite, which would have been shipped to China by rail once the link 
was completed (Railway Gazette 2012). According to the just-quoted report by the 
Vientiane Times, a groundbreaking ceremony was now planned to take place during the 
soon-to-be-inaugurated 9th Asia–Europe Meeting Summit, which was going to be hosted 
in the Lao capital on 5th–6th November that year. But, once the ASEM meeting was 
over, no sign of such a ceremony materialised, while, as explained in the previous 
chapter, Laos surprised many by launching the Xayaburi dam the next day (Vientiane 
Times 2012b). A factor that might well have again halted the process was the size of this 
investment, which risked driving up the interest rate to an overwhelming level and 
sinking the country to the ranking of fourth among the most highly indebted nations, a 
perspective that presumably triggered concerns and opposition to the project in Laos 
(Knowles 2013). Subsequently, in early December 2012, Radio Free Asia (2012b) 
quoted an anonymous official of the Lao Ministry of Finance as saying that the total 
sum of the interest Laos would have to pay back to China was around 3.33 billion 
dollars, as a result of a 30-year loan at a rate of 2%. Since a study estimated the break-
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even point to be 38 years, but the loan was due within only 30 years, the Lao official 
pointed out that proceeds from the Chinese-owned Sepone (gold) and Champasak 
(bauxite) mining operations would probably be entirely used to repay the loan without 
providing revenues for the Laos’s budget. Moreover, according to the same source, “at 
least nine legislators [in Laos] … have expressed opposition to the project” (Radio Free 
Asia 2012b). 
Such internal worries and opposition were reportedly coupled with external 
international advice along the same lines. On 1st January 2013, the New York Times 
wrote that 
In mid-November [2012], when Prime Minister Wen 
Jiabao of China visited Vientiane for a summit 
meeting of European and Asian leaders,84 he was 
expected to attend a groundbreaking for the railroad. 
The ceremony did not take place. An assessment of 
the rail project by a consultant for the United 
Nations Development Program [UNDP] said the 
terms of the financing offered by China’s Export-
Import Bank were so onerous they put Laos’s 
“macroeconomic stability in danger.” At the same 
time, construction through northern Laos would turn 
the countryside into “a waste dump,” the 
consultant’s report said. “An expensive mistake” if 
signed under the terms offered, the report concluded. 
As collateral for the loan, Laos was bound to 
provide China with minerals, including potash and 
copper. Other international donors echoed the 
findings. “Partners, including the Asian 
Development Bank and the World Bank, expressed 
concern, and the International Monetary Fund was 
here and said, ‘You have to be very careful,’” said an 
Asian diplomat briefed on the reservations expressed 
to the Laotian government. (Perlez and Feng 2013, 
emphasis added) 
The New York Times report therefore confirmed what had already emerged in the 
previous months and been recognised both in and outside Laos. The following events 
demonstrated that in the end Laos did indeed refuse to pursue such a risky investment. It 
                                                          
84 The reference here is to the ASEM Meeting mentioned on the previous page. 
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took years of protracted high-level negotiations for the two countries to find a solution, 
as described below. 
6.3.3 2013–2015: stalemate followed by steps towards a new deal structure 
These hurdles continued to present an insurmountable obstacle for more than three years 
afterwards, a period shaped by extreme uncertainty regarding the future of the project. 
During this period, the two sides’ general position of willingness to get the project 
under way appeared to be consistent, but the complexity of the negotiations emerged 
clearly not only from their length, but also from the needs of multiple high-level 
contacts. However, even though on such occasions Chinese and Lao leaders repeatedly 
expressed their commitment to building the HSR, this was not followed up straightaway 
on the ground, highlighting the persistency of obstacles and distance between Beijing 
and Vientiane. In September 2013, Laos’s prime minister, Thongsing Thammavong, 
met with his Chinese counterpart, Li Keqiang, in Nanning (China) and called the HSR 
project a priority, emphasising that a (new) formal agreement needed to be signed soon 
(Eimer 2013). Early in the next year, however, EXIM’s decision to suspend loans 
funding infrastructure and construction projects in Laos, in favour of mining and 
hydropower projects, was a setback to the financing structure that had been the proposal 
since 2011 (Radio Free Asia 2015). Nonetheless, the project in itself was in no way 
abandoned, as indicated by the occurrence of another round of high-level meetings and 
statements in April 2014. First, the two countries’ leaders convened at the Boao Forum 
for Asia that took place 8th –11th April, where a consensus on the railway was reached 
and a joint statement was issued that defined the project as crucial in the framework of 
the bilateral relationship, especially to increase trade and economic cooperation (China 
Railway International Group 2014; Radio Free Asia 2015). Second, later in the same 
month, a delegation of the China Railway International Group (CREC), led by its 
President, Mr Lu Bo, visited Laos from 24th to 29th April, where, in a series of high-
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level meetings with relevant Lao authorities and Chinese actors the company’s support 
and commitment to the project was restated (China Railway International Group 2014). 
A few months later, on 28th July 2014, the issue was discussed at the highest level 
between the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, and the Lao president, Choummaly 
Sayasone, who met at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. During the meeting, the 
Lao President expressed his hope for continuous support from China for Laos’s 
development, and he mentioned the railway along with agricultural and network 
projects that needed Chinese assistance (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s 
Republic of China 2014). Probably as a consequence of successful and fruitful talks 
during such high-level meetings, China made a strong move forward, approving the 
construction of the HSR from Kunming to the border with Laos in September 2014 
(Gluckman 2014). Soon after going ahead in its own territory, China gave a new pledge 
to make the HSR happen in Laos. The Chinese ambassador in Vientiane, Mr Guan 
Huabing, defined the project as strategic and historic in the framework of bilateral 
relations and declared that both governments were “working on some concrete issues 
and China is willing to work with Laos to begin the construction as early as possible” 
(Radio Free Asia 2014). Although, as already stated, great uncertainty continued to 
characterise the project until late 2016, these steps undertaken by China in the autumn 
of 2014 represented the first real turning point since the beginning of the negotiations 
nearly five years earlier. As a matter of fact, in an interview granted to Nikkei Asian 
Review in March 2015 – a rare interview with a foreign media organisation – Somsavat 
Lengsavad, then deputy prime minister of Laos and head of the Laos–China Railway 
Project Steering Committee, enucleated three key points that encapsulate what was at 
stake for his country (Janssen 2015, emphasis added): 
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1. “Laos hopes to reach an agreement with Beijing by June. The plan would then 
be presented to Laos’s one-party National Assembly.”85 
2. “Under the envisaged arrangement, Vientiane would provide $840 million in 
initial financing, with $1.26 billion coming from China. The balance of just 
under $5 billion would be borrowed from the Export-Import Bank of China by a 
joint venture company established to build and operate the line … The venture 
would eventually be transferred to Laotian ownership.” 
3. “The latest talks could also fail if Beijing rejects the financial terms proposed by 
the Laotian government, or if the costs – including interest payments – rise too 
high.” 
It is worth noting that these declarations revealed three main facts, to some extent 
already known but here made very clear through the interview: a) Laos was determined 
to complete the project; b) insights regarding the new (potential) financing structure 
were made public; c) for the first time, one Lao top leader had openly expressed Laos’s 
financial concerns, indicating that the country was ready to hold on firmly to its 
conditions. 
As is clearly reflected by Somsavat Lengsavad’s words above, in 2015 an agreement 
over the details was still to be reached and no one could have said at that time whether 
or not these details could once more endanger – and literally derail – the project itself. 
Nonetheless, at a meeting with the governor of Yunnan province in Laos, the Lao 
president envisaged officially launching the project by 2nd December 2015, Laos’s 
National Day (Radio Free Asia 2015). This was yet another signal that the Laos 
leadership was now determined to close the negotiations before the opening of the 10th 
Congress of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP), which was to be held 
between 18th and 22nd January 2016. Such state-of-the-art was confirmed in June 2015 
by a senior official of the Lao Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT), who 
said the agreement was “okay” but the budget was still under negotiation. The official 
                                                          
85 In this respect, he noted that “All big investment projects of over $500 million have to go 
through the National Assembly”. 
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also expressed confidence that the bulk of the costs would be covered by a loan from 
China (Interview 46-2015). Indeed, in line with the interviewee quoted above, Somsavat 
Lengsavad declared during a National Assembly session on 9th July 2015 that the line 
would be built (Radio Free Asia 2015c). This was then confirmed when the Lao 
President went to Beijing in his latest official visit to China to attend the 70th 
anniversary of the “Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression 
and the World Anti-Fascist War” on 1st September 2015. On that occasion, China’s 
prime minister and “HSR man”, Li Keqiang, explicitly said “China is willing to push 
forward infrastructure construction of railways and highways connecting the two 
countries, cooperate with Laos in areas including energy, mining and agriculture and 
promote the prosperity and stability of border areas”, and he was echoed by the Lao 
president, who underlined the relevance of the strategic partnership with Beijing, saying 
that “Laos is willing to accelerate cooperation with China on major projects, including 
the Laos–China railway, and find more possibilities for cooperation” (Xinhuanet 2015). 
Besides high-level commitments from both sides, looking back at the key events of the 
preceding 15 months (mid-2014 to September 2015), it can be seen that after 
Choummaly Sayasone’s visit to Beijing clear signals on the ground showed that 
concrete steps forward were being taken. Only a few days after the meeting in China, in 
fact, the MPWT opened a bidding process for building the HSR line to Lao and foreign 
companies. In particular, the Luang Namtha PWT Department started to accept bids, 
since the first leg of construction was to be carried out there, and news came out that 
some 30 Lao officials were to be trained by China on HSR-related skills (Radio Free 
Asia 2015). Although financial uncertainties remained, Laos was reportedly struggling 
to obtain an interest rate that was as low as possible (Mahitthirook 2015). According to 
the Deputy Minister of Public Works and Transport of Laos, Lattanamany 
Khounnivong, China agreed to charge a lower interest rate (Sweet 2015), and then on 
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13th November a new MoU was signed. According to the new deal, China agreed to 
finance 70% of the 6.04-billion-dollar HSR project, and the railway was to operate at an 
average speed of 160 km/h and would be built using Chinese technology and 
equipment. This development led to the successful launch of the project, with a 
groundbreaking ceremony organised in Vientiane on 2nd December 2015 (CRRC 2015; 
Ghosh 2016).  
Figure 6.10 – Lao and Chinese leaders launch the Boten-Vientiane High-Speed 
Railway  
 
Source: CRRC 
This happened before the Party Congress took place in January 2016, as auspicated by 
Laos’s president a few months earlier and by the Lao deputy prime minister Somsavat 
Lengsavad in the quoted interview with Nikkei Asian Review in March 2015. This 
progression was hailed by Wang Yi, China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, as an 
‘important step’ in the OBOR trajectory during a press conference a few months later 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2016). Soon after the 
ceremony, it was reported that the two countries had also reached an agreement on a 
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loan of 480 million dollars that China would provide to Laos to help it finance its own 
share of the project. According to a statement by Somsavat Lengsavad to the National 
Assembly, the agreed interest rate was below the 3% requested by China (Amornrat 
2015) and Laos did not have to pay any principal for the first five years of the 20-year 
loan. On the same occasion, the then deputy prime minister declared that the GoL 
expected some 14 million passengers annually (4 million of whom would be Lao), 
rising to over 18 and 24.6 million in the mid- and long term (Radio Free Asia 2016). 
Questions, however, remained on the table as to whether the new Lao leadership that 
emerged from the Party Congress in January 2016 could have a negative impact on the 
deal concluded by the previous politburo. In fact, the results of the Congress looked as 
if they were far from being in China’s favour, with Bounnhang Vorachit, the newly 
elected Secretary General of the party and soon to be president, deemed to be 
diplomatically closer to Hanoi than to Beijing. Moreover, Somsavat Lengsavad was not 
appointed as a member of the new politburo (Potkin 2016). However, the latter kept his 
key role as main supervisor of the railway project, meaning that the new leadership 
confirmed its commitment towards it. Although some manoeuvring was still occurring, 
as demonstrated by the absence of clear information on the future of the project during 
the first visit to China of the new Lao president in late April 2016,86 it was possible to 
observe some acceleration on the ground. One interviewee, who was contacted via 
Skype for an update in mid-May 2016 and asked about the future of the project, 
commented as follows: 
In late April [2016], I was in Boten, Luang Namtha 
province: the local authorities are starting to move a 
Chinese factory out of Nateuy, to make room for the 
station of the high-speed train in Luang Namtha. I 
think that with or without Somsavat Lengsavad, the 
project will go ahead as the entire leadership in this 
                                                          
86 The Vientiane Times, for instance, did not cover the HSR project in its report about the 
diplomatic visit. 
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country is fantasising about the train. (personal 
communication, May 2016) 
The fact that a point of no return was reached became evident a few months later when 
the procedure for managing the land along the HSR route officially started. This was the 
prelude to the last and decisive steps of the coming months. First, Lao news platform 
Tholakhong advised on 7th July 2016 that those who possessed land in the path of the 
railway should make themselves known. At the bottom of the notification there was a 
mention of “Lao–China Railway Construction”, and beneath this, contact details of a 
certain Mr Thongsay Saengmuang (personal communication, July 2016). In the same 
month, Somsavat Lengsavad announced that the terms of the MoU signed in December 
2015 were not going to be modified and that China would contribute a loan at an 
interest rate lower than 3% to be added to the initial capital of 630 million dollars (equal 
to 30% of the initial 2.1 billion dollars) invested by Laos. He also denied the speculation 
that China was trying to obtain exclusive rights to develop the land along the HSR line 
(Webb 2016). Second, on 11th August, Laos’s Deputy Minister of Public Works and 
Transport, Lattanamany Khounnivong, indicated during a lecture at the Party’s Central 
Committee’s Propaganda and Training Board that work had started (Laotian Times 
2016b). Third, one week later, the Propaganda Committee for the Lao–China Railway 
issued a 20-page document (Table 6.2) containing all the details of the final version of 
the agreement and the rationale for the GoL to go ahead with the venture. This 
document has not yet been mentioned by international media because an English 
translation is not available yet. The author got the chance to access it via a contact in 
Vientiane and the box below presents an unofficial translation of the key incentives and 
policies related to the project.87 The document indicates that Laos and China put in 
place several specific policies to support this joint revolutionary MTI and, among other 
details, it emerged that the final interest rate agreed on stood at 2.3%. 
                                                          
87 The table below contains Section 3 of the document. 
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The Government of Lao PDR has issued the following 6 special policies to support the project:  
(1) Regarding land use rights: given the importance and necessity of the project, the 
Government of Lao PDR has authorised the joint-venture company to use the following 3 
types of state-owned land without charge:  
− Land in the areas of tracks including stations and bridges across rivers for which the actual 
use must take into account the availability of each area. 
− Land in construction sites during the construction phase and small streets for entry/exit of 
construction sites. 
− Land in the areas connecting with facilities and public utilities (electricity, water supply, 
telephone etc.) and areas connecting with the existing national road system. 
(2) Regarding taxes: Approval granted for exemption of business turnover tax and value-added 
tax in favor of the joint-venture company during the railway construction phase. Appropriate 
consideration must be made for the commercial operation phase. 
(3) Regarding natural resource royalties: Approval granted for exemption of natural resource 
royalties for the use of domestic raw materials such as soil, stones, granite and sand during 
the construction phase.  
(4) Regarding import duties: Approval granted for exemption of import duties – VAT 0% of 
vehicles, machinery, construction equipment and materials, fuel, parts and other necessary 
equipment to be imported from foreign countries to serve the construction project.  
(5) Regarding stay and work fees: It is approved to charge half (50%) of normal fees for 
granting work permits for foreign (Chinese) workers, stay permits and multiple-entry visas 
for their work on the project. 
(6) Regarding railway supporting projects: The joint-venture company is authorised to develop 
other supporting projects surrounding the railway project for which the Government of Lao 
PDR will consider its approval in accordance with the Lao PDR’s Law on Investment 
Promotion. 
 
Table 6.2 – Laos’s and China’s incentives and Supporting Policies for the Boten-
Vientiane HSR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The Government of PR China has issued the following policies to support the project: 
(1) Since the Laos–China railway construction project has low effectiveness in terms of finance 
but provides a high return in terms of the economy, for the project to be realised, the 
Government of PR China has supported Chinese state-owned enterprises which have the 
capacity to invest in the construction and operation of such railway. 
(2) It has granted a special loan to its Lao counterpart for funding the project for USD480 
million with 2.3% annual interest rate which normally would have not been possible if 
borrowing was from the international market for such funding. 
(3) The general interest rate for funding railway construction in PR China would be around 
4.9% per annum. In this project, however the PR China Government has granted a loan for 
an annual interest rate of not more than 3%, the difference of which will be subsidised by 
the PR China Government.  
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Finally, the culmination of these negotiations of nearly a decade was the signing of the 
construction contract for sections I, II and III of the HSR project awarded by the Laos–
China Railway Co. Ltd to China Railway Group subsidiaries (Global Construction 
Review 2016). The predominant role of Chinese actors in developing the railway was 
far from being unpredictable, and in fact this manifested soon after the main contract 
was signed with the Chinese construction companies, consultancies and professionals 
who were becoming officially involved in different aspects of the project (Somsack 
2016; Xinhua 2016c; Laotian Times 2016). The land for construction was then 
eventually broken at a second ceremony, on 25th December 2016, in the historic Lao 
city Luang Prabang (Xinhua 2016d), although the two countries had yet to finalise the 
concession agreement for the management of the railway as declared by the director of 
the Lao National Railway Company, Koung Souk-Aloun, in December 2016 (Global 
Construction Review 2017). 
In May 2017, new data regarding the financing scheme of the project were released. 
According to these data, the final grand total of the investment is to be 5.95 billion 
dollars (instead of 6.04 billion), of which the initial investment will account for 40%, 
i.e. 2.38 billion. In line with the agreement discussed above, Laos will need to 
contribute 30% of the investment, and so, in the initial phase, 715 million dollars, while 
China is responsible for 70%, i.e. 1.67 billion dollars. To cover the investment Laos will 
draw 250 million dollars from its own budget and borrow the rest from the Export-
Import Bank of China at the interest rate of 2.3% already agreed. Specific data on the 
other 60% of the investment have not been disclosed yet, but according to the Laos–
China Railway Company it is going to be provided by “Chinese banks” (Janssen 2017). 
This reconstruction of the China–Laos negotiations was necessary to provide the raw 
material for the process tracing analysis in the following section, especially given the 
lack of a clear and systematic account on the subject and the consequent confusion that 
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shapes the project. An emblematic example occurred when, in late August 2016, 
Reuters reported that “The project is now believed to be on hold because Laos is 
unhappy with the terms of the deal”, while on the ground the deal was actually reached 
and concrete steps were being taken (Zaharia 2016). The next section therefore analyses 
the data presented so far. 
6.4 Analysis of the negotiations 
In contrast with the Xayaburi case, it can immediately be seen from the reconstruction 
of the long negotiations summarised above that, while in the Xayaburi case there was a 
clear divergence in the respective interests of the two states, Laos and Vietnam, here 
there is no such divergence. Consequently, while for the Xayaburi dam the question was 
how Laos could go ahead despite Vietnam’s opposing interests, here, instead, the 
intuitive starting question was the opposite: why did China not go ahead with the 
project, despite its own strong interest and the stark distance in the aggregate power of 
the two countries? Given the general convergence of the two states’ ambitious policies – 
OBOR/HSRD and LLLL – which is clearly reflected by the policies adopted by the two 
governments listed in the box above, what prevented a quicker and smoother deal? In 
answering these questions, the first factor to be analysed is the specific interests of the 
two countries in this particular HSR investment project, going beyond the policy 
context pitched above. This effort allows us to provide a first account of an overlooked 
issue. Chang’s (2016) study – the first to address the issue in the framework of China’s 
HSRD –, in fact, provided an overview of the phenomenon that is comprehensive but 
lacks detail on the Boten-Vientiane railway project. For instance, Chang takes the 
railway in Laos for granted without explaining why the first MoU signed in 2010 failed 
and the project experienced continuous delays over the next six years. Therefore, his 
conclusion with respect to Laos is to put it in the category of the countries “most 
supportive” of China’s HSRD (Chan 2016), without acknowledging nor explaining the 
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complexity, difficulties and obstacles experienced by the two countries during the 
negotiations on the first and crucial material representation of their broader HSRD and 
LLLL policies. 
6.4.1 Crossing the border with Laos: the first test for China’s high-speed 
railway diplomacy 
Starting with China, it can be argued that this particular project is crucial for Beijing, as 
it is the first international expansion of its domestic HSR network and thus constitutes a 
test of its HSRD. As proudly announced by representatives of the Laos–China Railway 
Company during a symposium held in Vientiane in late October 2016 (shortly after the 
first real contracts for the project were signed), the “China–Laos railway will be built … 
to become a demonstration project in the ‘Go Global’ strategy in the railway sector and 
the ‘Belt and Road’ initiative” (Xinhua 2016b). 
A few days before the groundbreaking ceremony took place in 2015, Zhao Wenyu, 
Economic and Commercial Counsellor of the Chinese embassy in Laos  (one of the 
Chinese diplomats from Vientiane who were involved in the HSR project negotiations) 
offered a comment to Xinhua that leaves no room for doubt about China’s interest in the 
project: “I believe that after the launching of Laos’ first satellite and the construction of 
the railway connecting China and Laos, the trade and economic cooperation between 
the two countries will be further enhanced” (Rong and Zhang 2015). In an interview 
with the author six months earlier, a Chinese diplomat at the China’s Embassy in 
Vientiane had further emphasised the position of the China–Laos HSR project in 
Beijing’s and Vientiane’s agendas, interestingly highlighting the salience of China’s 
neighbourhood for the OBOR grand strategy: 
Laos’s dream to transform itself from a landlocked 
to a land-linked country is a good match with 
China’s “One Belt, One Road” policy. As our 
president, Xi Jinping, said in 2013, OBOR is very 
important for China for economic trade cooperation 
with other countries and it is focused on cooperation 
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with Asian countries, but also with Europe. 
However, it especially targets neighbours and aims 
to bring about a new era. Everybody is very 
interested in building the Kunming–Vientiane 
railway, which is essential to connect China and 
Southeast Asia, but it is a long negotiation especially 
due to economic reasons. So now China and Laos 
need to invest together. If the two governments do 
not develop any special policy the project in itself is 
not sustainable because there won’t be enough 
people or goods to be carried. Moreover, it is not 
enough just to build the railway to Laos – it must 
reach Bangkok as well. That said, the “One Belt, 
One Road” policy allows us to have one clear way 
of cooperating that also applies to this railway 
project that will finally arrive in Thailand via the 
middle line through Laos, which is the shortest 
route. (Interview 47-2015, emphasis added) 
It is interesting to note how this narrative depicts the intimate and strong 
interdependence between the HSR project in question – fundamental for the bigger 
strategy – and the OBOR policy, without which the project would not have been 
economically viable. Moreover, to conclude on the subject of China: besides official 
declarations, the interest in forging ahead with the project and overcoming the long 
stalemate, might well also be deduced from developments on the ground and the 
Chinese economic commitment to – or gamble on – the project. In spring 2015, a 
National Geographic report showed how in Mohan, the small Chinese town just across 
the Lao border from Boten, the construction of a big shopping centre was at an 
advanced stage despite the lack of local demand to justify the investment. This was one 
of the signs pointing to the fact that China was expecting the HSR to become reality, 
since Mohan’s train station will be the main gateway into China. The National 
Geographic’s report also featured a big billboard installed in Mohan several months 
before the new MoU was signed, announcing the HSR by proclaiming “Strategy is the 
wide path, fortune is the wide future” (Hemes 2016). 
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Figure 6.11 – “Strategy is the wide path, fortune is the wide future” 
 
Source: Hemes (2016) 
At the same time, according to three interviewees, including a Chinese entrepreneur 
who is also a member of the board of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Laos, by 
June 2015 at least three engineering Chinese companies had had a physical presence in 
Vientiane for years, just waiting for the stalemate to be over and for the project to begin 
(Interview 31-2015; Interview 46-2015; Interview 47-2015). 
6.4.2 Laos faces a dilemma  
On the other hand, from Laos’s perspective things appear to be rather less clear. In fact, 
despite the GoL’s vision and policy to develop the country through infrastructural 
integration with neighbouring countries, land-linking Laos with the region, one cannot 
overlook, nor underestimate, the transformative capacity and wider effects of the 
Boten–Vientiane HSR project. With a socio-economic context characterised by a 
predominantly rural economy with a very modest industrial basis, an exiguous 
population and only 3.5 km of traditional railway line, the HSR project put Laos in front 
of a potentially profound and rapid transformation that will probably have a strong 
impact on its economy and society as well as on its geopolitics. Anyone who has been 
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to the country would probably not need much detailed information to understand how 
radically the railway will metamorphose it. Its domestic connectivity will jump 
suddenly into the high-tech realm of the 21st century from an underdeveloped status 
shaped by an extremely poor road network (Kyophilavong and Lamphayphan 2014), 
which, especially during the wet season, makes transport within and across Laos costly, 
slow and challenging. The map in Figure 6.11 below shows how the railway will largely 
follow the colonial national Route 13, completed by the French in 1944 (Stuart-Fox 
1997), which runs due south from Boten at the border with China to Vientiane and then 
to the border with Cambodia following the Mekong River. Route 13 is still the principal 
artery – and in theory the “highway” – of the country, but at the moment it takes more 
than 13 hours to drive the 608 km that separate the capital from the border with China, 
i.e. an average speed of less than 50 km/h. 
Figure 6.12 –  The transformative potential of the Boten-Vientiane Railway 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Google Maps 
Once the HSR is reality, this long, trying and sometimes dangerous trip along a narrow 
and bumpy road will be replaced (at least for those who can afford it) by a comfortable 
train trip of around 2.5 hours. Besides such a transport and logistic revolution along the 
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North–South axis, the HSR project also implies a geographic, geological and probably 
environmental change of a similar scope. Due to Laos’s mountainous morphology, in 
fact, 258.5 km of the HSR of the total length of 427 km (i.e. 60%) will be made up of 
the 154 bridges and 76 tunnels required by the infrastructure88 (Railway Gazette 2016; 
Lim 2015). The present research does not aim to assess the environmental or social 
impact of the project but the researcher felt it necessary to outline these key data to 
provide a complete picture of the reach this particular infrastructure has for Laos. 
However, in taking stock of the analysis of Laos’s connectivity provided above, it 
becomes clear that the transformative capacity of this infrastructure might well 
represent a big step forward for the country’s development. A video released by Lao 
National Television (LNTV), available on its YouTube channel, shows a rendering of 
the HSR project, plastically and impressively demonstrating how it will bring about a 
new future for the country.89  
Such promises for a brighter and richer future go hand in hand with China’s win–win 
narrative. When asked precisely how Laos could benefit from the project, a diplomat at 
the China’s Embassy in Laos replied that 
The railway will be a system project, meaning a lot 
of Chinese investments coming to Laos, and the 
railway is the cheapest way of building 
infrastructure and combines very well with Laos’s 
own policy. It is also very good for the prosperity of 
the whole Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) since 
the mountainous nature of Laos makes land 
transportation very expensive. That is why the 
railway will cut the costs significantly. Once the 
railway is completed a lot of FDI will follow, thanks 
to the great combination of availability of abundant 
electricity and land resources in Laos. (Interview 47-
2015, emphasis added) 
The wording of this answer leads us to guess that such “sales talk” had already been 
used several times over the years of negotiations by the Chinese embassy, with the 
                                                          
88 The railway will also be served by 31 train stations. 
89 Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UwDPPruOnPU#t=376.1778244. 
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powerful concluding promise that the HSR project would be a driver for plenty of new 
FDI coming to Laos, not only from China but from all over the region and the world. 
Not surprisingly, the Chinese narrative found eager ears in Laos, starting with Mr 
Somsavat Lengsavad, who was, as already stressed, the key policymaker involved in the 
promotion of the project. In the already quoted interview with Nikkei Asian Review in 
March 2015, he also stresses the concrete economic benefits for his country, saying 
We have also suggested to our Chinese counterpart 
that, based on our electricity production, we could 
use electricity to power the trains. This would mean 
saving foreign reserves, because less road transport 
will be used and Laos will not need to import fuel. 
(Janssen 2015) 
Moreover, the wider economic complementarity between China and Laos represents 
another push factor towards the construction of the railway. In fact, Laos has huge 
mining potential, which, according to then Minister of Energy and Mines, Soulivong 
Dalavong (currently chairman of the Planning and Investment Committee of Laos), 
might allow Laos to export some 5 million tonnes of minerals to China by 2020 
(Gronholt-Pedersen 2012; Penna 2013). Therefore, a clear complementarity emerges 
between Lao resources and Chinese capital and technology, and the HSR will be a key 
link to allow the two economies to make the most of such an advantageous 
configuration. In addition, from Laos’s point of view, an even greater incentive is the 
dream of leaving behind centuries of economic (but also social and political) seclusion, 
turning, as Yao Bin, the chairman of Krittaphong Group, a leading Lao construction 
enterprise, put it, into “an attractive logistic centre”, a “transport hub” and potentially a 
trade and financial centre (Seneviratne 2016). Two interviews with two Asian senior 
diplomats highlight the positive long-term impact of the railway for Laos. The first 
stresses the competitive advantage for Laos’s trade, especially to expand it beyond 
Southeast Asia: 
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The benefits for Laos will be relevant, especially 
since the railway will connect the North with the 
South of the country, which are now poorly linked 
because of the very bad condition of the road 
network. Poor transport infrastructure is also an 
obstacle in the bilateral trade relationship with more 
distant but huge markets in South Asia. (Interview 
19-2015) 
The second instead focuses more on the regional dimension, providing a visionary 
image of Laos as not only a small transit country within ASEAN and Chinese 
connectivity plans, but also a potential regional hub of its own: 
Laos might become a hub given its position in the 
middle of the North–South and East–West economic 
corridors.90 In this scenario, it might gain huge 
benefits as happened in Germany, where even 
secondary cities like Dortmund or Duisburg 
exploited the fruits of connectivity. Now everything 
goes to and through Bangkok, which holds a hub 
role in the region. Vientiane is not ready yet, but 
there is a plan for urban development. Therefore, I 
speculate that the high-speed railway could be good 
for Laos for exports, imports and tourism, but right 
now this is just speculation. However, developing 
road and rail networks concurrently will be good for 
Laos. At the moment, there are many proposals for 
roads development since they are much easier, 
requiring a much lower degree of coordination than 
an HSR project. (Interview 27-2015) 
It is extremely significant that in May 2015, i.e. only six months before the new MoU 
was signed, an ambassador to Laos said that the economic promises at the time were 
just speculation. The trade-off between road and railway development indicated in the 
closing phrase pinpoints to an important explanation of why the negotiations 
                                                          
90 This can be seen as a reference to the economic corridors of the Greater Mekong Subregion 
(GMS). The GMS countries adopted the economic corridor approach in 1998 at the Eighth 
GMS Ministerial Conference in Manila as a way to combine trade, infrastructure and 
production in a specific geographic area. Three corridors were identified: the East–West 
Economic Corridor (EWEC), the North–South Economic Corridor (NSEC) and the Southern 
Economic Corridor (SEC). However, these economic corridors did not include much of Laos 
and Vientiane was not part of any of them, seemingly due to the SKRL plan described above. 
To respond to this problem, at the 21st GMS Ministerial Conference held in Chiang Rai in 
November 2016 it was proposed that the Boten–Oudomxay–Luang Prabang–Vang Vieng–
Vientiane–Nong Khai–Udon Thani–Nakhon Ratchasima–Laem Chabang link be added to the 
NSEC (ADB 2016). 
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experienced an extenuating delay despite all the geopolitical and economic pressures 
delineated in the previous sections and the overall alignment of the interests of the two 
states. In fact, the scale of the project, coupled with Laos’s current state of development, 
meant that the HSR project offered not only tremendous and unimaginable opportunities 
for future prosperity, but also more contingent short-term challenges of a similar reach. 
For Laos, in fact, there is another side of the coin: the plurality of risks and 
disadvantages implied in the railway project, first of all related to its priorities in terms 
of financial commitment and allocation of resources. As a matter of fact, it appears 
meaningful that an “all-you-need-to-know” piece about the HSR project published by 
the Laotian Times in early 2017, once the project had already begun, included the 
“Benefits for Laos” in its list of important things to know, implying that these were not 
so clear to their audience and needed to be stated (Laotian Times 2017). Indeed, two 
scholars of the Faculty of Law and Political Science of the National University of Laos 
(NUOL), Associate Professor Sengphet Outhay and Lecturer Sypha Chanthavong, were 
clear in saying that if 
in the long term the railway will bring about benefits 
for Laos increasing tourism, trade and investments 
from China, in the short-term Laos will face 
problems related to the budget since the railway will 
be funded through a bilateral fund, which was why 
Laos postponed the project. (Interview 1-2015; 
Interview 2-2015)  
Laos’s dilemma also emerges clearly from an interview with another NUOL scholar, 
who elucidated the mix of geopolitical, economic and domestic reasons why Laos 
delayed the negotiations and hindered China’s attempts to speed up the process: 
At the beginning, Mr Somsavat Lengsavad, who is 
Lao–Chinese and can speak Chinese really well, 
pushed for the project, but there was a disagreement 
among different members of the government itself, 
because when the issue was submitted to the 
National Assembly it said that was a very big issue 
that Laos needed to manage carefully. The National 
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Assembly argument sounded like, “We are okay to 
have a good cooperation with China, a big country 
with a lot of investment in Laos, which on economic 
issues depends on China (as well as on other bigger 
countries like Thailand and Vietnam), but we also 
have self-determination and we need to guarantee 
it”. So, despite Somsavat Lengsavad’s influence the 
project had to be delayed because of the checks and 
balances within Laos’s governmental institutions. 
Laos had to delay in order to obtain better conditions 
based on mutual benefits since we were really 
getting fewer benefits. This is particularly relevant 
considering the imbalance between the two 
countries, evident insofar as the population of Laos 
is equal to one Chinese city like Kunming. 
(Interview 5-2015) 
Seemingly, a senior journalist of the state-owned Vientiane Times emphasised that, 
despite it being a very good project in the long term, Laos had different priorities: 
in the short term, Laos should concentrate on road 
construction and improvements. If we build the 
railway what will we export? First, we need to 
attract more FDI, build up our industry and then we 
can reconsider the railway. At this stage of 
development, increasing the connections inside the 
country is the priority. (Interview 16-2015) 
This more balanced and critical perspective was also endorsed by an associate professor 
at the Faculty of Economics and Business Management of the National University of 
Laos, who explained how investment in roads has higher spillover effects than the HSR 
project, and who identified another element of risk in the lack of transparency 
characterising Chinese investments: 
If the railway were sponsored by organisations like 
the ADB it would be better in terms of transparency, 
for instance. So, if they want to help Laos, 
international donors and MDBs should get involved. 
By contrast, China’s plan is very questionable and 
for Laos it would be better receiving money from the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). To 
make this region more prosperous we need 
infrastructure, but should Laos bear the costs? We 
need to clearly identify the different options that we 
have. (Interview 36-2015) 
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Social and environmental risks were then highlighted by an independent consultant 
who, aside from recalling the risk Laos faced of functioning only as a transit country, 
also stressed the potential drawbacks in terms of illegal trafficking activities (including 
human trafficking) across the Laos–China border, and in terms of development since the 
money necessary to fund the project might lead to a development model driven by 
exploitation of resources (Interview 43-2015). 
These negative elements point to a deeper picture in which, beyond the alignment of 
interests, a hidden misalignment on some aspect of the negotiations, both within Laos 
and between Laos and China, prevented smoother negotiations and a quicker start to the 
project. However, among the cons faced by Laos, three central issues that kept Laos’s 
and China’s positions distant over the years emerged during the research: financing, 
land and labour. 
6.4.3 The three main misalignments between Laos’s and China’s positions 
6.4.3.1 Size of the investment and financial burden 
As the reconstruction of the negotiations demonstrated, and somewhat predictably, the 
main difficulty preventing Laos from rapidly implementing the project related to 
funding. Considering Laos’s macroeconomic indicators, it comes as no surprise that the 
HSR project was an almost forbidden dream for the GoL. In fact, once the Chinese 
company pulled out from the joint venture in 2011, had Laos carried out the 7-billion-
dollar investment through a Chinese loan (with Laos’s natural resources, especially 
minerals, as collateral) it would have had to borrow a sum amounting to nearly 90% of 
its annual GDP, turning the country into one of the most indebted nations, as already 
highlighted (Lim 2015). The Economist pointed out how even institutions such as the 
World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), usually very supportive of 
investment in “capital-intensive physical infrastructure” to foster economic integration, 
warned Laos that the risk was too high, quoting the above-cited calculation made by the 
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director of Economists at Large, Tristan Knowles,91 who emphasised “that a (modest) 
10% appreciation of the yuan against the Laos kip could increase the burden of such a 
loan by 3.8 billion yuan ($620m) in a very short time” (The Economist 2013). As 
already underlined, at the end of 2012, Radio Free Asia quoted an official of the Lao 
Ministry of Finance as saying that the total interest could have equalled 3 billion dollars 
if the interest rate on the hypothetical loan from China’s EXIM Bank were 2% for 30 
years. The article also pointed out that at the time several issues needed to be agreed on 
by the two countries since, according to the same official, Laos would not reach the 
“break-even point” and start profiting from the investment for 38 years, which meant 
that the GoL would have to divert resources to fill the gap (Radio Free Asia 2012b). An 
interview conducted with an ADB official confirmed these concerns: 
Financial considerations are crucial since the 
benefits for Laos’s economy are not clear. The 
Economic Internal Rate of Return of Projects 
(EIRR) is 12% and that is why the ADB did not aim 
to finance this HSR. Moreover, the project is not 
necessary for Laos at this stage, considering the 
economy of the country. What will the outcome be? 
The issue has also been discussed at the annual 
forum of the Greater Mekong Railway Association, 
a body established to fulfil the purposes of the GMS 
and of the Cross-Border Transport Agreement 
(CBTA). On these occasions, Laos’s point of view 
has been: why should we contribute? Moreover, 
Laos should focus its own priorities: there are 
different options, and at the moment road 
development and improvements are really relevant 
for Laos. (Interview 14-2015) 
Thammasat University’s Professor Ruth Banomyong explained that this mix, composed 
of a huge economic burden and benefits that were expected mainly in the long term, 
made the project unattractive for Laos, and he also stressed the risk to the latter of 
gaining very limited economic returns once the HSR allowed goods to be transported 
                                                          
91 The entire analysis was published by Knowles on New Mandala, the Australian National 
University’s portal on Southeast Asia, in May 2013 and can be accessed here: 
http://www.newmandala.org/fiscal-folly-or-essential-infrastructure/. 
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without stopping in the country. In his view, Laos would gain indirect benefits such as 
better mobility, but they were not sufficient to justify the investment (Interview 17-
2015). Laos’s unpreparedness was also underlined by a Thai diplomat who recalled that 
during a trip to Laos with Thailand’s prime minister, organised in 2014, it was difficult 
to promote a tourist package in the South of Laos because of its lack of modern hotels 
and facilities (Interview 37-2015). The unequal distribution of costs and benefits, 
therefore, was presumably the main obstacle to the commencement of the project. 
Chalongphob Sussangkarn, Distinguished Fellow and Acting Program Director at the 
Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI) in Bangkok and a former Thailand 
Minister of Finance, clarified this point in an interview with The Nation in May 2015: 
The benefit-sharing system is not complete. Laos is 
a transit country in this deal with an economy that is 
less than 5 per cent of Thailand’s gross domestic 
product, and it stands to gain the least from the 
construction of the Kunming–Vientiane–Bangkok 
railway … There must be a system that would 
guarantee a discussion among Thailand, Laos and 
China on the overall plan, who will invest how 
much, where and what kind of benefits can be 
shared from the construction of the railway. (Parpart 
2015) 
As a result of the above-mentioned economic constraints, according to a senior 
consultant at GIZ, the GoL was ready to invest a maximum of 500 million dollars, 
leaving to the Chinese company the task of finding all the other money needed 
(Interview 32-2015). This forecast proved to be almost exactly right when the final deal 
was made public since, as noted in the reconstruction of the negotiations, to finance the 
first 40% of the project Laos provided 250 million dollars of its own money. 
6.4.3.2 China’s controversial land concession request 
The Economist (2013) also stressed another crucial impediment for Laos: China’s 
request for rights over a corridor of land on both sides of the railway that could have 
given Beijing control over a strategic route from Yunnan directly into Thailand. Despite 
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uncertainty regarding the size of this requested concession, it has indeed been confirmed 
by various sources that the two countries were unable to reach a compromise on how 
much land China should obtain and for how long. Taillard (2014) points out that Laos 
had already refused to grant the 200-metre concession on each side of the line requested 
by China under the 2010 memorandum. Nevertheless, with the reframing of the 
negotiations between 2011 and 2012, which occurred after the failure of the first 
proposal, the land issue became even more problematic since, according to several 
interviewees, the new formula resulted in much higher Chinese demands in this respect. 
In 2015, the Bangkok Post, for instance, clearly named the land issue as the main cause 
of the delay from 2010 onwards, writing that “China and Laos signed an agreement on 
the project in 2010, but the progress has been delayed due to conflict over the land 
rights along the route” (Bangkok Post 2015). In June 2016, Reuters reported how the 
difficulties in reaching an agreement were still, seemingly, linked to the land issue as 
well as to funding problems: 
across the Southeast Asia border, China is facing the 
most complex and possibly most significant 
obstacles to its ambitions, as its neighbours protest 
what they say are excessive Chinese demands and 
unfavourable financing conditions. They have 
resisted Chinese demands for the rights to develop 
the land either side of the railway. Beijing says 
turning a profit on land development would make 
the rest of the project more commercially viable and 
allow it to make a greater upfront financial 
commitment. (Goh and Webb 2016, emphasis 
added) 
Primary sources then confirmed that the land issue was a crucial obstacle (for instance, 
Interview 20-2015; Interview 21-2015; and Interview 31-2015), also linking it with 
financial conditions offered to Laos. In fact, it emerged that at the outset China had 
wanted to provide all the necessary capital, but its demands were too high because 
China wanted a land concession between 10 and 20 km deep on each side and Laos 
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refused to agree to this (Interview 22-2015). Ruth Banomyong was convinced that the 
most difficult issue in the negotiations had been the land concession requested by 
China; he said that “initially it was 5 km per side, and then it was reduced to 2.5 km, 
that is still considered too much by Laos. This land request is being negotiated together 
with the interest rate of the loan” (Interview 17-2015). A Lao professor of International 
Relations reconstructed the negotiations and explained the delays to the project as 
follows: 
The two countries agreed to start in 2010. They 
started to construct something, some office, but then 
the HSR project disappeared from the news. I think 
it depended on the issue of mutual benefits, because 
it seems that Laos was going to get fewer benefits 
than the Chinese. Especially because the Chinese 
asked for 5 km of land on each side of the railway. 
When the Government of Laos submitted this 
proposal to the National Assembly, it responded by 
saying okay, but added that if the GoL met this land 
concession request it would mean giving too many 
benefits to China so it should negotiate more, and 
that is the reason for the delay and for continuing the 
negotiation. In fact, if Laos allowed China to use 
such a big portion of land along the railway from the 
border with China to Vientiane it would be too much 
because then Chinese people would come and invest 
in those lands without any control or rules imposed 
by Lao authorities. It would in fact be a very big 
portion of land if you take into account the 427 km 
route and Laos’s total area (236,800 km2). That is 
why the National Assembly asked to renegotiate the 
deal and reduce the amount of land in the agreement. 
(Interview 5-2015) 
Also, a senior Vientiane Times journalist acknowledged the fact that the delay was 
caused mainly by the disagreement on the land concession, which raised concerns 
among Lao people, Lao institutions and also international organisations such as the UN 
and NGOs (Interview 16-2015). A Chinese entrepreneur confirmed that land posed a 
crucial problem (Interview 46-2015) and so did a Vietnamese diplomat, who underlined 
the sensitivity and strategic relevance of the land concession for the GoL, which was 
223 
reluctant to raise concerns and provoke protest among Lao society (Interview 42-2015). 
Finally, the land issue was linked by a senior consultant to the third main obstacle in the 
negotiation: labour. The consultant, in fact, stressed that a big land concession would 
have made it very easy for China to resettle Chinese workers in Laos (Interview 43-
2015). 
6.4.3.3 The labour obstacle 
The third, and last, major hindrance relates to the workforce necessary to build the MTI. 
The origin of the problem is the lack of skilled labour in Laos in general, and the 
complete absence of railway construction skills, since the country has not built any in its 
history. Therefore, as already pointed out above, a large influx of Chinese workers is 
expected to flow into the country, an assumption reported by several sources including 
the Vientiane Times, according to which the HSR project carries the risk that “It would 
likely be unavoidable to import a number of foreign workers to work for the project 
once its construction starts” above the level allowed by the Lao law (GMS Info 2015). It 
was clear from the beginning that the majority of the labourers that were needed were 
going to be Chinese. In 2012, Radio Free Asia quoted an official of the Lao Ministry of 
Labour and Social Welfare as saying that “the rail project will likely use more workers 
from China than those from Laos … That’s the way it’s going to be, as there’s not 
enough Lao labor” (Radio Free Asia 2012b). According to more recent estimates, the 
total number of workers needed to construct the railway will be around 100,000 (Ghosh 
2016) and the likelihood of an influx of Chinese workers when the project started was 
also highlighted by Tan (2015). 
This factor might well exacerbate the so-called China syndrome, similar to that 
experienced in Myanmar, which is rooted in the two countries because of the difficulties 
of integration between locals and Chinese migrant communities, and because of the 
misconduct of the latter, as noted by Walsh: 
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In Burma and Laos, in particular, the areas in which 
Chinese migrants have come to dominate economic 
activities have tended to exclude non-Chinese, 
unofficially and not by regulation, as well as being 
antithetical to state laws. State institutions have 
already yielded to those areas a degree of autonomy 
and more will be taken as local groups and networks 
continue to flourish. These areas may be more 
economically advanced than neighbouring areas in 
which indigenous people live and this has the 
potential to provoke further antipathy and personal 
conflict. As noted previously, the region has a 
history of sporadic violence against Chinese 
migrants extending through centuries. (Walsh 2009: 
8) 
The Financial Times underlined the issue in a commentary on Laos’s accession to the 
WTO in 2012, indicating Laos’s discomfort about Chinese dominance: 
There is also a strong element of what some western 
diplomats call “Myanmar’s China syndrome”. While 
the west for decades ignored Laos as a backwater, 
Chinese business interests have rushed into projects 
ranging from natural resources to gambling … Just 
like Myanmar, Laos is signalling growing 
determination to break out – or at least move away 
from – the Chinese embrace and diversify sources of 
investment. To that end, the Communist 
government, while uneasy about western-style 
reform, is likely to implement further changes on the 
economic front, including plans to expand its stock 
market and streamline financial services. (Robinson 
and Watts 2012) 
As a matter of fact, the potential threat represented by China is well described by Tan 
(2015), who notes how “The growing link between Laos and China has alarmed many 
scholars and development workers, both Lao and foreign; some even speak of a Chinese 
‘shadow state’ threatening Lao sovereignty and territorial integrity” (Tan 2015). Such a 
fear might seem exaggerated, but one should consider it in perspective, taking into 
account Laos’s population relative to China’s. It is then easy to understand the potential 
impact for a country whose population is, as already highlighted as high as that of 
Kunming alone. The enormously superior economic and investment capacity of Chinese 
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entrepreneurs, who will follow the HSR investment and will provide goods to the 
thousands of Chinese workers during the railway construction, might arguably also pose 
risks to Laos’s economy, especially for small businesses. Besides problems related to 
scales, with its related threat perception, negative precedents must not be overlooked. In 
fact, the Chinese presence in Laos, especially in Northern Laos, which is 
underestimated by official sources (Fau et al. 2014), had already created tensions by 
creating unequal opportunities in favour of Chinese inhabitants rather than the local 
population (Malar 2014). Moreover, bad practices carried out by Chinese companies in 
Laos, related to the environment and the relationship with Lao communities and 
workers, complicated the situation, worsening the negativity in Lao society towards the 
potential imminent immigration of Chinese rail engineers and staff. In particular, in 
2015 Lao employees marched against a Chinese company that was accused of delaying 
payments and discriminating against Lao workers relative to Chinese ones (AsiaNews 
2015), while a well-known instance of Chinese bad practice in Laos is the case of 
investment in banana plantations, which after an economic boom were blamed by 
segments of the Laos’s population and authorities for severely damaging the 
environment using prohibited chemicals and not putting in place sufficient safety 
measures, and which ended up being banned (Parameswaran 2017). The tensions 
created by Chinese investment in the sector also led occasionally to violence and open 
threats by armed Chinese guards against Lao workers (Radio Free Asia 2016b). Such 
behaviours even increased the anti-Chinese sentiment among Lao people and 
presumably led to the series of armed attacks that broke out at the beginning of 2016, 
clearly targeting Chinese nationals (five were killed), which could have been fuelled by 
the fears associated with the railway’s need for a Chinese workforce (Oxford Analytica 
2016). To conclude, the relevance of the difficulties related to labour were confirmed by 
a key Lao negotiator at the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, who, while 
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“promising” that the GoL would try to assign as much work as possible to Lao 
companies, commented that the lack of skills within Lao society would force Lao 
workers to carry out the easiest tasks (Interview 41-2015). 
Having analysed the three fundamental issues emerging from the research that delayed 
to various extents the confirmation of the project, it is now necessary to evaluate how 
these obstacles were managed and how Laos coped with such issues and managed to 
resist China and obtain a better deal. 
6.4.4 Laos’s resistance against the Chinese giant 
The key object of this analysis is to understand how to interpret the development of the 
negotiations through all the delays and changes to provide the necessary material for the 
relational power analysis. Was the delay mainly caused by the economic-technical 
complexity of the project, or was Laos able to stop the railway project and resist China, 
given the incomplete alignment of interests and the associated risks and concerns for 
Laos analysed above? Combining on the one hand China’s strong interest in the project 
and its formidable economic and technical capacity in the HSR field with, on the other 
hand, Laos’s dilemma and serious concerns, it can be argued that the second is the 
correct answer, as acknowledged over the years of the negotiations by a plurality of 
authoritative primary and secondary sources. 
Taillard (2014) clearly notes that the failure of the first agreement was due to Laos’s 
refusal of Chinese conditions that were perceived as “unequal” and “hegemonic” since 
they implied Laos was involved only as a co-financer and did not give Laos any 
opportunity to increase its technical capabilities in the sector, nor to develop its 
industry. The Reuters analysis reported above, stressing how Southeast Asian 
neighbours posed a challenge to China’s ambitions, quoted Peter Cai, a researcher at the 
Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney, as suggesting that China believed its 
southern periphery was “going to be the first significant hurdle as they implement One 
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Belt, One Road” (Goh and Webb 2016). The analysis also pointed out Beijing’s 
frustration in the face of the continuous problems and delays and stated that while in 
2013 “all signs pointed to fast completion” and “construction on the line's terminus in 
Kunming began” in November 2013, when the article was published in June 2016 only 
a few months remained before the opening of the high-speed train station in Kunming, 
which cost 325 million dollars, and “yet, there [was] no action in Vientiane” (Goh and 
Webb 2016). In 2014, Forbes also highlighted Laos’s reluctance, in spite of its policy 
proclamations, by commenting on the available options to link Bangkok and Kunming 
via HSR as follows: “Various routes from China have been pitched over the years, with 
the main options via reticent Laos or the more difficult terrain of Myanmar, which has a 
keener government”, implying that the GoL at that time was not yet convinced 
(Gluckman 2014, emphasis added). Then, in 2015, another newspaper article explicitly 
highlighted how painful Laos’s slow response was for China: 
China’s appetite for infrastructure deals in Asia was 
affirmed this October when the country edged out 
Japan to secure rights to build Indonesia’s first high-
speed rail from Jakarta to Bandung. But the painfully 
slow progress in Laos suggests Beijing’s “railway 
diplomacy” doesn’t always deliver. (Mairs 2015, 
emphasis added) 
This interpretation was confirmed when triangulated with primary data, most 
importantly by a diplomat at the Chinese embassy in Laos, who admitted that the main 
reason for the delay had to do with Laos’s difficulties and concerns, especially 
regarding financing the project (Interview 47-2015). The Chinese diplomat also 
estimated that despite general agreement and support in Laos towards the project, it 
would have been much better to finalise the deal before the Party Congress in 2016 to 
avoid adverse impacts or changes. He concluded, nonetheless, by acknowledging Laos’s 
agency, saying “it would be better to start before the Congress, but it will be quite 
difficult. It can be started in two to three years because a lot of efforts have already been 
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made to prepare, but it will depend on the attitude of the Lao side” (Interview 47-2015). 
This seems to be confirmed by an interview with a Western consultant who had just 
returned from a business trip to China and who commented that “In China no one seems 
to know anything. I have recently talked with people at the EXIM Bank and other 
institutions and they say they are only waiting for Lao approval” (Interview 31-2015). 
An interview with a Lao senior official in the MPWT went very much along the same 
lines; the official evocatively said “What I know for certain is that China cannot connect 
to Thailand by flying over Laos. That’s the only truth” (Interview 41-2015). The Lao 
official also focused on funding as the key obstacle, especially with respect to hidden 
costs such as unexploded ordnance (UXO) removal and land acquisition, and the 
economic and social costs of the resettlement process, which were difficult elements 
that would have to be dealt with by the GoL and had yet to be negotiated with China, 
together with the interest rate. The fact that Laos managed to stop China was then 
confirmed by three other diplomats in Vientiane: an ASEAN ambassador was 
convinced that Laos was holding firm and asking China to bear the costs, because it was 
afraid of paying more than the country could afford (Interview 27-2015); a Thai 
diplomat thought that Laos was unsure of China’s intentions and was using systematic 
delays as a tactic to buy time (Interview 37-2015); and, finally, an American diplomat 
said that Laos was resisting China’s pressure to start the HSR project because it was 
worried about Chinese workers, among other factors, even if it was impossible to 
forecast how long it could maintain such resistance (Interview 26-2015). A general 
agreement that the delay was provoked mainly by Laos also emerged from the 
interviews with Lao informants, whose argument usually sounded something like “the 
delay was due more to Laos since China always wanted to start as soon as possible: they 
have everything – money, companies, technologies, skilled workers, materials – so they 
were just waiting for permission from Laos”. 
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To summarise, it is clear that the right interpretation of what happened from 2010 until 
late 2016 is that Laos showed its capacity for resilience and not only challenged China’s 
objectives but also succeeded in obtaining better conditions. Next, the role played by the 
broader geopolitical context will be assessed. 
6.5 The role of the geopolitical context 
While in the reconstruction and analysis of the Xayaburi dam negotiations it was clear 
that the geopolitical context played an important role, the same is not true for the 
Boten–Vientiane MTI. In this regard, the principal difference with the Xayaburi case is 
easy to appreciate, since here the investor and the neighbour whose border will be 
crossed by the MTI coincide, while in the Xayaburi case they were different states. 
However, before discussing the findings, the next section will clarify if (and how) the 
broader geopolitical context interacted with the China–Laos negotiations over the 
Boten–Vientiane railway. 
It cannot be overlooked that the MTI project would be inconceivable without taking 
Thailand into account, since it would not make much sense to link China with Vientiane 
without the opportunity to keep travelling on a high-speed route down to Bangkok. One 
could therefore argue that the HSR in Laos was delayed in order to wait for Thailand’s 
domestic crisis to be over and see how the political situation would develop (Tan 2015). 
However, after the Thai military government that came into power after a coup in May 
2014 approved a 24-billion-dollar scheme to build two HSR lines to connect Thailand to 
China via Laos at the end of 2014 (Niyomyat and Lefevre 2014), a year passed before 
an agreement was reached between China and the GoL and it was another year before 
the groundbreaking ceremony was held on 25th December 2016. Even more importantly, 
the argument might be turned around, since the opposite reasoning is also valid, i.e. that 
without the agreement with Laos, the plan to build the HSR in Thailand would have 
been nonsensical. In fact, only four days after China had signed the MoU with Laos on 
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13th November 2015, the Thai cabinet approved the scheme for its own HSR link from 
the Lao border to Bangkok (Railway Gazette 2015), reflecting the fact that Laos was 
essential to the overall project. It is therefore certain that China held two separate 
bilateral negotiations with Laos and Thailand and the project could begin only when 
Beijing had agreed on all details with both countries, since the project would have been 
meaningless if it had not included at least these three countries, running from Kunming 
to the Bangkok hub before reaching Singapore. There is also no doubt that once China 
and Thailand reached an agreement the pressure increased on Laos, which found itself 
between the two neighbours, and main trading partners and investors, as if in a 
“sandwich” (Interview 17-2015). However, it has been seen that, despite the 
agreements, a high degree of uncertainty regarding the actual sealing of the deal 
remained until the summer of 2016, demonstrating that despite the agreements signed 
and the combined pressure from China and Thailand, Laos continued to exercise strong 
leverage because of its central geographic position. 
In addition, according to some experts, Vietnam might have played a role in causing 
Laos to delay the negotiations. Yun Sun, senior associate at the Stimson Centre, told the 
Straits Times in 2016 that “it took 10 years of negotiations to seal the deal with Laos – 
partly because its neighbour Vietnam, whose relationship with China is rocky, was wary 
of security implications” (Ghosh 2016, emphasis added). Seemingly, Ian Baird, 
associate professor of Geography at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, asserted in 
an interview with The Diplomat that the HSR project allegedly provoked tensions 
between Hanoi and Vientiane (Potkin 2016), implying that the former might have 
exercised pressure on the latter to delay, halt or compromise the project. When 
questioned on this point, a Vietnamese diplomat in Laos replied that “from a neutral 
perspective this project could provide mutual benefits to Laos and China and also to 
Vietnam, but the Government of Vietnam is nonetheless worried” (Interview 43-2015). 
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However, there is no evidence of whether Vietnam concretely acted to get the GoL to 
stop the project, and therefore its role remains vague. While the hypothesis that Hanoi 
was worried and advised Vientiane to be careful is plausible, there is no evidential basis 
for the argument that Laos delayed the negotiations because of Vietnam, and it is also 
likely that without much of a direct stake in the project Hanoi did not push too much in 
this sense. 
To conclude, on balance it appears that the geopolitical context did not have much 
impact on the outcome of the negotiations between Laos and China and did not play a 
decisive role in supporting Laos to delay the process, nor in pushing it to speed up the 
negotiations. 
6.6 Discussion of the findings 
6.6.1 The MTIs–relational power analytical framework applied to the Boten–
Vientiane high-speed railway project 
As in chapter 5, the discussion of the findings will start with the application of the 
MTIs–relational power analytical framework to the findings on the MTI analysed in this 
chapter, while the theoretical implications of those findings will be addressed in the 
second part of the discussion. The relational power analysis below aims to evaluate the 
impact of the Boten–Vientiane HSR MTI project (the independent variable) on the 
relational power of Laos (the dependent variable) with respect to China (the domain) 
and within the scope of transport connectivity in the region, for which the Boten–
Vientiane HSR will be a crucial artery. 
6.6.1.1 Assessment of preferences 
The Boten–Vientiane HSR MTI negotiations between China and Laos indicate that 
Laos and China shared an overall interest in the construction of the high-speed railway. 
In fact, Laos was interested in grabbing the chance to make China construct the HSR in 
the Lao territory instead of letting the Chinese do so through neighbouring Vietnam or 
232 
Myanmar, and in this way to address its infrastructure deficit and push its LLLL policy 
and economic development. This was clearly seen in Laos’s Eighth Five-year National 
Socio-Economic Development Plan, in which the Boten–Vientiane project was ranked 
second among priority infrastructures. China, on the other hand, displayed an even 
greater interest since this particular MTI was a key step towards the promotion and 
implementation of two of its major national initiatives: OBOR and HSRD. With regard 
to the latter, in particular, this infrastructure would be the first high-speed railway 
linking the Chinese domestic network with a foreign country (and, through it, with the 
three other countries that the line would reach: Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore). 
However, the findings demonstrate that despite this convergence of interests at a general 
level, the two states did not agree on the details, and this caused six years of uncertainty 
and delays. After analysing the negotiations from 2009 to 2016, it can be concluded that 
the Boten–Vientiane MTI allowed Laos (A) to get China (B) to do something (wait 
several years and accept Laos’s requests) that it would not (in an ideal scenario, i.e. 
following its own preferences and schedule) otherwise do. In Dahl’s terms, therefore, 
the analysed MTI had a positive impact on Laos’s relational power in its bilateral 
relationship with China, since in the Boten–Vientiane HSR case Laos had the power to 
resist China despite the high asymmetry of absolute power that shapes their bilateral 
relationship. The findings show that there is a broad evidence base proving that, thanks 
to the leverage deriving from a combination of factors – Laos’s location, the very strong 
Chinese interest in proceeding with the infrastructure and China’s lack of alternatives – 
the small state was able to minimise negative potential effects and resist China’s 
political and economic pressure for years. In fact, the findings clearly show that a final 
agreement and the commencement of the construction were possible only after China 
gave up on two requirements that were key concerns for Laos: land concession and the 
financing conditions (in terms of both the total amount invested by Laos and the interest 
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rate). As for the labour issue, as the problem was structural, given Laos’s lack of skilled 
labour to build the HSR, it was impossible to avoid an influx of Chinese workers. The 
divergences observable in Laos’s and China’s positions on some of the Boten–Vientiane 
MTI’s key issues therefore indicate that Laos prevailed over China to the extent that it 
coerced China into adapting to its requests in order to go ahead with the construction. 
Having concluded, based on the assessment of preferences, that the outcome of the 
negotiations was in favour of Laos, it is now necessary, according to the analytical 
framework, to verify the presence of conditions and forms of power, as well as whether 
Laos’s balance between absolute gains and costs ended up being positive. 
6.6.1.2 Conditions of power 
Verifying the presence of a causal relationship between Laos’s actions with regard to 
the Boten–Vientiane HSR and outcomes in terms of relational power with regard to 
China is the first step in assessing whether the alleged causal effect is consistent. In this 
regard, as Goh (2016) underlined, a context shaped by opposing preferences increases 
the likelihood of a causal relation. Indeed, the analysis of the negotiations clearly 
demonstrates that the decisions (or non-decisions) autonomously taken by Laos had a 
decisive impact on the timing and outcome of the negotiations. In this respect, it is 
sufficient to recall the declaration of deputy prime minister of Laos Somsavat 
Lengsavad, who told Nikkei Asian Review that Laos hoped to find a solution by June 
2015 but that the negotiations could fail if China refused to comply with Laos’s request 
concerning the financial terms. Therefore, the GoL’s proactive response to China’s 
plans and demands in relation to the HSR MTI confirms the causality between the MTI 
and the impact on relational power. The fact that Laos refused to comply with China’s 
demands clearly indicates that in not doing something the small state was in fact 
capable of exercising a power of inertia, i.e. the power to resist. In so doing, Laos also 
demonstrated goal attainment, consistently pursuing its agenda on the HSR issue, which 
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was composed of two substantial objectives: building the Boten–Vientiane railway and 
obtaining acceptable conditions, especially regarding financing and land concession. 
6.6.1.3 Forms of power 
Despite the overall convergence of interests in building the Boten–Vientiane railway, 
Goh’s (2016) assumption that in the presence of opposing interests hard power and 
coercion are the most important assets for the prevailing actor is confirmed, given the 
divergence of interests on important issues in the project. This is confirmed by looking 
at the reconstruction of the negotiations provided in this chapter: a) the failure of the 
first MoU signed in 2010 was in fact due to Laos’s opposition to China’s “tough 
conditions”; b) then the GoL avoided funding the project by itself, which would have 
required borrowing the necessary money from China and taking on an unsustainable 
debt; and c) finally, after a long stalemate, Laos managed to fulfil its requirements for 
the interest rate and land concession. As has been pointed out in the analysis, several 
interviewees (Interview 31-2015; Interview 41-2015; Interview 26-2015; Interview 27-
2015; Interview 37-2015; Interview 47-2015) and observers (e.g. Taillard 2014; Peter 
Cai, cited in Goh and Webb 2016; Forbes 2014 and Mairs 2015) noted that China was 
frustrated by Laos’s reluctance to begin construction. Therefore, Laos undoubtedly 
managed to coerce China into postponing the project and to comply with its requests, 
leveraging, as noted above, its geographic position, China’s lack of alternatives and 
Beijing’s great interest in (and political-economic commitment to) the broader 
Kunming–Bangkok–Singapore project. Laos could coerce China into a certain course of 
action and achieve a power of inertia thanks to the time discrepancy created by the 
combination of China’s urgency (driven by the commitments it had already undertaken, 
as the development of the Mohan area demonstrates) and Vientiane’s preference for 
buying time and delaying the railway, not only to minimise the risks and obtain better 
conditions but also because Laos would have preferred to build the railway in the 
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medium-long term rather than in the short term, as pointed out by a number of 
interviewees (Interview 1-2015; Interview 2-2015; Interview 3-2015; Interview 19-
2015; Interview 16-2015; Interview 27-2015; and Interview 45-2015). 
6.6.1.4 Outcome 
Having established that Laos prevailed in the negotiations, this research now goes on to 
check whether, overall, the gains derived from negotiating the Boten–Vientiane MTI 
with China have been lower or higher than the costs. Starting with the gains: Laos 
obtained a multibillion-dollar investment to construct an MTI deemed important to the 
country’s development, securing, at the same time, fair financial and collateral (e.g. the 
land concession) conditions and leaving most of the financial burden on China’s 
shoulders. Regarding the costs, the findings show that, thanks to the absence of 
conflicting interests, despite the length and slowness of the negotiation process there 
was no evidence of direct confrontation or open conflict. Therefore, Laos could avoid 
the risk of damaging its relationship with such an essential political and economic 
partner as China, which would have been costly. The only cost Laos could not avoid 
was the inflow of thousands of Chinese workers, but, as already stressed, in this respect 
the country did not have any alternatives. Therefore, it can be seen that for Laos the 
balance of gains and costs associated with the Boten–Vientiane high-speed railway 
project is undoubtedly positive. 
In conclusion, the relational power analysis carried out in this section shows that the 
Boten–Vientiane HSR MTI is a variable that has permitted Laos to increase its 
relational power over China and obtain its goals in spite of divergences with the latter 
over the details of the deal. This conclusion has been corroborated by the presence of 
the conditions and forms of a power relation and by controlling that the final outcome 
was in favour of the “prevailing” state even in terms of the absolute costs–gains 
balance. The next section will discuss the implications of these findings in theoretical 
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terms with regard to small states studies, underlining the implications of this research’s 
findings. 
6.6.2 Theoretical discussion of the findings 
The findings of the Boten–Vientiane high-speed railway case study combine to confirm 
the salience of the role of geography that emerges as the key and most interesting 
explanatory factor. The MTI analysed here produces the same conclusion as the 
Xayaburi dam in relation to the effect for a small state of being centrally located, in 
opposition to Handel’s (1990) hypothesis, since the key factor that Laos was able to 
leverage during the negotiations was its geographic position between China and those 
Southeast Asian countries (and markets) with which Beijing aimed to connect through 
this MTI. The findings of this research point to the need to take geography – and 
geographies – into consideration to a far greater extent, given that small neighbours like 
Laos can be a hurdle for the transcontinental connectivity plans, such as OBOR, of 
more powerful states. The lack of alternative territories through which China could 
connect its landmass to Southeast Asia via a modern high-speed railway was 
determined by geopolitical constraints: the central route through Laos was the only 
option for Beijing, since the Vietnamese and Burmese corridors were not politically 
viable. 
The difference between the Boten–Vientiane railway and the Xayaburi dam MTI leads 
also to an appreciation that, while there is a rich literature on hydropolitics within IR, 
the same is not valid for transport connectivity. Even though connectivity has now 
become a key term for policymakers at the national, regional and global levels, having 
been clearly identified as a priority by regional organisations such as the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), IR scholars have so far paid little attention to the 
role of physical cross-border and foreign-funded infrastructure transport MTI projects, 
which are a fundamental element – and driver – of connectivity. In this framework, 
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China represents an exception since its recent infrastructure initiatives have prompted 
scholars to focus on them. China thus offers a unique opportunity to observe the relation 
between MTIs and power within asymmetric bilateral relationships, because its 
relationships with neighbouring countries are undoubtedly shaped by a clear asymmetry 
of capabilities in most cases, and because cross-border infrastructure development is at 
the core of its OBOR and HSRD initiatives. The existing scholarship, however, has so 
far neglected small states and has viewed China’s efforts to link itself with neighbouring 
countries through infrastructures as a tool for exercising power and expanding China’s 
sphere of influence (see, for instance, Fallon 2015; Fasslabend 2015; Moritz 2016). In 
Connectography, Khanna, with specific regard to infrastructures, emphasises China’s 
goal of binding “countries to it through infrastructural tethers” (Khanna 2016: 203), 
while Arase stresses that China, like the United States, makes of infrastructures a tool 
for power projection, pursuing “a core-to-periphery structure of connectivity” (Arase 
2015b: 2). With particular regard to railway connectivity, China’s HSRD has often been 
depicted as a strategy for deploying financial and technological means in order to gain 
strategic international advantages (Chan 2016; Kratz and Pavlicevic 2016). Zhang 
Yiwu, a professor at Peking University, lauded the Chinese railway sector, saying that 
“high-speed trains mark China's rising power and influence globally” (Xinhua 2015). 
However, Agatha Kratz, co-author of China’s High-Speed Rail Diplomacy: Riding a 
Gravy Train? (Kratz and Pavlicevic 2016), in a personal conversation with the author, 
described a much more complex scenario: 
Many interviews with Chinese and foreign 
specialists of China’s HSR have shown quite a 
different picture. It seems that since the “success” 
narrative deployed regarding HSR a couple of years 
ago, a more cautious approach to these projects is 
now mainstream. All of my interviews so far have 
shown a more nuanced picture where many of 
China’s high-speed rail projects abroad are now 
either considered failures or at least seen as 
encountering strong difficulties in their negotiation 
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or completion. (personal communication with 
Agatha Kratz, October 2016) 
The findings on the Boten–Vientiane project do indeed tend in this direction, 
demonstrating the need for further research and the potential role of small states in 
China’s major infrastructure initiatives, and showing that big national and transnational 
connectivity endeavours cannot overlook either smaller states or the local dimensions of 
the spaces to be crossed by the infrastructures, as demonstrated by the labour issue in 
Laos, which was driven by animosity towards the Chinese. As underlined by a study on 
the Lao–Thai bridge within the Asian Highway project, it is necessary “to listen to local 
perceptions at the Thai–Lao border as they signal potential ill-feelings that could 
jeopardize future cross-border geopolitical ties and trade” (Lin and Grundy-Warr 2012: 
1). By focusing concurrently on small states, asymmetric relations and connectivity 
infrastructures (MTIs), IR scholars can therefore explain a great deal about these 
projects. In this context, the Boten–Vientiane railway is embedded in broader regional 
and national policies, from those implemented by China – the Policy of Good 
Neighbourliness, the Yunnan as a Bridgehead strategy, the One Belt, One Road 
initiative and high-speed railway diplomacy – to those developed in Vientiane, such as 
the “from landlocked to land-linked” policy, and, further, to the ASEAN connectivity 
programmes. Therefore, the case study of this specific infrastructure project represents a 
focal point in wider trajectories shaped by the drivers of integration and connectivity 
between China, the Mekong Region and the whole of Southeast Asia, which tells us 
how complex and unpredictable the actual power relations in this geopolitical spectrum 
can be. 
6.7 Conclusion 
To summarise, the findings on the negotiations of the Boten–Vientiane HSR MTI 
between China and Laos demonstrate how in this case, the transboundary dimension – 
geography – played a primary role in enabling Laos to prevail. The impact of the 
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multinational nature of the infrastructure, on the other hand, appears to be important but 
less clear-cut. 
The transboundary characteristic of the railway is clearly the fundamental factor, thanks 
to which Laos was able to increase its relational power, since passing through Laos was 
China’s only available option for realising its dream of a railway connecting the Middle 
Kingdom to the prosperous Southeast Asian region and so implementing the first 
concrete item of its ambitious high-speed railway diplomacy, as well as the One Belt, 
One Road strategy. Laos’s most important leverage, therefore, originates from its 
geographic position. Moreover, not only did Laos achieve a positive negotiation 
outcome in this transboundary context, despite the colossal imbalance of material power 
with China, but it also benefited from the MTI itself. In fact, had it been placed in a 
non-central and less strategic position, it would have been impossible for it to attract 
such advantageous foreign funding simply for its own infrastructural development. 
Therefore, the transboundary dimension of the MTI provided Laos with the opportunity 
to negatively resist and positively attract China at the same time. 
The multinational dimension, by contrast, emerged as being less determinant in terms of 
relational power. The reason for this outcome is that in the case of this specific MTI 
there is a complete overlap between the “affected” country and the investing country, a 
combination that made it impossible for Laos to exploit external interests and stakes. 
However, the multinational element did matter since China’s great financial 
commitment (to the MTI itself, as well as to the associated connectivity plans) appeared 
to be an important driver in causing Beijing to accept Vientiane’s requests. At the same 
time, although China was the sole potential investor for the North–South high-speed 
line in Laos until construction began, it could potentially have been challenged by other 
HSR competitors such as the Japanese. This points to the fact that the multinational 
dimension, despite not being crucial, had a latent effect, since, starting from the 
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assumption that Laos alone could not afford the MTI, Vientiane might always have 
attempted to attract other investors by offering better conditions. 
In conclusion, the Boten–Vientiane MTI case demonstrates how a small country 
holding a central geographic position, which creates the potential to attract MTIs, can 
mobilise non-national capital and obtain negotiation outcomes far above what its 
capabilities would have suggested. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS  
Like a wedge at the summit of an arch, Laos 
occupies a key position on the map of 
Indochina. From Burma and Thailand on 
the west to Vietnam on the east, with its 
foundations in the Malay peninsula and the 
Indonesian archipelago, the arch supports 
the weight of China and the mass of Central 
Asia.... But like the keystone of an arch, 
Laos has the dual function of holding apart 
the other, larger stones so they do not 
tumble and fall and of tying all together so 
the structure thus created is solid - Dommen 
198592  
 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis has provided a systematic and theoretically informed analysis of the impact 
of two selected multinational transboundary infrastructures (MTIs) on the relational 
power of Laos with respect to Vietnam and China. It posed the following overarching 
research question: what is the impact of multinational transboundary infrastructures 
(MTIs) on Laos’s relational power? And the following subquestions: a) what is the 
impact of the Xayaburi dam MTI on Laos’s relational power with respect to Vietnam 
(the domain) and within the scope of the management of the Mekong River?; b) what is 
the impact of the Boten-Vientiane high-speed railway MTI on Laos’s relational power 
with respect to China (the domain) and within the scope of transport connectivity in the 
broader China–Southeast Asia context?; c) does a central geographic position increase 
or reduce the asymmetry of a relationship? 
The result of the analysis seems to prove that former United States president Barack 
Obama was right when he stated that even a superpower could not afford to ignore Laos 
in an interconnected world. If it was true for the remote United States, it has proven to 
                                                          
92 Dommen (1985: 1) cited in Kittikhoun (2008: 39).  
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be even more so for Laos’s neighbours, against whom the small Laos has prevailed in 
the negotiations on the two MTIs observed in this research. Nonetheless, one of 
Obama’s fellow Americans had suggested, nearly five decades before Obama’s trip to 
Vientiane, that “If Lilliputians can tie up Gulliver … they must be studied as carefully 
as the giant” (Keohane 1969: 310). To this end, instead of taking as a starting point 
power intended as capabilities, this thesis looked at the effect on actual power of two 
complex infrastructure projects. The high-speed railway that is being built to connect 
Kunming in China to Bangkok and then Singapore through Laos, one of the MTIs 
selected, is in fact widely mentioned but often in the framework of China’s effort to 
exercise influence through infrastructure investment within the One Belt, One Road 
initiative. Yet the analysis has shown how in that case Gulliver was to some extent 
indeed tied up by a Lilliputian. 
This chapter aims to present the key findings of the research at both the empirical and 
the theoretical levels. The chapter is divided into five sections: the first will review the 
previous chapters, summarising the key elements; the second will present the key 
empirical findings through a combined discussion of the outcomes of the two case 
studies; the third section addresses the theoretical implications of the findings to clarify 
the wider meaning of what emerged from the MTIs–relational power analysis; the 
fourth section will then point out the contributions to knowledge of this thesis for the 
International Relations literature; and, finally, the fifth section will outline potential 
lines of further research. 
7.2 Review of chapters 
This thesis is composed of seven chapters. Chapter 1 introduced the thesis and outlined 
the research background, approach and structure. Chapter 2 reviewed the International 
Relations literature on small states and underlined how this body of literature had 
almost completely overlooked geography. Chapter 3 built on the geographic gap 
243 
highlighted in chapter 2 to develop a definition of multinational transboundary 
infrastructures (MTIs) and develop an analytical framework to observe the impact of 
MTIs on relational power. Chapter 4 described the methodology of the research and was 
followed by two findings chapters (5 and 6) that included two case studies through 
which it is possible to observe the impact of MTIs on the relational power of Laos with 
regard to Vietnam and China: the Xayaburi dam and the Boten–Vientiane high-speed 
railway. 
Chapter 1 began by explaining the background, rationale and goals of conducting PhD 
research on Laos despite its allegedly limited relevance in the international system. 
Given that the main reason for the overlooking of the country in the IR literature can be 
traced to the broader neglect of small states, examining Laos’s actual power has 
important theoretical implications. The chapter then provided a summary of Laos’s 
contemporary diplomatic and economic relations, stressing the asymmetries in terms of 
capabilities with China and Vietnam and explaining why the transboundary and 
multinational dimensions are crucial for its foreign policy. After clarifying that the two 
MTIs used as case studies were selected because they are the two most internationally 
relevant MTI projects in the country, the chapter concluded by making explicit the 
overall methodological and analytical approach. In this way, it was clarified from the 
start that the unit of analysis is the state, taken as unitary and rational, and that the 
research is situated at the inter-state level. 
Chapter 2 carried out a review of the body of knowledge included within the broader 
International Relations (IR) discipline, underlining how the overlooking of small states 
has much to do with the basis of the discipline and with the fact that one of the most 
important guiding criteria in IR is power. Through the analysis of how power has been 
conceived and studied in IR, the chapter pointed to several difficulties in pinpointing an 
overall definition and measure of power, which consequently makes ranking states by 
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their level of power very problematic. In particular, the difference between power-as-
capabilities and relational power is highlighted. In this context, the analysis of IR 
studies that focus on small states revealed that, in addition to the absence of a shared 
definition of the constitutive elements of small states, very limited and unsystematic 
attention is paid to the role of geographic factors, leading to what the author defined as a 
“paradoxical geographic gap” in the literature, since less powerful polities relying 
heavily on their neighbourhoods are intuitively much exposed to different geographic 
positions, contexts and features. 
Chapter 3 built on the geographic gap identified in chapter 2 and interrogated how 
geography and power can be linked and analysed together. Moving on from these 
theoretical premises, as well as from the empirical necessities of the case study of Laos, 
the chapter developed an original analytical framework in which MTIs were used as the 
independent variable and relational power as the dependent one. The first section of the 
chapter therefore provided a definition of MTIs and stressed how the variable might be 
relevant for small states thanks to the combined impact of three concurrent phenomena: 
the rise of sovereign states; the rise of interdependence; and the rise of investment in 
infrastructure. The second section focused on the dependent variable and developed an 
operational analytical framework, combining Dahl’s (1957) relational power approach 
with Hagström’s (2005) inputs on how to conduct a relational power analysis using 
process tracing and Goh’s (2016) framework of influence. The framework achieved 
through this combination made it possible to observe whether or not MTIs led Laos (A) 
to prevail over two more powerful states (B). 
Chapter 4 defined the methodology of the research, adapting the tools of process tracing 
and qualitative elite interviews to the analytical needs of the two MTI case studies. 
Given the limited data available, especially with regard to the Boten–Vientiane high-
speed railway, before analysing the events it was necessary to carry out a 
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comprehensive reconstruction of the two complex negotiations. To this end, process 
tracing sits well with the analytical framework and the overall approach of the research, 
since it enabled the researcher to examine the causal mechanisms of complex decision-
making. The chapter provided a reflexive account of how the data were collected and 
then analysed. The data collection took place through a period of fieldwork during 
which the author carried out 48 qualitative semi-structured elite interviews with a 
diverse sample of stakeholders (diplomats, policymakers, officers of international 
organisations, academics, analysts), mostly at senior levels and with varied national 
backgrounds; significantly, 50% were Lao and 50% non-Lao. The chapter concluded by 
underling the strengths and challenges of the methodological approach in the context of 
Laos. The main strength of the methodological strategy followed consists in the choice 
to conduct fieldwork in Laos while affiliated to a local institution, and to carry out face-
to-face interviews. Secondary strengths are represented by two facts: a) despite the 
different level of seniority the members of the elite interviewed had a similar 
background to that of the researcher, which for instance made the use of an interpreter 
unnecessary in most cases; b) the issues under examination were not considered too 
sensitive. The main challenge, on the other hand, was that access to valuable informants 
was hindered by bureaucratic procedures. Moreover, cultural and power divides, as well 
as the not-always-cooperative attitude shown by more junior interviewee, constituted 
additional challenges. 
Chapter 5 then applied the analytical and methodological strategies to the first of the 
two MTI case studies: the Xayaburi dam. The aim of the chapter was therefore to 
understand the impact of the Xayaburi dam MTI on the relational power of Laos with 
respect to Vietnam (the domain) and within the scope of the management of the 
Mekong River. With this aim in mind, first the respective preferences of Hanoi and 
Vientiane in relation to the MTI were presented, displaying a context of clearly 
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divergent interests of the two states. On one hand, in fact, Laos sees hydropower 
facilities as a key tool in developing its economy and becoming the battery of Southeast 
Asia, while, on the other hand, Vietnam faces the threat of environmental damage 
downstream in the Delta region, which could lead to food and human insecurity, as 
underlined by Vietnam’s official statements and documents, as well by Vietnamese 
leaders, including the then president, Truong Tan Sang. After assessing the respective 
preferences, the chapter reconstructed the negotiations around the Xayaburi dam, 
observing how such divergent interests were reflected during the five years of 
negotiations, and explored how Laos could proceed with its plan and prevail over 
Vietnam, pointing out the crucial role played by the broader geopolitical context. The 
chapter concluded by discussing the findings through the application of the MTIs–
relational power analytical framework and from a theoretical perspective. 
Chapter 6 followed the same structure as chapter 5 to analyse the impact of the other 
selected MTI – the Boten–Vientiane high-speed railway – on Laos’s relational power 
with respect to China (the domain) and within the scope of regional connectivity. By 
assessing the respective interests in the scope of the MTI, the analysis highlighted the 
overall convergence towards building a high-speed railway to link the two countries. 
The infrastructure is a core component of China’s high-speed railway diplomacy and of 
the broader One Belt, One Road initiative, while at the same time being compatible with 
Laos’s “from landlocked to land-linked” policy, aimed at turning Laos from an isolated 
country into a connected one. However, the reconstruction and analysis of the 
negotiations between the two countries that began in 2009 and ended in 2016 showed 
that, despite the overall convergence of preferences, significant misalignments relating 
to the conditions for investment posed a significant challenge to identifying a smooth 
and quick solution to the negotiations. The discussion of these findings stressed how, 
despite the sharp power asymmetry, Laos leveraged its geographic position and China’s 
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higher level of interest in and commitment to this MTI, with it being the first cross-
border HSR linking the Chinese network with a foreign country and so a key test case 
for China’s HSRD. 
7.3 Core empirical findings 
The first core empirical finding emerging from the analysis of the two observed MTIs is 
that they both had a positive impact on the relational power of Laos with regard to 
Vietnam and China. It has in fact been seen that “the Xayaburi dam MTI enabled Laos 
(A) to get Vietnam (B) to do something (accept the construction of the dam) that it 
would not (in an ideal scenario, i.e. following its own preferences informed by national 
interests) otherwise do” and that “the Boten–Vientiane MTI allowed Laos (A) to get 
China (B) to do something (wait several years and accept Laos’s requests) that it would 
not (in an ideal scenario, i.e. following its own preferences and schedule) otherwise do”. 
Therefore, in both cases the two MTIs had a positive impact in Dahl’s relational power 
terms on the smaller state within an asymmetric relation, and this conclusion was 
verified and strengthened by the application of the analytical framework that allowed 
the presence of a causal relationship, goal attainment and forms of power to be tested. In 
the two MTI cases, Laos exercised hard power, coercing Vietnam and China to comply: 
in the first case, forcing Vietnam to accept the infrastructure, and in the case of China 
forcing it to delay the project and eventually accept Laos’s most important demands in 
order to get the green light from Vientiane. 
The second core empirical finding consists in the fact that in both cases the combination 
of multinational and transboundary factors that characterises the two infrastructures 
was the key driver that led Laos to prevail over Vietnam and China. As far as the 
transboundary dimension is concerned, it has been seen how in the Xayaburi MTI case 
it was Laos’s upstream geographic position that resulted in the possibility of producing 
transboundary effects through the dam that were contrary to Vietnam’s preferences, and 
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how in the Boten–Vientiane HSR MTI, Laos, which formed an obligatory gateway for 
China’s connectivity plans, abstracted from its location a key source of leverage. The 
multinational dimension was, however, also necessary for the positive impact on 
relational power of both MTIs. In the Xayaburi case it provided a fundamental 
opportunity to mobilise external diplomatic and financial resources from Thailand in 
support of Laos’s goal. In the railway case the multinational dimension was less crucial 
because the source of the investment overlapped with the country with whom the border 
was crossed, and the relational power effect observed. Nonetheless, even in the railway 
case the fact that multinational financing was necessary (and thus an MTI was in place) 
played an important role in providing Laos with leverage and the chance to prevail 
because it reflected the investor’s (China’s) political and also its financial commitment. 
The third empirical finding is that of the differing levels of relative importance of the 
transboundary and multinational factors in the two case studies. In fact, the findings on 
the two negotiations indicate how the transboundary dimension – geography – held an 
even more primary role in enabling Laos to prevail in the Boten–Vientiane railway case 
than it did in the Xayaburi dam MTI, since it was the most important card in the hands 
of Lao negotiators, as noted by a Lao official, who said, emblematically, that the only 
certainty was that China could not connect its territory to Thailand via a high-speed 
train flying over Laos. The multinational dimension, by contrast, emerged as being less 
determinant for the Boten–Vientiane project than for the Xayaburi dam in terms of 
relational power because, as underlined above, there was no investing country other 
than the A–B pair whose interests and stakes could be mobilised as there was in the 
Xayaburi case. 
The fourth empirical finding is the differing weight and relevance of the broader 
geopolitical context for the two MTIs. It was crucial in the Xayaburi dam case, while 
only latent in the Boten–Vientiane railway case. This difference was certainly a result of 
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the different investment configurations, but it was also linked to the different 
compositions of preferences in the two cases. In the Xayaburi case, the interests of 
Hanoi and Vientiane clearly diverged since Vietnam faced severe threats. By contrast, 
in the Boten–Vientiane railway case both countries shared an interest in building the 
MTI, despite disagreeing on secondary issues. In other words, it has been seen that in 
the Xayaburi case there was opposition about the what involved (building the dam or 
not), whereas in the railway case the what (building the railway) was a mutual interest, 
but how, who and when were the objects of the negotiations. That said, given that in the 
Xayaburi case Laos exploited more significantly by far the drivers coming from the 
geopolitical context, the findings indicate that the higher the discrepancy between A’s 
and B’s preferences, the higher the importance of actors outside the pair and therefore, 
likely, of the multinational dimension. Furthermore, the impact of the geopolitical 
context appeared to some extent intensified by the weaknesses of the governance 
structures;  the weaknesses of the MRC appeared in all their severity in the Xayaburi 
case, while in the Boten-Vientiane railway case it has been seen how China firmly 
refused to turn the discussion into multilateral, preferring to keep talking only with 
Vientiane on a bilateral basis. This helped making the inter-state interactions, and the 
geopolitical context in which such interactions take place, an important factor in 
influencing the outcomes.  
To summarise, this thesis shows four core empirical findings: 
1. the two MTIs had a positive impact on the relational power of the weaker state 
in an asymmetric relationship; 
2. in the two case studies, the combined multinational and transboundary effects 
had a determinant role in shaping the negotiation outcomes; but: 
3. the multinational and transboundary factors had different relevance in the two 
cases; 
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4. the broader geopolitical context had different impacts in the two cases. 
7.4 Theoretical findings 
The first and most important theoretical finding relates to the role of geography, since it 
has been noted how it was determinant, physically providing a transboundary context in 
which MTIs could be developed and enabling the state less powerful by capabilities, 
Laos, to prevail over two countries such as China and Vietnam, with much greater 
resources. Therefore, the findings of this thesis represent a critique of the general 
overlooking of geography in IR (as underlined by, among others, Calder (2012)) and 
more specifically in studies of small states and asymmetric relations, where geography 
is almost completely ignored, which suggests that geographic factors deserve more 
attention. 
The second theoretical finding challenges the hypothesis of Handel (1990), the only 
International Relations scholar who has offered a specific proposition on the role of 
geographic positions for less powerful states. While Handel concluded that being at the 
periphery of their systems was more advantageous for small states than being centrally 
located, the findings emerging from the case studies of this thesis highlight how Laos, 
by contrast, could increase its relational power thanks mainly to its central geographic 
position. 
The third theoretical finding is also intimately linked to the conceptualisation of 
geography. Observing the Xayaburi dam through the “geographic lens of analysis” 
pointed to the consistency of the case study’s empirical findings with the literature on 
hydrohegemony, of which geography and power are the constitutive elements. The 
relevance of an upstream geographic position as a coercive resource capable of 
influencing the balance of forces and providing a weaker state with a tool for forcing a 
more powerful one to face a fait accompli (which it is often too costly to change) is 
contained in the article by Zeitoun and Warner (2006) that first developed the 
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hydrohegemony framework, and is consistent with the findings of the Xayaburi MTI 
case. The same body of literature, moreover, also highlights how small states might 
mobilise political and financial resources to augment their power (Kehl 2011). Since a 
significant body of literature on transboundary water interactions provides insights into 
how location influences power (e.g. Lowi 1993; Daoudy 2009; Dinar 2009; Tir and 
Ackerman 2009; Cascão and Zeitoun 2010; Zawahri and Mitchell 2011; Warner and 
Zawahri 2012; Kuenzer et al. 2012; Hensengerth 2015; Menga 2016), this thesis has 
shed new light on the potential relevance of this literature for the subfield of small states 
and asymmetries of power in the wider IR discipline. 
The fourth theoretical finding coincides with the theoretical significance of a geographic 
variable such as MTIs for studying power and asymmetric relations. In fact, 
technological advancement, as stressed by Calder (2012), has caused geography to be 
overlooked in IR by reducing the importance of time and space. Nonetheless, geography 
could be brought back to the centre of the debate by MTIs, a consequence of that very 
development. The highlighted concurrent trends of an increase in the number of 
sovereign states (leading to international fragmentation and more kilometres of borders 
between states) and the expectation that billions of dollars will be invested in 
infrastructures around the globe in the next decade will dramatically raise the incidence 
of MTIs, and so the significance of geography, for those small states geographically 
susceptible to such trends. It can be argued that, as in the case of Laos, most small states 
also have small economies and so are likely to need a large proportion of those billions 
of dollars destined for investment in development and connectivity. The findings of this 
research show how MTIs make proximity determinant in relation to small states, 
reducing the relative importance of material capabilities for centrally located states such 
as Laos. Despite their relatively low level of power-as-capabilities, attracting wider 
interest in investing in MTIs located in their territory small states can exploit the need 
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for their “mise en valeur” (which, from an outside perspective, could be regional, trans-
regional or global), generating far-reaching power consequences. As a matter of fact, it 
is clear that the more centrally located a small state is, the more likely it is that an MTI 
will cross its territory and that of a neighbouring country. The Xayaburi dam and the 
Boten–Vientiane railway MTIs reveal how Laos managed to use to its advantage the 
external (multinational) interest in development of MTIs by Thailand and China within 
its territory. To conclude this consideration of the relevance of this theoretical finding, it 
must be underlined that one of the main reasons for the overlooking of small states in IR 
rests on the assumption that while studies on great powers are considered of great 
importance because of the relevance of the subject, analyses of small states are 
presumed to have much less importance in terms of outcomes (Neumann and Gstöhl 
2004). However, since for their economic size and geographic scale MTIs are 
undoubtedly significant, shaping the geography, politics and economics of countries and 
regions, and since they are likely to be built in small states, the latter should be 
considered in much greater depth by IR. Since the four theoretical findings listed above 
all relate to geography here a clarification is necessary. In fact, as already noted, 
geography can go beyond a landlocked central position or an upstream position within a 
river basin, including a much wider range of features (e.g. environmental and energy 
attributes or natural resources) that combined together might constitute a fertile soil for 
MTIs. The fifth finding in theoretical terms is that in both the case studies in this thesis, 
relational power showed a greater explanatory capacity respect to power-as-capabilities. 
The two negotiations clearly confirmed the correctness of the arguments of scholars 
such as Dahl (1957) and Baldwin (2013), demonstrating how, despite their high 
superiority in terms of aggregate power, neither China nor Vietnam was able to spend 
such power “as if it were money”, and thus their overall national power turned out to be 
non-fungible and irrelevant for the two specific scopes in which the relational power 
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was observed. Therefore, the findings also confirm the appropriateness of using Goh’s 
(2016) approach to develop the analytical framework in chapter 3 since they 
demonstrate the importance of actual power (i.e., in Goh’s terms, influence) in relation 
to static measures of it. This finding challenges the value of theoretical exercises such as 
ranking states by their capabilities or defining states by their level of absolute power. 
Instead, it seems that in-depth multidimensional studies of power asymmetries might 
provide much more fruitful results. If we consider Laos’s capabilities, conceptualising 
the country as an isolated entity, we can hardly understand how it prevailed in the two 
negotiations, and we might also be led to think that it actually did not prevail at all 
simply because it is not possible and realistic to believe that Laos could coerce a 
superpower such as China, the second-largest economy in the world. Nonetheless, the 
analysis of the Boten–Vientiane HSR MTI shows how the opposite is possible – and did 
indeed happen – and so how a small state can have a high level of relational power. 
To conclude the theoretical discussion of the findings: it emerges that besides the four 
core empirical findings this thesis also contains five main theoretical results: 
1. geography matters and IR should pay much more attention to it; 
2. in the case of Laos, its central geographic position allowed it to reduce 
asymmetries of power in contradiction of Handel’s (1990) hypothesis; 
3. the literature on hydrohegemony can be extremely useful for the subfield of 
small states and asymmetries of power in the wider IR discipline; 
4. the relevance of the geographic variable of MTIs for small states makes the 
latter extremely relevant for IR analyses; 
5. relational power manifests a greater explanatory capacity than power-as-
capabilities. 
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7.5 Contributions to knowledge 
Having assessed what the core findings of this thesis are, this research will now stress 
what the contributions are to knowledge in the discipline of IR, in both empirical and 
theoretical/analytical/methodological terms. 
From an empirical point of view, the thesis offers four original additions to previous 
knowledge, consisting in the original analyses of the two selected infrastructures, the 
Xayaburi dam and the Boten–Vientiane high-speed railway; a consequent original study 
of Laos’s international relations; and a first attempt to investigate China’s high-speed 
railway diplomacy (HSRD). 
Beginning with the Xayaburi case: this research does not represent the first piece of 
academic research on the dam to which several scholars, have devoted their attention 
(including, but not limited to, Baran et al. 2011; Cronin and Hamlin 2012; 
Thabchumpon and Middleton 2012; Le 2013; Jakkrit 2015; Geheb et al. 2015; Rieu-
Clarke 2015; King 2015; Hensengerth 2015; Mirumachi 2015; and Suhardiman et al. 
2015). However, this thesis does provide the first attempt to systematically analyse the 
diplomatic dimension of the infrastructure, looking at the negotiations between Laos 
and Vietnam. As a consequence of its original focus, the case study of the Xayaburi 
dam presented in chapter 5 provides abundant new data on the negotiation process, 
including the first interview on the subject with a Vietnamese diplomat which was 
important to illuminate the behind the scene of the negotiation Vietnam’s need to 
safeguard the special relationship with Laos. Finally, in the reconstruction of the events, 
light has been shed on the previously completely overlooked role played by the United 
States in the issue, through the analysis of three diplomatic cables from the US embassy 
in Vientiane, released by WikiLeaks, whose content had never previously been reported 
or analysed. 
The second MTI case study, that of the Boten–Vientiane HSR, in contrast to the 
Xayaburi dam case study, represents the first comprehensive and updated account 
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focused on the infrastructure, not only within IR but in general. In the context of the 
previous lack of knowledge, and the scarcity of the data available (especially in 
English), which has at times also led to incorrect conclusions (see, for instance, the map 
published in Fau et al. (2014) that showed the railway as under construction when Laos 
and China had still to finalise an agreement), this thesis has contributed to the 
knowledge available, both by providing a systematic reconstruction of the events – i.e. 
outlining the raw material – and analysing the complex negotiations on the 
infrastructures. In addition, it includes an analysis of an original policy document issued 
by the Propaganda Committee for the Lao–China Railway in August 2016 and provides 
a translation from Lao of China’s and Lao’s key policies related to the railway. 
The original contribution on Laos’s international relations derives from the two 
infrastructure case studies. In fact, even though this thesis does not focus on the broader 
bilateral relationships with Vietnam and China, nor on Laos’s foreign policy, it provides 
important insights into Laos’s contemporary diplomatic context via the analysis of two 
important multi-billion-dollar negotiations that involved all three of its most important 
partners: Vietnam, China and Thailand. Therefore, despite a narrower focus on two very 
specific negotiations, the case study of Laos, a country not often on the IR radar, made 
it possible to shed new light on the country’s international relations at large. 
The fourth and last empirical contribution to knowledge is made by the analysis of 
China’s high-speed railway diplomacy. As underlined in chapter 6, apart from two 
papers published in 2016 (Chan 2016; Kratz and Pavlicevic 2016), the policy had 
remained an overlooked aspect of the widely studied One Belt, One Road initiative. In 
this context, through the Laos case study, this thesis illuminates how HSRD works in 
practice, since the Boten–Vientiane network is the first link between China’s domestic 
HSR system and a foreign country. And indeed, looking at how things worked out on 
the ground – in practice – it has been possible to observe that, contrary to the common 
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wisdom that China’s influence is mounting through infrastructure investment (Fallon 
2015; Fasslabend 2015; Arase 2015; Moritz 2016; Khanna 2016), in Laos this alleged 
Chinese hegemony met with reality since, as Mairs (2015) put it, “the painfully slow 
progress in Laos suggests Beijing’s ‘railway diplomacy’ doesn’t always deliver”. Much 
more research on other HSRD-related cases will be necessary, but the lesson that can be 
drawn from the Boten–Vientiane MTI case is the need for a critical perspective and a 
deeper analysis. 
Besides these four empirical contributions, this thesis also offers one theoretical, two 
analytical and one methodological contribution to knowledge. From a theoretical point 
of view, the literature review of small states presented in chapter 2 underlined the 
geographic gap of this literature, thus contributing the identification of a theoretical 
weakness within IR. The first analytical contribution builds on reflection on the 
implications of this geographic gap and consists of the development of an original 
definition of MTIs, as a powerful tool for observing power relations as it emerged from 
the two MTI cases included in this research. The second analytical contribution is 
represented by the development of the MTIs–relational power analytical framework 
that, despite building on the recent framework of influence proposed by Goh (2016), on 
previous work by Hagström (2005) and on Baldwin’s (2013) suggestion to look at 
power as a dependent rather than independent variable, presents a completely original 
system of observing power relations, with MTIs as the independent variable. Moreover, 
not only has the analytical framework been conceptualised, but also, through its 
application to two case studies, proof has been obtained that it can work and can be 
applied to different asymmetric relations. Finally, the methodological contribution 
pertains to the strategies applied to carry out the research and described in chapter 4: 
here, the section on how to gain access to members of the elite in Laos constitutes an 
original contribution to knowledge that might be useful for researchers approaching 
257 
fieldwork in Laos for the first time, either in IR or in other disciplines. In sum, this 
thesis adds the following eight original contributions to knowledge: 
1. an analysis of the negotiations between Vietnam and Laos on the Xayaburi dam 
issue; 
2. the first account of the Boten–Vientiane high-speed railway project; 
3. an original perspective on Laos’s international relations, illuminated by two 
specific negotiations with its closest partners, Vietnam and China; 
4. a first case study of China’s High-Speed Railway Diplomacy; 
5. the recognition that the IR literature on small states is affected by a geographic 
gap; 
6. the development of the concept of MTIs; 
7. an original analytical framework for observing the impact of MTIs on relational 
power; 
8. fresh methodological and practical insights into how to gain access to members 
of the elite in Laos. 
7.6 Further research 
However, the findings of this thesis must be understood against the backdrop of its 
scope. Being a within-case study, it provides new insights and hypotheses, but, as 
pointed out in chapter 4, further research is needed to verify the consistency of the 
findings in different geopolitical contexts and under different political and economic 
conditions. Nevertheless, even if this research did not aim to build new theories, the 
findings presented here may constitute the basis for further research, which could use 
them in a deductive way to produce generalisable results. The aim of this thesis must 
therefore be seen as generating fresh hypotheses to stimulate the theoretical IR debate 
on power, asymmetry, connectivity and infrastructures beyond the particular context of 
Laos. Then, to test the findings that emerged from this research, a comparative study 
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might be carried out to observe whether the relation between MTIs and relational power 
that emerged in the case of Laos is confirmed in different contexts. To this end, in the 
following a non-exhaustive list is provided of potential ways of and criteria for setting 
up a comparative study in which the MTIs–relational power analytical framework might 
be applied, and the findings of this thesis further tested. A preliminary step could 
consist in further developing the reconceptualisation of the definition of small states 
since in chapter 2 it has been seen how serious and problematic the lack of scholarly 
consensus in this respect is. This thesis shows that a relational definition can be 
successfully applied to concrete cases pinpointing to the opportunity to further 
deepening the analysis of the concept within the subfield of small states studies. 
Moreover, carrying out further research in a comparative way would also provide a 
unique opportunity to refine the concept of MTIs itself, since a plurality of examples 
will be enormously important to enrich and better develop the category. Stress has 
already been placed on the potentially fruitful cross-fertilisation between small states 
studies and the literature on transboundary water interaction; besides such a cross-
fertilisation providing important insights for small states scholars, the two literatures 
might be combined in a more structured manner in order to observe the impact of 
transboundary MTI dams on the relational power of small states with regard to more 
powerful actors. In this respect, it has already been noted how both subfields offer a 
wide number of case studies that could be drawn on to provide comparisons. In 
addition, a further initial step could be broadening the geographic scope, keeping China 
at the centre of the topic and exploring a set of MTIs between China and its smaller 
neighbours. This could be a feasible path since the relations between China and almost 
all its neighbours are clearly asymmetric and since, as stressed by Khanna (2016), 
China’s neighbourhood represents ground zero for Beijing’s grand initiatives such as 
OBOR and HSRD. Moreover, considering that the findings of the Boten–Vientiane MTI 
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might be tested through analyses of other MTIs promoted by the same actor within the 
same logic and framework, the insights from Laos’s case might inform such 
comparative research, not only by replicating the MTI concept and the analytical 
framework, but also because it would be possible to find out similarities (or differences) 
across contexts, such as that of the so-called China syndrome. A second way to 
conceive a comparative study could consist in selecting a sample of landlocked small 
states in different continents and regional contexts. A third option might be looking at 
asymmetric relations shaped by a wider range of types of relationships. In the two case 
studies in this thesis, it has been seen how Laos has a good bilateral diplomatic 
relationship with both Hanoi and Beijing. Taking stock of this, it could be interesting to 
look at the impact of MTIs on tenser (or unfriendly) diplomatic relations. By extension, 
a fourth selection criterion could be using asymmetric relations embedded in different 
regional contexts. Firstly, regions can be shaped by different degrees of stability; it has 
been noted in the case of both MTIs analysed in this thesis how the peace dividends 
underlined by Bakker (1999) were crucial in making planning and agreements on the 
two international infrastructures possible. Secondly, two or more countries could be 
selected in regions characterised by different structures of power: for instance, one 
asymmetric relationship in Europe, where no state is predominant (by capabilities), and 
one in Central America, where the United States is without doubt the most powerful 
actor by capabilities. Thirdly, regions differ also by their degree of integration, a factor 
that might significantly alter the impact of MTIs on small states. In fact, it has been seen 
how relevant the processes of economic integration and liberalisation have been in both 
the two case studies of this thesis. Future research could therefore, on one hand, 
applying the analytical framework to other bilateral relations in regions characterised by 
different integration levels, and on the other hand, even going beyond bilateral 
relationships to observe MTIs within regional integration processes and the space for 
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small states within this dynamic. All these ideas must certainly be refined in a much 
more sophisticated way, but it seems useful to sketch them here to give the reader an 
impression of what lines of research might be undertaken in future. Beside comparative 
further research, the two MTI case studies analysed in this thesis could be expanded by 
looking, on one hand, at the negotiation on the mainstream dams in Laos that followed 
the Xayaburi project, and, on the other hand, at the development of the railway project 
both in Laos and in the other countries between Laos and Singapore. 
7.7 Conclusion 
To conclude, it must be underlined again that geography matters, since it sets the 
context in which MTIs may or may not become feasible and assume a role of their own, 
becoming independent variables able to influence power relations among states. With 
regard to the case study of Laos, without geographic sensibility there was a risk of 
classifying it as an insignificant pawn in China’s strategy, not worth the effort of 
making it the subject of PhD research. In this respect, Abuza’s (2003) work Laos: 
Maintaining Power in a Highly Charged Region, a piece of literature rare in that it is 
framed in a small states perspective and within the wider discipline of IR, is exemplary. 
It starts with a description of the country from an economic and diplomatic angle, 
underlining the main features of its geopolitics, i.e. the traditional special relationship 
with Hanoi, the characteristics of the so-called “Thai threat” and the greater importance 
gained by China after the end of the Cold War thanks to its provided economic 
assistance (Abuza 2003: 161) – key elements also addressed by Ciorciari (2010) and 
Pholsena and Banomyong (2006). Having adopted the conceptual model based on the 
three levels proposed by Hey (2003) as a guiding structure for the whole volume (the 
systemic, domestic and individual levels), Abuza concludes by suggesting that 
as Laos becomes more integrated in the region, 
system-level analysis will become a more interesting 
model. Laos is currently in the midst of a massive 
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road-building and infrastructure program that is part 
of the development of a regional transportation 
network. (Abuza 2003: 182) 
For the purposes of this research, it is of great relevance that Abuza stresses more than 
once the relevance of transboundary infrastructures for Laos’s foreign relationships. 
Implicitly, then, the whole chapter refers extensively to geographic variables. Regarding 
the evolution of the ties between Vientiane and Beijing in the early 1990s, for instance, 
he writes that “China saw Laos as the gateway to Thailand, with which China was 
rapidly expanding economic relations in the 1990s. To that end, China financed the 
construction of a major highway through Laos to the Thai border” (Abuza 2003: 163). 
In the same section, explaining Vietnam’s reaction to the Chinese moves the author 
underlines the effort of “actively constructing roads to link Lao cities with Vietnamese 
ports to serve as the export center for Lao raw materials” (Abuza 2003: 164). And 
again, addressing the Laos–Thailand relationship, hydropower projects are mentioned as 
a means of economic integration due to Laos’s production potential and the chance to 
acquire revenue by exporting huge quantities of electricity to the energy-hungry 
Thailand. The issue of dam building is also raised with regard to the relation with 
China, since “Vientiane is already angry at China’s massive dam-building campaign in 
its portion of the river” (ibid.). Here, Abuza provides an interesting quote – with regard 
to smallness and the perception of it – from Milton Osborne, who in his book about the 
Mekong River stresses that “China is perceived as an impossibly large presence whose 
power is such that to question its actions and motives is to risk unquantifiable damage” 
(Osborne 2000: 228). 
It is certainly the case that Abuza (2003) implicitly pays great attention to infrastructure 
and networks, even at the very conclusion of his work, where he writes 
As the region becomes more interdependent, and the 
Lao communications and transportation networks 
become more central, foreign interest will remain 
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strong. Likewise, as Laos remains resource-rich but 
sparsely populated, we should expect the great 
powers that surround it, China, Vietnam, and 
Thailand, to continue to compete for influence over 
the “land of 10,000 elephants”. (Abuza 2003: 183) 
However, he fails to explicitly individuate the powerful explanatory factors in Laos’s 
case of geography and infrastructures. The analysis of Abuza’s chapter on Laos is 
emblematic and sits well in the concluding lines of this thesis, since it anticipated as far 
back as 2003 the key factors that would shape Laos’s international relations. In chapter 
1, it was seen how contemporary Laos is abandoning its traditional role of being a 
buffer zone and an in-between land – particularly acute at the time of the Cold War and 
the Indochina War – and is turning itself into a land-linked country that can function as 
a regional crossroads (Jerndal and Rigg 1999; Evans 2002; Pholsena and Banomyong 
2006). As Sayakane Sisouvong, ambassador of Laos to the United Kingdom, Ireland 
and Iceland, clearly and ambitiously put it in 2016, Lao leaders “have a long-term 
vision of Laos becoming the Switzerland of this part of the world” (Foreign Affairs 
2016). It has been pointed out, in this regard, that MTIs are considered by Lao leaders to 
be the only way out of their country’s landlocked status. This research highlighted how 
Laos’s central geographic position at the core of mainland Southeast Asia, together with 
the presence of the giant Mekong River, which, thanks to a beneficial morphology, can 
be turned into a source of electricity, has enabled Laos to reach its goals despite its 
limited aggregate power. It has been seen how small states, and Laos among them, have 
often been ignored, being of greater interest as battlegrounds for great powers than on 
their own merits. However, since it has been discovered how MTIs have provided Laos 
with a source of leverage and an equilibrising factor in its international asymmetric 
relationships, it emerges that IR scholars, as well as observers of world affairs more 
broadly, can no longer afford to overlook Laos (and its peers). As Khanna put it, 
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“GEOGRAPHY IS DESTINY,” one of the most 
famous adages about the world, is becoming 
obsolete. Centuries-old arguments about how 
climate and culture condemn some societies to fail, 
or how small countries are forever trapped and 
subject to the whims of larger ones, are being 
overturned. Thanks to global transportation, 
communications, and energy infrastructures – 
highways, railways, airports, pipelines, electricity 
grids, Internet cables, and more – the future has a 
new maxim: “Connectivity is destiny”. (Khanna 
2016: 5) 
This thesis demonstrates that in the connectivity era, a small country like Laos, no 
matter how small and powerless, can achieve unexpected outcomes and become 
extremely relevant for its neighbours, its region and the world. 
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